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Abstract
A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm
performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across
firms, even within the same industry. This research assumes that the same compensation
model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory variables, and coefficients on those
variables) can be applied to all CEOs. If you will, extant research assumes a one-sizefits-all CEO compensation model approach to empirical analysis. Furthermore, much of
this research also examines firm performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all
firm performance model. I develop a proxy for CEO managerial power that I use to rank
and classify CEOs into two groups: Elite CEOs (above a cut-off by the ranking) and NonElite CEOs (the remaining CEOs). As a note, I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by
my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply ranking the CEOs by their
total direct compensation. My empirical results show that a one-size-fits-all model can
be rejected. That is, the estimated coefficients in compensation models and firm
performance models are different for Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs. Also,
firms with Elite CEOs do not have higher performance. This suggests that Elite CEOs
extract excessive compensation due to undue influence over their respective boards rather
than to superior performance. These findings have both academic and corporate policy
implications.
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Overview
The tremendous increase in CEO total compensation and the increased use of and

payouts from stock options since the early 1990s has generated considerable debate and
concern in boardrooms, in the financial press, and among academics. The following
quote from the New York Times nicely portrays the prevailing sentiment regarding this
issue.

“Corporations have been wrestling for decades with ways to link pay to

performance, with little success. In the 1980’s, they tried tying cash bonuses to rising
sales or earnings, only to find that the payouts encouraged executives to make decisions
that yielded short-term results—and often longer-term disasters.

In the 1990’s,

companies tried stock options, figuring that they would be the best way to tie the
executives’ fortunes to those of shareholders. Instead, they prompted some managers to
time decisions to pump up the stock price just when the options vested. Bonuses and
options at Tyco and Enron, for example, did little to prevent widespread accounting
frauds at either company. The secret to linking pay to performance remains elusive.”
Deutsch (2005)
A particular body of research examines this issue of linking executive pay to firm
performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across
firms, even within the same industry. This research uses CEO characteristics, (such as
“superstar” or “celebrity” status, “reputation”, “skill”, “managerial power”, age, dual role
as CEO and Chairman of the Board, and percent of firm ownership by the CEO) and firm
characteristics (such as size, complexity, growth opportunities, and leverage) to explain
‘why’ CEO compensation varies widely in cross-section.

However, this research

assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory
1

variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs (this
assumption is implicit in the use of all CEO’s in the samples for which the models are
tested). If you will, extant research assumes a one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model
approach to empirical analysis. Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm
performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model.
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) shed a different light on this issue by suggesting
that only a few CEOs have sufficient managerial power or influence to extract excessive
compensation. These authors argue that “U.S. executive pay may not be quite the
runaway train that has been portrayed in the press.” However, I find no research that
thoroughly investigates the impact and distortions that a class of ‘only a few’ powerful
CEOs has on the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation and firm performance models. In
other words, does this class of powerful CEOs affect only the residual term in the models,
or does it also affect the estimated coefficients of the model? If so, including these CEOs
in a sample without making any special adjustments might lead to a spurious
interpretation of the resulting estimated model. In addition, the literature has not
examined whether the firms that are managed by such CEOs experience superior
performance. This void in the literature motivates my research.
To empirically test the Holmstrom and Kaplan hypothesis that only a few
powerful CEOs can extract excessive compensation, a proxy for CEO managerial power
is required. I develop two separate proxies for CEO managerial power that I use to rank
and classify the CEOs. 1 First, I use the ratio of CEO total direct compensation to the

1

I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply
ranking the CEOs by their total direct compensation.
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total direct compensation of the highest paid executive, other than the CEO, as a proxy
for CEO managerial power. This ratio has been used in previous literature for a slightly
different purpose, as I describe in Section 3. Second, for robustness and sensitivity tests I
develop a concentration measure of CEOs compensation, based on the top five
executive’s compensation at each firm, which is analogous to the concentration ratio used
to measure industry competitiveness (the Herfindahl Index).
I hypothesize that the most powerful (or “Elite”) class of CEOs, as defined by my
proxies, receives excessive compensation relative to the class of other (or “Non-Elite”)
CEOs. For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs receive higher and
different compensation, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs; and if
so, how are Elite CEOs compensated differently? Furthermore, I hypothesize that Elite
CEOs’ firms do not experience superior performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’
firms. For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs’ firms perform
differently, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; and if so,
how do Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently?
If Elite CEOs receive higher compensation but their firms do not provide superior
performance, then this suggests that Elite CEOs’ compensation is due to their influence
over their board rather than to their ability. Also, if the firms of Elite CEOs do not have
superior performance, then the inclusion of Elite CEOs in the samples of previous studies
of the links between firm performance and CEO compensation might have biased the
results. In other words, it is possible that the link between firm performance and CEO
compensation is much stronger for most CEOs than previously thought.

3

My empirical results show that one-size-fits-all models can be rejected. The
estimated coefficients in compensation models and firm performance models are different
for Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs. Also, firms with Elite CEOs do not
have higher performance. In fact, I find evidence suggesting that the presence of an Elite
CEO hurts firm performance and value. This suggests that Elite CEOs extract excessive
compensation due to influence over their respective boards rather than to superior
performance. These findings have two important implications. First, it is possible that
previous empirical research results and conclusions regarding the link between CEO
compensation and firm performance might be distorted because previous studies have
failed to explicitly address the impact caused by a small number of highly-paid influential
CEOs. Second, it is important for shareholders, boards, and policy makers to understand
the link (if one exists) between CEO managerial power and firm performance.
This dissertation has two distinct components. The first is a broad survey of the
literature addressing the structure of CEO compensation, the relationships between CEO
compensation and firm performance, and the relationship between corporate governance
and CEO compensation. The second component is an empirical test of several very
specific hypotheses related to CEO managerial power, compensation, and firm
performance. Note that the survey is intentionally broad so that it could be used as a
primer on CEO compensation and firm performance. As such, the survey does not
specifically inform this research. Instead, the specific literature review that motivates the
empirical research is provided in Section 3.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 is the broad
literature survey of previous research that investigates the structure of CEO
4

compensation, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, and
the relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation.
reviews the specific literature that motivates this research.

Section 3

Section 4 describes the

methodology for this research. Section 5 describes the data set used for this research.
Section 6 presents and reviews the results. Section 7 offers closing comments.

5

2

Literature Survey
The focus of this literature survey is on the body of previous research that

investigates the structure of CEO compensation, the relationship between CEO
compensation and firm performance, or the relationship between corporate governance
and CEO compensation. This survey is intentionally broad so that it could be used as a
primer on CEO compensation. As such, the survey does not specifically inform this
research. Instead, the specific literature review that motivates this research is provided in
Section 3.
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 provide a brief description of agency theory and corporate
governance, respectively, as a lead in to a more thorough discussion of internal
governance and external governance in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Sections 2.3
and 2.4 are laid out in a similar format as a review of corporate governance presented in
Gillan (2006).

2.1

Agency Theory
The separation of ownership (stockholders) and control (management) of the

modern corporation is the classic agency problem suggested by Berle and Means (1932)
and formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that gives rise to potential conflicts
between stockholders and management. In a large corporation, the ownership may be so
diffuse that the stockholders cannot even make known their objectives let alone control or
influence management. This creates a situation where management may act in its own
best interest rather than the interests of the stockholders. However, stockholders do
delegate decision-making and operational authority to management expecting that
6

management will act in the best interest of the stockholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
showed that stockholders could assure themselves that management will make optimal
decisions (1) only if management is monitored and (2) only if appropriate incentives are
given to management.

This issue of potential conflict between stockholders and

management gives rise to the topic and purpose of corporate governance.

2.2

Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is generally considered to be the set of complementary

mechanisms intended to align the actions and choices of managers with the interests of
stockholders.

Corporate governance entails the relationships among a firm’s

stockholders, board of directors, and executive management. These relationships provide
the framework within which objectives are set and performance is monitored. Corporate
governance is also the framework by which management is monitored by the board of
directors and incentives are set by the board of directors in an attempt to align
management with the objectives of the stockholders.

These last two functions of

corporate governance relate directly to the two points made by Jensen and Meckling
(1976) noted previously. Within the corporate governance literature there is research
related to both monitoring and incentives (executive compensation). The focus of this
paper is to extend the literature related to executive compensation, particularly the
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation.
There are several definitions of corporate governance found in the literature.
Zingales (1998a) views corporate governance systems as the complex set of constraints
that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm. Shleifer and
7

Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of financing
to corporations assure themselves of getting an acceptable return on their investment.
Gillan and Starks (1998) define corporate governance as the system of laws, rules, and
factors that control operations at a company. Regardless of the particular definition used,
researchers often view corporate governance mechanisms as falling into one of two
categories: those internal to the firm and those external to the firm.
literature on these two categories in turn.

I review the

While there is a tremendous volume of

literature available on corporate governance my focus is on the research that relates to
CEO compensation, executive compensation, or firm performance.

2.3

Internal Governance
This sub-section reviews the following elements of the corporate governance

system that are internal to the firm: board of directors, managerial incentives, capital
structure, bylaw and charter provisions, and managerial power.

2.3.1 Board of Directors
The board of directors (‘board’) has a fiduciary obligation to stockholders and the
responsibility to monitor the executives’ and firm’s performance, hire and fire the CEO,
set executive compensation, and provide strategic direction; obviously the board’s role in
corporate governance is important. Traditionally, research on corporate boards has
focused on links between board characteristics and CEO compensation, firm value and
performance, governance choices, and investment and financing decisions (including the
sale of the firm). Unfortunately, the impact of board structure on executive compensation
8

and firm performance is unclear given the mixed results of empirical research.
Furthermore, there is no clear evidence in the literature for the optimal board structure
(number of directors, number of outside versus inside directors, ownership, etc.) as it
relates to firm performance or executive compensation.
The literature examines corporate governance issues that limit the effectiveness of
the board of directors. Jensen (1993) argues that typical boards of directors often fail to
effectively monitor the firm’s management for several reasons: boards have a collegial
culture that does not encourage constructive criticism, boards are too large and
cumbersome, there is insufficient equity ownership represented on the board, and because
of the informational asymmetry that exists between management and the board. Crystal
(1991) argues that directors are ineffective at setting CEO compensation because outside
directors are hired and can be fired by the CEO (some describe this as managerial power
or cronyism). Goyal and Park (2002) find that CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm
performance when the CEO is also the chairman of the board suggesting that this duality
limits the board’s effectiveness.
Some argue that the board composition of outside directors (directors that are not
employees of the firm) and inside directors (employees of the firm) is an indication of the
board’s ability to act independently of the CEO.

The relationship between board

composition and executive compensation has been examined in many empirical papers.
Hallock (1997) finds CEO compensation is higher at firms with interlocked directors
(interlocked is defined as firm A’s chairman or CEO sits on the board of another firm
whose chairman or CEO sits on the board of firm A) which suggests mutual back
scratching or cronyism. Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) find CEOs receive higher
9

pay with a higher percent of board members appointed by CEO (mutual back scratching
or cronyism) and find a positive relation between CEO compensation and the percent of
outside directors.
However, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) do not find that CEO compensation is
related to the percent of outside directors. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that
a weak board composition, including interlocked, gray, and busy directors, is associated
with higher CEO compensation and lower firm performance. This research does not
explicitly identify the optimal board composition but it implies that board composition
does matter. The research implies, at least to me, that a higher percent of outside
directors is better provided that the outside directors are not hired by the CEO,
interlocked, gray, and too busy – which in practice is probably a pretty tall order.
The relationship between board composition and firm value and performance has
also been investigated and again the results are mixed. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find
a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of an additional outside director
suggesting the market perceives this action as an improvement to the firm’s governance.
However to the contrary, Yermack (1996) finds no association between percent of
outside directors and firm performance. Yermack (1996) finds that firm value and
performance is decreasing function of board size which implies having too many
directors can make the board ineffective but it does not speak to the optimal composition
of outside versus inside directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no meaningful
relation between various characteristics of board composition and firm performance.
Recent empirical work by Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) examines the
relationship between board characteristics (particularly director compensation) and CEO
10

compensation. The authors suggest that CEO and director compensation levels may be
related for one of several possible reasons. For instance, a negative relation between
CEO compensation and directors’ compensation could exist if directors’ increased effort
substitutes for a lack of CEO effort. Alternatively, a positive relationship between CEO
compensation and directors’ compensation could exist for two reasons: (1) if the firm is
large and complex, this affects the skill and effort required of both the CEO and the
directors or (2) a positive relation could reflect cronyism, where the CEO and the
directors put their joint interests ahead of the interests of the stockholders.
In order to distinguish between these alternative explanations, Brick, Palmon and
Wald (2006) model CEO and director compensation and find a significant positive
relation between excess CEO compensation and excess director compensation. The
authors regress the future firm performance on excess CEO compensation and excess
director compensation. If cronyism were the primary reason for the positive relationship
between excess CEO compensation and excess director compensation, they would expect
a negative relationship between future firm performance and excess CEO and director
compensations. This negative association between excess compensation and future firm
performance would reflect the suboptimal performance of a CEO and directors that put
self-interest ahead of stockholder interests.
In contrast, if firm risk and complexity were the primary reasons for a positive
relationship between excess CEO compensation and excess director compensation, they
would expect a weakly positive impact on firm performance. They find that the excess
compensations are associated with poor firm performance in the future (based on return
on assets) which they interpret as suggesting cronyism or mutual back-scratching. That
11

is, excess directors’ compensation compromises the directors’ independence and leads to
overpayment of CEOs and poor firm performance in the future.
The matter of contradictory results aside, I will follow the pattern of the recent
research and include a firm governance index in my models (this is discussed in more
detail in Section 4).

2.3.2

Managerial Incentives
Compensation policies, in particular the incentive component of compensation,

set by boards can play an important aspect of internal governance in addressing the
potential agency problems between stockholders and CEOs.

During the 1980s and

1990s, academics and practitioners alike argued in favor of equity-based compensation to
better align the interests of stockholders and CEOs. Jensen and Murphy (1990a) and
Yermack (1995) each provide empirical evidence that CEO compensation is not as
sensitive to stockholder returns as is, in their opinions, necessary to control for the
potential agency problems. The research paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990a) led to an
article by Jensen and Murphy (1990b) that was published in the Harvard Business
Review. These research papers and the article, coupled with the support of compensation
consultants, may have contributed to some degree at least to the increased use of equitybased compensation for executives throughout the 1990s.
The increased use of equity-based compensation is clearly evidenced by the
following information. Murphy (1999) presents equity-based compensation data, in 1996
constant dollars, for CEOs of S&P 500 firms for the period of 1970 to 1996. The equitybased compensation as a percent of total compensation increased from 0% (1970) to 5%
12

(1976) to 20% (1980) to 28% (1990) to 45% (1996). It is interesting and curious that
CEOs received very little of their total compensation in the form of equity-based
compensation prior to Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Research by Hall (2003) tells a
similar story as the author reports that, in 1984, less than one-half of the CEOs of
publicly traded U.S. corporations were granted stock or stock options in a given year and
equity-based compensation comprised less than 1% of total CEO pay for the median firm.
By 2001, equity-based compensation accounted for approximately two-thirds of total
CEO pay for the median firm.
Whether or not it is coincidental to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen and
Murphy (1990a), and Jensen and Murphy (1990b), it is clearly evident that the equitybased portion of CEO compensation has increased dramatically since the early 1970s.
Another possible explanation for the proliferation of stock option grants relates to the
technology boom of the 1990s. So-called "new economy" firms (high-tech and dot-com
firms) used large stock option grants in lieu of cash to recruit top managers from "old
economy” firms. Consequently, old economy firms were forced to use more stock option
based compensation in order to retain top management. During the boom, these stock
option grants for both the old and new economy firms were extremely valuable.
As stated by Murphy (2002) the compensation practices of new economy firms
had a strong influence on all other firms in the 1990s, as stock options became an
increasingly large component of compensation packages. Many agree that because of the
favorable accounting treatment, that stock option were not expensed in the year of grant,
the stock options seemed a cheap way of enhancing compensation and the competitive
recruitment pressures pushed the size of stock option grants. The influence of new
13

economy firms on executive compensation practices in the 1990s also fits the collapse of
the technology bubble (new economy firms) in 2000 leading to a subsequent decline in
executive compensation.

Jensen and Murphy (2004) report that the average

compensation of CEOs of the S&P 500 firms fell after the market crash in 2000 and by
2002, the percentage of stock-related compensation fell as well.
This growth in the use of stock options as a component of executive
compensation has become extremely controversial and openly debated. Proponents make
the argument that the use of stock options better aligns CEO’s wealth with stockholders’
wealth, which reduces the potential agency problems. Detractors make the following
counter arguments: (1) there is a disconnection between CEO compensation and firm
performance, (2) CEOs have no downside risk if the stock options expire out of the
money, (3) the open ended upside potential of the stock options (with no downside risk)
give the CEO incentive to take excess business risk and to fraudulently manipulate the
firm’s stock price. There has been much research on each of these counterarguments but
the following review focuses only on the landmark and recent research on the
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance.
Mehran (1995) finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between
CEOs’ equity-based compensation and firm performance (using both Tobin’s Q and
return on assets). Jensen and Murphy (1990a) find a statistically significant relationship
but weak economic relationship, in their opinion, between changes in stockholder wealth
and changes in CEO’s wealth. Hall and Liebman (1998) find a strong relationship
between percentage change in firm value and CEO compensation, particularly the equitybased compensation component. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that excess
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compensation has a negative relationship with subsequent firm operating performance
and stock returns.
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) find a positive relationship between CEO
compensation (both equity and non-equity based compensation) and lagged firm
performance (both return on assets and stockholder return). Brick, Palmon and Wald
(2006) find a negative relationship between subsequent year excess returns and both CEO
and director total compensation. A quote from Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) provides a
nice summary description of the results of the research on the relationship between firm
performance and CEO compensation, “There is presently no theoretical or empirical
consensus on how stock options and managerial equity ownership affect firm
performance.”
One of the issues with the aforementioned research is that the papers published
prior to 2000 had limitations in the data sets. Mehran (1995) performs cross-sectional
analysis of the relationship between executive compensation, ownership structure, and
firms’ performance based on the average of 1979 and 1980 data for 153 randomly
selected manufacturing firms.

Mehran (1995) had several interesting findings but

obviously we gain no insights on the temporal relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance.
The Jensen and Murphy (1990a) use several data sets of which one is based on all
2,213 CEOs listed in the Executive Compensation Surveys published in Forbes from
1974 to 1986. An obvious limitation to this data set is that the Forbes definition of total
compensation does not include any value for newly awarded stock options or the value
recognized from the exercise of stock options.
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While stock options were not as

commonplace then it was still a significant portion of the CEOs compensation. The
authors recognized this limitation of the data set and hand collected stock option
information on a sample of 73 manufacturing firms for the period 1969 to 1983. The
obvious trade off here is a more thorough measure of changes in CEO wealth but for
fewer firms.
The Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) data set was for 205 publicly traded
firms for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984.

The data was provided by a major

compensation consultant and was rich in the specifics of the executives’ compensation.
The authors actually cite three advantages to this data set: (1) the data set predates the
controversy over corporate governance and thus potentially provides more powerful tests
of the importance of corporate governance, (2) the availability of a long time series of
subsequent firm performance, and (3) the detail of the compensation components. This
would be a great data set if the compensation were extended for much longer than just
three years.
The Hall and Liebman (1998) data set contained executive compensation and firm
performance information on 478 firms for the period of 1980 through 1994. This is
another rich data set but even it has shortcomings as it overlays a particularly robust
period in the stock market. The ideal data set would cover about 50 years of history
comprising several bull and bear cycles in the stock market and provide extensive history
of executive compensation and firm performance prior to and throughout the period of
the abundant use of stock options. Unfortunately, that data set is unobtainable!
Mr. Biggs, former Chairman and CEO of TIAA-CREF, and Mr. Bogle, founder of
The Vanguard Group, are not academic researchers. However, both are well revered in
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the investment community and both have been very vocal with their opinions regarding
managerial incentives, particularly equity-based compensation. Biggs (2005) quotes a
report from The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise
that described the 1990s as a “perfect storm – a confluence of events in the compensation
area which created an environment ripe for abuse”. Biggs (2005) notes two important
elements of the report were the sometimes extraordinary payments made to leaders of
failing companies and the dramatic windfalls given to almost all executives during the
1990s. The following quote from Bogle (2005) summarizes his opinion regarding equitybased compensation, “It is said that stock option plans align the interests of managers
with the interests of the owners. Seldom has a more untoward lie been foisted on the
American public. Options do no such thing. They have a lottery-like benefit because
executives do not hold their stock. Academic studies have shown that as soon as their
options vest, executives exercise the options and proceed to sell the shares almost
immediately. Executives are not stockholders; they're gamblers in the stock market
lottery.”
2.3.2.1 Arm’s Length Contracting
Corporate governance theory states that boards set CEO compensation as guided
by stockholders interests and therefore operate at arm’s length from the CEOs whose
compensation they set. This notion that boards contract CEO compensation at arm’s
length is a fundamental premise in the corporate world and in most academic research. In
the corporate world, this premise serves as the basis for laws, public policy, and
justification of the boards’ compensation decision to stockholders, policymakers, and
courts. However, some researchers have considered the disconnection between CEO
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compensation and firm performance to be an arm’s length contracting (or ‘optimal
contracting’) problem. A review of this line of research follows but unfortunately the
findings are inconsistent.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found an inconsistent relationship between the
level of top managements’ and the boards’ percentage ownership of the firm with firm
performance (Tobin’s Q). This and any other research that does not find a consistent
positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance implies either
implicitly or maybe even explicitly that the process for contracting CEO compensation is
largely inefficient and therefore does not minimize agency costs. However, this point of
view that most boards are contracting CEO compensation inefficiently is difficult to
accept because the labor market, the stock market, and the market for control should
work to correct such inefficiencies. Others such as Fama (1980) argue the opposing point
of view that transactions costs in the aforementioned markets are so small that all agency
costs are eliminated.

However, this point of view overlooks the information and

contracting costs, and the frictions in the markets.
Later research by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Murphy (2002) develop
theories that incorporate the attractive features of these opposing views. They argue that
firms in general contract optimally, but that transaction costs prohibit continuous recontracting for the frequent changes in the relationship between the parties involved in
the contracts. Since contracting is not continuous, the terms of firms’ contracts gradually
deviate from the optimal arrangement. Contracting theory models such as from John and
John (1993) predict that in situations with an increase in the agency costs of equity and a
decrease in the agency costs of debt should lead to an increased use of stock option based
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compensation. This theory is supported by the research by Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006)
which provides evidence of an increase in the agency costs of equity and a decrease in the
agency costs of debt from the beginning to the end of the 1990s which in turn supports
the increased use of stock option based compensation throughout the 1990s.
A strain of research investigates the agency problems that could lead managers to
over-invest (empire-building to gain private benefits) or under-invest (shirking duties to
avoid personal costs) in projects. Certainly stockholders and boards want to eliminate or
at least minimize these agency problems, since both managers’ private benefits and
private costs can ultimately reduce firm value. An obvious method for addressing these
agency problems is through the optimal contracting of managements’ incentives. Some
research finds that managers are empire-builders to gain private benefits such as
additional compensation and more prestige. Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1993) argue that
managers invest in negative net present value projects because the managers derive
private benefits from controlling more assets. Along the same lines, Hennessy and Levy
(2003) find that managers continue to invest in projects even after investing in all
available positive net present value projects.
Other research finds that managers shirk duties associated with investing in
projects to avoid the incremental work associated with managing additional assets.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that when new laws are implemented that protect
a firm from the threat of takeover that both the destruction of old plants and the
construction of new plants falls. This suggest that managers under-invest to shirk the
incremental duties associated with tearing down old plans and building new plants.
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) use an optimal contracting model to show that the
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relationship between firm performance and managerial incentives, in isolation, is
insufficient to determine whether or not managers have private benefits associated with
empire-building.

This leads the authors to estimate the joint relationships between

incentives and firm performance and between incentives and investment. This approach
provides results showing that investment is increasing in incentives and that firm
performance is increasing in incentives. Taken together, these results are consistent with
managers having private costs of investment and that the agency problem of
underinvestment is mitigated through the use of optimal incentive contracts.
2.3.2.2 Tournament Theory
This paragraph on tournament theory paraphrases comments made in Gordon
(2005). The author notes that a body of labor research views CEO compensation as part
of the prize for winning a "tournament" against other managers and that the prize
includes rewards for the prior effort of all competing managers. These tournaments for
promotion occur in situations where it is difficult to accurately measure individual
performance among competitors for the promotion. Therefore, firms implicitly promise
to promote and reward the winner of the tournament. In keeping with this theory, the
competitors contribute a portion of their current implicit wage in order to have the
opportunity to compete in the tournament for a better position with greater compensation.
All of this suggests that the optimal CEO compensation package might very well consist
of rewards for not only current and future performance but also for the firm’s past
performance as part of the prize for winning the tournament.
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2.3.3

Capital Structure
The following reviews the literature on capital structure from two perspectives:

agency problems of debt and agency problems of equity.
2.3.3.1 Agency Problems of Debt
Theory suggests that increasing levels of debt can act as a self-enforcing
governance mechanism as increasing levels of debt forces managers to use discretionary
cash flow to satisfy interest and principle payments rather than on selfish pursuits such as
empire-building or perquisites. Research by Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen
(1993) confirms that debt mitigates the potential agency costs of free cash flow. Allen
and Gale (2000) make the counter-argument that most firms can easily meet interest and
principle payments and also note that firms often rely on internal financing.
Yermack (1995) and Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000) use the firm’s leverage
(debt to equity ratio) as a proxy for evaluating the agency problems of debt. Bryan, Nash
and Patel (2006) argue that proxies that pinpoint specific conflicts between stockholders
and bondholders should provide greater insights than the leverage variable. Therefore,
Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) develop separate proxies for three specific agency
problems of debt: underinvestment, asset substitution, and firm financial distress. I
discuss these three specific agency problems of debt in order.
2.3.3.1.1 Underinvestment
Myers (1977) identifies a potential underinvestment problem for highly leveraged
firms with relatively more growth opportunities. These highly leveraged firms will need
an equity infusion in order to have the capital to invest in the growth opportunities: while
an equity infusion is certainly acceptable to the bondholders it may not be attractive to
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the stockholders. If the stockholders decide against an equity infusion then the firm has
an underinvestment problem. However, Myers (1977) suggests that firms with relatively
more growth opportunities that use shorter term debt, which is lower risk to the
bondholders, should be able mitigate this underinvestment problem more effectively than
similar firms that use more long term debt, which has higher risk to the bondholders.
That is, firms with a lower risk capital structure should have better opportunities to raise
new capital.
Begley and Feltham (1999a) contend that while increasing levels of equity-based
compensation can better align stockholder and manager interests it can exacerbate the
underinvestment problem because management will become more protective of the
stockholders, including managements, capital.

This suggests that firms with relatively

more growth opportunities and that also use shorter term debt can use greater amounts of
equity-based compensation than similar firms with longer term debt. This is possible
since the firms with shorter term debt have less of an underinvestment problem from their
capital structure and can issue more equity-based compensation and still have less overall
of an underinvestment problem than similar firms with longer term debt.

This is

confirmed by Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) that find a statistically significant positive
relationship between their proxy for short term debt and the use of stock option based
compensation for the sub-sample period of 1992 to 1995. However, the coefficient is not
statistically significant for their full sample period of 1992 to 1999 or the sub-sample
period of 1996 to 1999.
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2.3.3.1.2 Asset Substitution
Asset substitution is when stockholders in a leveraged firm expropriate wealth
from bondholders by switching investments from safer to riskier projects. The theory is
that the riskier projects have more upside potential than the safer projects and the
shareholders stand to gain more from any realized upside potential than do the
bondholders. John and John (1993) contend that the issuance of convertible bonds
mitigates the asset substitution problem because it reduces the opportunity to transfer
wealth from the bondholders to the stockholders. The reason is because the convertible
bondholders have the option to become stockholders and participate in any increase in the
stock price. The asset substitution problem is potentially greater for firms with relatively
more growth opportunities because there are more opportunities for the stockholders to
expropriate wealth from the bondholders. Combining the two strains of logic suggests
that firms with relatively more growth opportunities can mitigate the agency costs of
asset substitution by using more convertible debt.
On another front, John and John (1993), Yermack (1995) and Begley and Feltham
(1999a) argue that asset substitution is increasingly more likely as management receives
increasing levels of equity-based compensation. Management has the inside information
on the risk level of the projects and can invest in the riskier projects to expropriate wealth
for themselves.

Incorporating this logic suggests that for firms with relatively more

growth opportunities, using relatively more convertible debt mitigates the asset
substitution problem and can therefore issue more equity-based compensation and still
have less overall of an asset substitution problem than similar firms with relatively less
convertible debt. The reason a firm wants to even issue the equity-based compensation at
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all is to; in theory at least, better align the stockholders and the managers’ interests, even
though as noted above increased levels of equity-based compensation can lead to an asset
substitution problem. Since convertible debt mitigates the asset substitution problem for
firms with relatively more growth opportunities, Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) expect and
find a statistically significant positive relationship between their convertible debt and
growth opportunity interaction term and the use of stock option based compensation for
the their full sample period of 1992 to 1999.
2.3.3.1.3 Financial Distress
Circumstances where it is uncertain that bondholders will receive contracted
payments from the firm lead to conflicts between bondholders and stockholders. Since
financial distress restricts a firm’s ability to make the contracted payments to the
bondholders infers that financial distress exacerbates the agency problems of debt.
Therefore, firms prone to financial distress should design CEO compensation such that
the CEO’s interests are aligned with the interests of the bondholders. That is, firms with
a greater propensity for financial distress should use more non-equity based
compensation and firms less prone to financial distress can use more equity-based
compensation. Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) measure the likelihood of financial distress
by calculating the Z-score for each firm; see Altman (1993) for an explanation of the Zscore. Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) find the expected negative relationship between the
likelihood of financial distress and the use of stock option based compensation for some
but not all of their cases.
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2.3.3.2 Agency Problems of Outside Equity
Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) develop separate proxies for five specific agency
problems of equity: namely, managerial shirking, monitoring issues associated with
growth options, monitoring issues associated with firm size, poor firm performance, and
excess free cash flow. I discuss these five specific agency problems of equity in order.
2.3.3.2.1 Managerial Shirking
The separation of ownership and control provides opportunities for CEOs to exert
less than maximum effort, which is known as shirking. An aspect of a CEO’s utility is
the exertion of effort and even if the CEO is a workaholic presumably less exertion is
better than more.

Contracting theory suggests that equity-based compensation may

mitigate agency problems of outside equity, including shirking, between CEOs and
stockholder wealth.
John and John (1993) note that the capital market (external governance) mitigates
the agency problems of outside equity by directly monitoring and disciplining managers
for expropriation of stockholder wealth. That is, management knows that if they are
subject to scrutiny by external monitors then they need to avoid the appearance of
shirking duties. Comment and Jarrell (1995) argue that a firm’s ratio of short term debt
(less than one year to maturity) to total debt is an indication of a firm’s reliance on
external capital markets and its frequency of accessing the capital market to refinance the
short term debt. The firms with higher ratios of short term debt to total debt should be
more frequently monitored in the external capital markets and therefore should have
lower agency problems of outside equity. Furthermore, a firm that is more frequently
monitored by external oversight should require less equity-based compensation to align
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the interest of the CEO with the stockholders. Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) find the
expected negative relationship between the ratio of short term debt to total debt and stock
option based compensation for the sub-sample period of 1996 to 1999.
2.3.3.2.2 Growth Options
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the level of a firm’s agency costs is
influenced by the amount of managerial discretion in decision making and the cost of
measuring managerial performance. Along the same lines, Bryan, Hwang and Lilien
(2000) contend that firms with relatively more growth options have broader informational
asymmetries, insiders know more than the outsiders, that create more opportunities for
managers to expropriate wealth.

The inference of these papers is that firms with

relatively more growth options are likely to be more difficult to monitor and therefore
may have greater potential for agency problems of equity. Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006)
argue that firms with relatively more growth opportunities (larger market-to-book ratio)
and presumably more difficult to monitor, should use more stock option based
compensation to better align the interests of management with the stockholders. Bryan,
Nash and Patel (2006) find a statistically significant and positive relationship between
their proxy for growth options and stock option based compensation for all of their cases.
2.3.3.2.3 Firm Size
Yermack (1995) and Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000) find a positive relationship
between firm size and the level of managements’ stock option based compensation.
These authors attribute this relationship to the idea that the difficulty for external markets
to monitor management is increasing with firm size. Therefore, since presumably larger
firms are more difficult to monitor, Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) predict and find a
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positive relationship between firm size and stock option based compensation for all of
their cases.
2.3.3.2.4 Firm Performance
Stockholders of a firm stand to profit when the firm’s performance meets or
exceeds the market’s expectations, which implies that the stockholders should link
managements’ compensation to firm performance. This suggests that stockholders might
increase managements’ level of equity-based compensation when firm performance falls
short of the market’s expectations. Consistent with this notion, Bryan, Nash and Patel
(2006) argue that firms with lower abnormal firm performance should use more stock
option based compensation. Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) find a statistically significant
and positive relationship between their proxy for firm performance (return on assets) and
stock option based compensation for their full sample period of 1992 to 1999 and the
sub-sample period of 1996 to 1999.
2.3.3.2.5 Free Cash Flow
Jensen (1986) argues that agency problems are increasing with free cash flow
since discretionary free cash flow may be invested in negative NPV projects (empirebuilding) or on management perquisites. Consistent with contracting theory, providing
management with equity-based compensation should motivate managers to optimally
utilize excess free cash flow and maximize stockholder wealth. Along these lines, Bryan,
Nash and Patel (2006) expect and find a statistically significant and positive relationship
between their proxy for free cash flow and stock option based compensation for their full
sample period of 1992 to 1999 and the sub-sample period of 1996 to 1999.
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2.3.3.2.6 Summary of Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006)
In summary of the research by Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006), the authors consider
the link between compensation and the agency costs of debt and the link between
compensation and the agency costs of equity. The authors note that, even though
contracting theory predicts that greater levels of equity-based compensation decreases the
agency problems of outside equity, it may aggravate the agency problems of debt. The
authors argue that while the agency costs of debt declined during the 1990s (with the
tremendous increase in equity, the debt to equity ratio fell throughout the 1990s), the
attendant decline in external oversight increased the agency costs of equity. The authors
conclude that the net effect of these changes explains why more firms used equity-based
compensation in the latter portion of the 1990s and why the proportion of equity-based
compensation increased throughout the 1990s.

2.3.4

Bylaw and Charter Provisions
According to Gillan (2006) certain corporate governance features such as poison

pills and staggered boards operate as deterrents to the market for corporate control. The
argument in favor of these features is that they force potential acquirers to negotiate with
the incumbent board and executives to ensure the current stockholders receive an
acceptable price for their shares. The undesirable tradeoff is that such features may
undermine the external oversight provided by the market for corporate control. Malatesta
and Walkling (1988) and Reingaert (1988) find negative abnormal returns surrounding
the adoption of anti-takeover measures, which implies that the stock market is indeed
concerned about the loss of external oversight provided by the market for control.
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Drilling deeper than prior research, Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) find that
stock market reactions to the adoption of anti-takeover measures depends on board
structure as they find a positive market reaction associated with independent boards and a
negative market reaction associated with less independent boards. This suggests that the
stock market views the oversight of an independent board as a substitute for the loss of
external oversight by the market for control. However, the stock market is concerned
about the loss of external oversight provided by the market for control when the board
lacks independence.
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) use 24 distinct corporate governance
provisions to build a governance index as a proxy for shareholder rights. They find the
expected correlation between the governance index and stock returns during the 1990s,
specifically finding that an investment strategy that bought firms with the strongest
shareholder rights and sold firms with the weakest shareholder rights earned an abnormal
8.5% return. However, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) note that while their findings
are indicative of associations between corporate governance and firm performance, they
can not draw any conclusions regarding causality.
Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) also find that firms with weak shareholder rights
underperform the market but their results do not support the theory that weak corporate
governance causes poor stock performance. Danielson and Karpoff (2006) focus on
companies that adopt poison pills prior to widespread implementation of state laws
affording firms anti-takeover protection. Contrary to the opinion that the adoption of
poison pills leads management to shirk duties and entrenchment, they find that firms
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experience modest operating performance improvements during the 5-year period after
the adoption of the poison pill provision.

2.3.5

Managerial Power
Bebchuk and Fried (2004), Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002), Bebchuk and

Fried (2003), Bebchuk and Fried (2005), and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) provide a
description of how managerial power or influence has shaped the structure of executive
compensation in publicly traded U.S. firms. They argue that the presence of managerial
power can explain much of the current structure of executive compensation, including
features that have long perplexed financial economists. The authors also show that
managerial influence over the structure of executive compensation which has produced a
considerable transfer of wealth from stockholders and the economy to management.
Furthermore, they argue this managerial power has led to components of compensation
that weaken managers' incentives to increase stockholder wealth and may even provide
perverse incentives to reduce stockholder wealth.
As an author’s note, many of the comments in this section on managerial power
stem from the work by Drs. Bebchuk, Fried, Grinstein, and Walker.
2.3.5.1 Limits of the View on Arm’s Length Contracting
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that similar to the agency conflict between
stockholders and management, there is potential for agency conflict between stockholders
and directors of the board. The authors contend that directors have had and continue to
have various incentives to support arrangements that favor management over the
stockholders. The authors discuss a variety of social and psychological factors such as
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collegiality, team spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict within the board, friendship and
loyalty, and cognitive dissonance that support their position. I review the ten reasons that
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) present for limits to arm’s length contracting of executive
compensation in the following sub-sections.
2.3.5.1.1 Incentives to be Re-elected
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that directors’ desire to be re-elected to the board
creates an incentive to support the CEO's compensation package, a matter that is
extremely important to the CEO, as long as the compensation can be reasonably justified.
Furthermore, a director does not want to develop a reputation for blocking compensation
arrangements sought by executives for concern of not being invited to join other boards.
The authors’ argue that besides attractive compensation, a directorship also provides
prestige and valuable business and social connections. They further argue that both the
financial and non-financial benefits of holding a board seat provide directors incentive to
act in such a fashion to have the best opportunity of retaining their position. In a world
where stockholders select individual directors, the directors would have incentive to
develop a reputation of serving the stockholders. However in practice, the director slate
proposed by management is typically the only slate voted on my stockholders. Since the
CEO has significant influence (power) over the nomination process of the slate of
directors, displeasing the CEO over compensation or any other matter can potentially hurt
a director's chances of being put on the firm’s slate and re-elected.
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2.3.5.1.2 CEO Power to Benefit Directors
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that if the CEO is generous with compensation
and treatment of the directors then the board is more likely to support generous
compensation and treatment for the CEO, and vice versa.
scratching or cronyism.

This is known as back

Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) find that excess director

compensation leads to excess compensation for the CEO and poor future firm
performance, which is evidence of cronyism at the expense of the stockholders.
2.3.5.1.3 Friendship and Loyalty
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) note that a director may have a professional, personal
or social connection to the firm’s CEO or other executives; which may cause the director
to have a strong sense of loyalty to the executives. The authors point out that even those
directors who do not know any of the firm’s executives prior to taking the position may
have a stronger sense of loyalty to the executive team that they will be working with on a
routine basis than to the stockholders.
2.3.5.1.4 Collegiality and Authority
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that in addition to friendship and loyalty, there
are other social and psychological factors that make it difficult for directors to resist
generous executive compensation packages. Directors are generally expected to treat
their fellow directors, including the firm’s CEO and other firm executives that sit on the
board, collegially. The CEO is also the firm's leader, the person whose decisions and
visions should have the most influence on and authority over the firm's future direction.
For these reasons the directors often treat the CEO with respect and deference which can
make it awkward for the directors to negotiate the CEO’s compensation contract at arm’s
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length. In fact, Holmstrom (2005) provides anecdotal evidence that firms may even want
to avoid arm’s length bargaining so as not to damage relations with the firm’s CEO.
Holmstrom (2005) argues that compensation is a sensitive matter and that the board may
prefer to benchmark rather than risking potentially contentious negotiations with the
CEO.
2.3.5.1.5 Cognitive Dissonance and Solidarity
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) note that many members of compensation committees
are logically current or former executives themselves and may have developed views
about executive compensation consistent with their own self interest. That is to say, they
are likely to support a compensation package for the CEO that is in line with how they
themselves have been or would like to be compensated.
2.3.5.1.6 The Small (to the directors) Cost of Favoring Executives
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) point out that the independent directors of public firms
may own only a small fraction of the firm’s stock and consequently there is little direct
cost to the directors to support a generous compensation package for the CEO.
2.3.5.1.7 Ratcheting
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2005) the practice of many boards to
compensate their CEO more than the industry average is a broadly recognized
contributing factor to the rise in executive compensation. Murphy (1999) suggests this
widespread practice has led to an ever-increasing average and a continuous escalation of
executive pay.
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2.3.5.1.8 Limits of Market Forces
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) find fault with the argument that even if directors are
influenced by the CEO, market forces will cause boards and executives to adopt
compensation arrangements equivalent to what would have been contracted under arm’s
length negotiations. The authors’ argue that market forces are neither sufficiently finetuned nor sufficiently powerful to compel such outcomes.

They acknowledge that

markets for capital, corporate control, and managerial labor do impose some constraints
on executive compensation. However, they go on to argue that these constraints are
limited and allow significant deviations from the equivalent compensation package
produced from arm's length contracting.
2.3.5.1.9 New CEOs
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that all of the foregoing limitations still
potentially apply to CEOs hired from outside of the firm even though the negotiations
with new CEOs hired from outside of the firm may be closer to arm’s length negotiations
than with incumbent CEOs.
2.3.5.1.10 Firing of Executives
Jenkins (2002) concludes that the increased willingness of directors to fire CEOs
over the past decade provides evidence that boards do indeed deal with CEOs at arm’s
length. However, according to Bebchuk and Fried (2005) instances of firing a CEO are
still limited to circumstances in which the CEO is accused of legal or ethical violations or
is viewed by stockholders and directors as having dismal performance. Without such
extenuating circumstances, mere mediocrity is far from enough ammunition for a board
to fire a CEO. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) point out that in cases in which boards do fire
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the CEO, boards often provide the departing CEO with compensation well beyond what
is required by the contract to soften the blow and alleviate the directors' guilt and
discomfort.

They go on to argue that boards' track record of dealing with

underperforming CEOs does not support the view that boards treat CEOs at arm’s length.
2.3.5.2 Managerial Power and Pay Relationships
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) acknowledge that although CEOs generally have some
degree of influence over their boards, the extent of each CEO’s influence is a function of
their respective firm's governance structure. Their managerial power theory predicts that
executives who have more power should receive higher compensation, or at least
compensation that is less sensitive to firm performance, than their less powerful
counterparts. The authors indicate that there is a substantial body of evidence that
supports their theory.
First, there is evidence that CEO compensation is higher when the board is
relatively weak. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that CEO compensation is
higher (1) when the board is large, which makes it more difficult for directors to organize
in opposition to the CEO; (2) when more of the outside directors have been appointed by
the CEO, which could cause them to feel gratitude, obligation, or loyalty to the CEO; and
(3) when outside directors serve on three or more boards, and thus are more likely to be
busy (distracted). Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) find CEO pay is 20% to 40% higher if
the CEO is the chairman of the board, and it is negatively correlated with the stock
ownership of the compensation committee members.
Second, studies find a negative correlation between the presence of a large outside
stockholder and compensation arrangements that favor CEOs.
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A large outside

stockholder might engage in closer monitoring and thereby reduce CEOs’ managerial
power (influence) regarding their compensation. Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) find a
negative correlation between the equity ownership of the largest stockholder and the
amount of CEO compensation. More specifically, they find that doubling the percentage
ownership of a large outside stockholder is associated with a 12% to 14% reduction in a
CEO's non-salary compensation. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) find that CEOs in
companies without a 5% (or larger) outside stockholder tend to receive more "luckbased" pay; that is, compensation associated with increases in profits that are generated
entirely by external factors (for example, changes in oil prices and exchange rates) rather
than by CEOs’ own efforts. This study also finds that companies lacking large outside
stockholders, the boards make smaller offsetting reductions in cash compensation when
they increase CEOs' stock option based compensation.
Third, there is evidence linking CEO compensation to the concentration of
institutional stockholders, which are more likely to monitor the CEO and the board.
Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that more concentrated institutional ownership leads to
lower and more performance sensitive compensation. Parthiban, Kochar and Levitas
(1998) find that the effect of institutional stockholders on CEO pay depends on the nature
of their relationships with the firm.

The authors report that CEO compensation is

negatively correlated with the presence of "pressure resistant" institutions, institutions
that have no other business relationship with the firm and thus presumably are concerned
only with the firm's share value. But they find that CEO compensation is positively
correlated with the presence of "pressure sensitive" institutions, institutions that have
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business relationships with the firm (for example, managing its pension funds) and are
thus more susceptible to managerial power.
Finally, studies find a connection between pay and anti-takeover provisions,
arrangements that make CEOs and their boards less vulnerable to a hostile takeover.
Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino (1997) find that CEOs of companies adopting antitakeover provisions enjoy above market compensation before adoption of the provisions
and that adoption is followed by further significant increases in compensation. This
pattern is not readily explainable by arm's length contracting. Indeed, if risk-averse
managers' jobs are more secure, stockholders should be able to pay the managers less.
Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2005) find that CEOs of companies that became protected by
state anti-takeover legislation enacted during the period from 1984 to 1991 reduced their
holdings of shares, which became less important for the purpose of maintaining control,
by an average of 15%. Arm’s length contracting, by contrast, might predict that CEOs
protected by anti-takeover legislation would be required by their boards to increase their
stockholdings to restore their incentive to generate stockholder value.
In closing this section on internal governance I quote from Hubbard (2005): “there
is very little evidence in the data that suggest that simply changing a governance
mechanism, like share ownership or independent directors, has much effect on firm
value. This pattern simply indicates that markets try to get it right across an entire range
of mechanisms.” I do not take this statement to mean that internal governance does not
matter. To me it means that the tremendous increase in CEO compensation was a change
in a governance mechanism intended to mitigate the agency problem between the CEO
and the stockholders. The question is did we get it right or is it wrong?
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2.4

External Governance
This sub-section reviews the following aspects of the corporate governance

system that are external to the firm: laws and regulations, capital markets (ownership
structure), market for corporate control, labor markets, and external oversight (private
sources).

2.4.1

Laws and Regulations
Laws and regulations are integrally related to corporate governance, and a large

body of research studies the link between corporate governance, the law, and finance. La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) focus on corporate governance and
how it relates to the legal protections afforded to stockholders and creditors. The authors
find that differences in countries’ laws account for differences in the breadth and depth of
countries’ financial markets and in the ability of firms to access external capital. Daouk,
Lee and Ng (2006) examine the link between capital market governance (CMG) and
several key measures of market performance. Using detailed data from individual stock
exchanges, the authors develop a composite index that captures three dimensions of
security laws: the degree of earnings opacity, the enforcement of insider trading laws, and
the effect of removing short selling restrictions. The authors find that improvements in
the CMG index are associated with decreases in the cost-of-equity, increases in market
liquidity, and increases in market pricing efficiency.
Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006) ask if there is a dark side to incentive
compensation. Put simply, their answer is yes. After controlling for other elements of
compensation and possible determinants of fraud, the authors find a positive association
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between the use of stock options and allegations of fraud. Using a matched sample
procedure, the authors report a positive association between measures of stock option
intensity and class action lawsuits for securities fraud. Expanding the analysis to include
ownership structure, they find the link between stock option use and alleged fraud is
stronger in firms with higher outside block and institutional ownership. The authors’
interpretation of this finding is that the incentive to engage in fraudulent activity is
heightened by the presence of block and institutional owners who may also benefit from
the fraud. The authors argue that in firms with higher stock option compensation, the
CEO benefits in two ways from fraudulent activities that increase stock price: (1) CEOs
benefit directly from an increase in their compensation and (2) CEOs benefit indirectly
by lowering the probability of dismissal.

2.4.2

Capital Markets (Ownership Structure)
The relation between ownership structure and CEO compensation has been

studied with conflicting results. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that managers who
are majority owners receive marginally higher salaries than other managers.

Allen

(1981) finds level of CEO compensation is a decreasing function of the equity held by the
CEO (and family) as well as the level of equity holdings by board members not related to
the CEO. Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) find CEO compensation is lower when
the CEO’s ownership is higher and when a director other than CEO has ownership
greater than 5%. Core (1997) finds that CEO compensation is increasing in insider
control of share votes and decreasing in insider ownership of the firm.
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Others have studied the relationship between ownership structure and firm value
and performance. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) demonstrate that firm value first
rises with increases in inside ownership as the desired alignment effect of share price
dominates, then falls as the managerial entrenchment effect of insider voting control
becomes stronger. Shivdasani (1993) finds that hostile takeovers are more likely when
target outside directors own less equity and serve on fewer boards and when there are
unaffiliated outside block-holders of stock. Holthausen and Larcker (1996) indicate that
performance subsequent to the initial public offering of a previously leveraged buy-out is
positively associated with the change in the equity stake of both the significant nonmanagement investors and the operating management of the firm. Yermack (1996) finds
that firm value is significantly higher when officers and directors have greater ownership,
although this ownership variable has an ambiguous relation with contemporaneous
measures of accounting operating performance.
Other research focuses on the influence of institutional and block-holder
ownership. Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) report
evidence consistent with the view that block-holders and institutions play an important
role in limiting agency problems between managers and other investors.

However,

Colvin (1998) contends that institutional investors overreact to negative earnings news
and consequently force managers to be overly concerned about short-term earnings.
Consistent with this view, Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) report that the market reaction
to negative earnings announcements is stronger in firms with greater institutional
ownership.
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Berry, Paige Fields and Wilkins (2006) find that as CEO ownership declines,
board independence, board seats held by venture capitalists, and unaffiliated block
ownership increase. Their findings suggest that as inside ownership decreases alternative
governance mechanisms evolve to help mitigate the resulting increase in agency costs.

2.4.3

Market for Corporate Control
According to Gillan (2006), the market for corporate control is the ultimate

corporate governance mechanism. As managers compete in the market for control, assets
(companies) go to the highest creator of value and the inefficient managers are thusly
disciplined. However, the market for corporate control may have two sides to the coin in
that it also provides inefficient managers the opportunity to indulge in empire building
through acquisitions.

According to Bebchuk and Fried (2005), many believed that

significant stock option grants would align stockholder and managerial interests and
would thereby provide a substitute for the market for corporate control. Additionally,
stock options were included into severance arrangements (known as golden parachutes)
so that a change in control triggered the immediate vesting of stock options otherwise
scheduled to vest over a multi-year period. While the golden parachutes were seen as
aligning managerial and stockholder interests at the crucial moment of an uninvited
takeover bid, the other side of this coin is that the inefficient manager of the target firm is
simply rewarded for poor performance.
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2.4.4

Labor Markets
Hubbard (2005) states that executive compensation is often talked about as a

stand alone corporate finance topic but he argues that we are really talking about a market
for labor in a specific area. The finance literature on labor markets focuses on CEOs,
members of senior executive teams, and directors. Classic papers, such as Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that labor market forces and
reputation concerns have a disciplining effect on both managers and directors. On one
hand, solid performance by CEOs and directors has the potential to lead to better
opportunities in the future. For example, CEOs may be offered a position at a larger or
more prestigious firm or more board seats in the future.

On the other hand, poor

performance may lead to termination and subsequent difficulties obtaining new positions,
either as an executive officer or director. Early empirical work by Coughlan and Schmidt
(1985) and Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) provide a broad perspective on the
association between firm performance and the labor market for CEOs. These studies find
that good performance is positively associated with CEO compensation, whereas poor
performance increases the likelihood of termination or CEO turnover.
Holmstrom (2005) suggests that a reason it may be difficult to explain why
executive compensation is so high is because of the dynamic nature of the labor market.
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) find empirical
evidence suggesting that the rapid rise in executive compensation can be explained as a
shift in the demand for top executive talent. They argue that in the second half of the
1990s, executives had lucrative opportunities outside their traditional jobs, as either
investors or partners in the red-hot venture and buy-out markets or as entrepreneurs.
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Holmstrom (2005) argues that the view that there are many CEO substitutes, which
should keep the compensation level under control, is misguided. The author supposes
there are many potential CEO substitutes, but the board of directors does not know who
they are and where to find them. In this event, a CEO that is performing well and is
trusted can be worth much more than the second best alternative.

2.4.5

External Oversight (Private Sources)

One of the primary private sources of external oversight is the media. The media
clearly plays an important function in reporting on corporations’ performance, activities
and matters of governance. For example, Bethany Mclean of Fortune Magazine is
credited with being the first to publicly reveal the problems at Enron.

Finance

researchers have also examined the corporate governance role of the media. Notably,
Dyck and Zingales (2002) investigate how the media pushes corporate managers and
directors to behave in a socially acceptable manner. The authors conclude that the media
affects corporations’ environmental policies and policies for diverting firm resources to
controlling stockholders.
In closing this section, this dissertation follows a literature survey and empirical test
format.

This survey is intentionally broad as it establishes my foundation and

understanding of research that investigates the structure of CEO compensation, the
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, and the relationship
between corporate governance and CEO compensation. However, the survey does not
specifically inform this research.

The specific literature review that motivates this

research is provided in the next section.
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3

Development of Empirical Research Hypotheses
The tremendous increase in CEO total compensation and the increased use of and

payouts from stock options in recent years has generated considerable debate and concern
in boardrooms, in the financial press, and among academics. The following quote from
the New York Times nicely portrays the prevailing sentiment regarding this issue.
“Corporations have been wrestling for decades with ways to link pay to performance,
with little success. In the 1980’s, they tried tying cash bonuses to rising sales or earnings,
only to find that the payouts encouraged executives to make decisions that yielded shortterm results—and often longer-term disasters. In the 1990’s, companies tried stock
options, figuring that they would be the best way to tie the executives’ fortunes to those
of shareholders. Instead, they prompted some managers to time decisions to pump up the
stock price just when the options vested. Bonuses and options at Tyco and Enron, for
example, did little to prevent widespread accounting frauds at either company. The
secret to linking pay to performance remains elusive.” Deutsch (2005)
My research extends the literature that investigates the link or connection between
CEO (executive) compensation and firm performance. In sub-section 3.1, I describe the
components of CEO compensation, provide a brief description of the CEO compensation
data used in my dissertation (I more fully describe the complete sample in Section 5), and
report changes in the level and composition of CEO compensation during the sample
period. As I discuss in sub-section 3.1, CEO compensation has increased dramatically,
which raises the question as to whether CEOs’ performance has improved or whether
CEOs have become better at extracting personal wealth from their firms. In sub-section
3.2, I point out which components of CEO compensation are potentially disconnected
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from firm performance by comparing the components of CEO compensation to the S&P
500 (market) performance during the sample period. Although I do not perform any
explicit tests in sub-section 3.2 as to whether there is a disconnection between CEO
compensation and performance, a cursory view of the data does pique interest in several
possible research questions. In sub-section 3.2 I also review literature that describes
potential sources of disconnection between CEO compensation and firm performance. In
sub-section 3.3, I review a very specific branch of the literature that suggests a small
group of CEOs has an inordinate impact on the overall levels of CEO compensation and
the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance.

The gaps and

unanswered questions in this literature review motivate my empirical research questions
as described in sub-section 3.3.

3.1

CEO Compensation
This sub-section describes the components of CEO compensation. It also presents

summary information and graphs of CEO compensation to illustrate the significant
changes in the level and composition of CEO compensation that have occurred during the
1993-2005 period.

3.1.1 Description of the Components of CEO Compensation
The Board of Directors of a firm has a Compensation Committee that is responsible
for setting the compensation package for the CEO and possibly other executives. The
principle objective, consistent with agency theory, is for the Compensation Committee to
set the CEO compensation such that the CEO has incentives to act in the best interest of
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the stockholders. The Compensation Committee may engage a compensation consultant
to provide a third party opinion on the appropriate levels of executive compensation.
Although there is significant heterogeneity across firms and industries, most CEO
compensation packages contain four basic components: (1) a base salary, (2) an annual
bonus tied to accounting performance, (3) equity-based compensation (restricted stock
grants and stock options), and (4) other compensation (hereafter “Other compensation”),
such as perquisites, retirement benefits, loans, and severance packages.
CEOs’ and other executives’ base salaries are typically based on industry and market
peer salary surveys. The annual bonus is usually based on achieving certain accountingbased performance measures (for example, level of revenues, earnings, or return on
assets) for the immediately preceding fiscal year (or several preceding fiscal years for
multi-year plans). Restricted stock is stock granted by a company to an employee with
certain restrictions. Typically, the restrictions include a vesting period, a holding period,
and possibly performance conditions, such as the company reaching certain earnings per
share goals or financial targets. Stock options are contracts, which after vesting (options
usually take one to three years to vest) give the holder the right to buy a share of stock at
a set exercise price for a certain period of time (typically five to ten years). Also, CEOs
and other top executives will often sign employment contracts with the firm which
includes a description of the base salary, target bonus payments, severance arrangements
in the event of separation or change in corporate control, and other terms.
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3.1.2

Summary Information and Graphs of CEO Compensation
The discussion and figures in this sub-section report changes in the level and

composition of the components of CEO compensation during the 1993-2005 sample
period for the firms in the ExecuComp database (which includes the S&P 1500, firms
that were formerly in the S&P 1500, and a small set of other firms chosen by the data
provider, Compustat). My base sample (which I describe in detail in Section 5) includes
data for 5,210 CEOs and 2,746 firms collected from the ExecuComp database from 1993
through 2005. Roughly speaking, the average firm replaces its CEO once during the
sample period (5,210 CEOs/2,764 firms = 1.9 CEOs per firm). However, there is little
movement of CEOs from one firm in the sample to another firm in the sample. In fact,
only 150 of the 5,210 CEOs ever serve at more than one firm in the sample. This
suggests that newly hired CEOs either come from non-CEO positions from firms in the
ExecuComp sample or come from firms outside the ExecuComp sample.
Approximately 64% of the CEOs serve longer than three years as the CEO, with a
mean CEO tenure of 6.4 years. The firm count per year ranges from 1,622 to 1,996; on
average, 95% of the firms survive from one year to the next. The firm life during the
sample period has a mean of 8.6 years. These summary statistics suggest that the sample
of firms and CEOs are relatively stable and time invariant, which makes it possible to
meaningfully compare yearly compensation data from the sample. (I more fully describe
the complete sample and its stability in Section 5.)
Before developing specific hypotheses, it will be helpful to begin with an
overview of compensation patterns during the sample period. Table 1, Panel A (all tables
and figures are in the Appendix), presents annual summary statistics for mean CEO
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compensation; all values are adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars. Because a picture is
worth a thousand words, it is more insightful to view this data graphically, beginning
with Figure 1.
Figure 1 presents the percent contribution of each of the four major components
of CEO total direct compensation: salary, bonus, equity-based compensation (restricted
stock grants plus stock options), and Other compensation for all CEOs in my sample. It
is interesting to note that the equity-based compensation, as a percent of CEOs’ total
direct compensation, increased dramatically from 42% in 1993 to 73% in 2000 but
curiously dropped in subsequent years to a level of 53% in 2005. This increase and then
subsequent decline in the percentage contribution of equity-based compensation could be
coincidental to the technology bubble and bust in the stock market. Alternatively, it
could reflect stock and labor market forces at work attempting to discover the optimal
level of equity-based compensation to minimize agency conflict.
Another curiosity, as shown in Figure 2, is that even the make up of equity-based
compensation has changed dramatically since 2001. Stock options contributed 90% of
the equity-based compensation in 2001, but their contribution is down to only 64% in
2005 (with of course an exact offsetting increase in the contribution of restricted stock
grants). A cynic might say this is because stock options are out of favor and it is now
easier to ‘hide’ compensation in the form of restricted stock grants. Alternatively, it
could reflect stock and market forces at work attempting to find the optimal mix of
equity-based compensation.
Figure 3 is a stacked bar graph that presents the mean dollar value of each of the
four major components of CEO total direct compensation: salary, bonus, equity-based
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compensation (the value of restricted stock grants plus stock options), and Other
compensation for all CEOs in my sample, all adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars. Note
the large increase in CEO compensation.

Even with the decline in mean CEO

compensation following the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000, the mean level of
compensation in 2005 is still much greater than in 1993. Also, it appears from this graph
that the increase in the CEOs’ total direct compensation is primarily due to the increase in
equity-based compensation.
These data clearly indicate a significant increase in CEO mean compensation.
The next sub-section explores potential sources of disconnection between CEO
compensation and firm performance.

3.2

Is CEO Compensation Linked to Firm Performance?
This sub-section begins to explore the link between CEO compensation and firm

performance and as such is foundation for the questions underlying my empirical
research. Although I do not perform any empirical tests in this sub-section, the data I
report do point out which components of CEO compensation are potential sources of
disconnection between CEO compensation and firm performance, which piques the
interest in my research questions. In addition, in this sub-section I review literature that
describes potential sources of disconnection between CEO compensation and firm
performance.
Is CEO compensation linked to firm performance? A simple comparison of the
growth rate in CEO total direct compensation to the annualized return of the S&P 500
index (which is a proxy for the market) for various periods of time suggests the answer is
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no. For the period of 1993 though 2000, mean CEO total direct compensation increased
at an annualized nominal growth rate of 20.9% per year compared to an annualized
nominal growth rate of 16.0% per year for the S&P 500 index (before dividends). The
substantially higher growth rate in CEO compensation relative to the S&P 500 index
growth rate seems ‘excessive’ and probably unnecessary for addressing any potential
agency conflicts. Furthermore, it suggests that CEO compensation may not be properly
linked to firm performance from the shareholders’ perspective.

This evidence is

consistent with the point argued by Bebchuk and Fried (2005) that “executives' large
compensation packages are much less sensitive to their own performance than has been
commonly recognized.”

For the period of 1993 though 2005 the CEO total direct

compensation increased at an annualized nominal growth rate of 10.0% per year
compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 8.5% per year for the S&P 500 index
(before dividends). While growth in CEO compensation during the 1993-2005 period
was not as high as in the 1993-2000 period, it still may have been more than was
necessary to address any potential agency conflicts.
This simple comparison technique certainly is not sufficient to conclude that CEO
total direct compensation is not linked to firm performance, but it does raise questions. A
similar comparison for each of the four major components of CEO compensation, as
described in sub-section 3.1, with firm performance raises even more questions. Figure 4
presents the cumulative nominal increase in each of the four major components of CEO
compensation for the period of 1993 through 2005, with each component indexed to 100
in 1993.
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First, I focus on the cash components of compensation, salary and bonus, and their
relationship to firm performance. Murphy (1999) found the sum of salary and annual
bonus increased from $700,000 in 1970 to $1,300,000 in 1996, only a 2.3% annual
increase above inflation. Referring to Figure 4, the annual plot of mean salary indicates a
fairly steady increase for 1993 through 2005 at a nominal rate of 3.7% per year. Also, the
annual plot of mean bonus has some fluctuation but generally it depicts a steady upward
trend at a nominal rate of 10.0% per year through 2005. Combined, mean salary plus
bonus increased from 1993 at a nominal rate of 7.0% per year through 2005. This rate of
increase for the combined mean salary plus bonus is comparable to the 8.5% annualized
increase (before dividends) in the S&P 500 index from year end 1993 through year end
2005 and the average inflation rate of 2.5% for the same period. These comparisons
imply that the cash components of CEO compensation are not likely to be responsible for
any disconnection between CEO compensation and firm performance.
Next, I explore the equity-based compensation component of CEO compensation.
As stated previously, in the agency theory framework, the intention behind increasing
equity-based compensation is to create an efficient compensation contract with the CEO
such that the CEO acts to maximize stockholders’ wealth. Hall and Liebman (1998)
established that much of the increase in CEO total compensation is due to increased use
of stock options. According to these authors, the percentage of CEOs receiving stock
options awards increased from 30 percent in 1980 to nearly 70 percent in 1994. Also, the
percentage of CEOs holding stock options increased from 57 percent to 87 percent for the
same period. Hall and Murphy (2003) find the average real pay for S&P 500 CEOs
skyrocketed during the 1990s, growing from $3.5 million in 1992 to $14.7 million in
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2000. According to these authors, most of this increase reflects the escalation in stock
option values at time of grant, which grew nine-fold from an average of about $800,000
in 1992 to nearly $7.2 million in 2000.
Looking at Figure 4, the mean equity-based compensation component (restricted
stock plus value of stock options) of CEO compensation increased almost seven-fold
from 1993 through 2000. This is an annualized nominal growth rate of 31.1% per year
compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 16.0% per year for the S&P 500 index
(before dividends).

The substantially higher growth rate in CEO equity-based

compensation relative to the S&P 500 index growth rate seems ‘excessive’ and probably
unnecessary for addressing any potential agency conflict. For the period of 1993 though
2005 the CEO equity-based compensation increased at an annualized nominal growth
rate of 12.3% per year compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 8.5% per year
for the S&P 500 index (before dividends). While not apparently as excessive it still may
have been more than was necessary to address any potential agency conflict. These
comparisons suggest that equity-based compensation is a likely contributor to any
disconnection between CEO total direct compensation and firm performance.
Arguably, a substantial fraction of stock price increases is due to market and
industry movements, rather than to firm-specific factors that might reflect the CEO's own
performance. Therefore, CEOs can profit substantially from their stock options even
when their companies' performance lags that of their peers, as long as market and
industry movements provide sufficient boost for the firm’s stock price. Also, stock
options enable CEOs to legally profit from temporary spikes in the firm's stock price,
even when long-term stock performance is poor (however, it is illegal for CEOs to take
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advantage of inside information that is not available to the public when exercising their
options). As designed, a CEO’s profit from stock options is not necessarily linked to firm
performance. The question is whether or not firm performance, measured either by
accounting metrics or changes in the stock price, justifies this increase in CEO equitybased compensation. Alternatively, since causal direction is unknown, would market
returns have been as high if CEOs had not been as well compensated?
Lastly, I explore the Other compensation component of CEO compensation.
Looking at Figure 4, the mean Other compensation component of CEO compensation
increased almost three-fold from 1993 through 2005. This is an annualized nominal
growth rate of 11.7% per year compared to an annualized nominal growth rate of 8.5%
per year for the S&P 500 index (before dividends). This comparison suggests that Other
compensation may be excessive relative to market (firm) performance and that it is a
likely contributor to any disconnection between CEO total direct compensation and firm
performance.
For the reasons noted above, much of the attention in the media and in academic
research has been on the tremendous increase in the contribution of equity-based
compensation to executives' compensation during the 1990s. However, non-equity based
compensation continues to be substantial and should not be overlooked. According to
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005), non-equity compensation represented on average about
half of the total compensation of both the CEO and the top five executives of S&P 1500
companies not classified as new economy firms in 2003. Murphy (1999) points out that
many firms use subjective criteria for at least some of their cash (non-equity) bonus
payments. Such subjectivity can be a useful tool in the hands of boards that are looking
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out for stockholder interests.

However, boards that favor their top executives over

stockholders can use their discretion to pay executives handsome bonuses for substandard
performance or any other reason. For example, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find in about
40% of large acquisitions during the period from 1993 to 1999, the acquiring firm’s CEO
received a multi-million dollar cash bonus for closing the transaction. The authors argue
that an acquisition is not an action for which CEOs should receive additional
compensation above and beyond whatever rewards they stand to receive from the
resulting effect of the acquisition on the value of the CEO's options, shares, firm size
based incentives, and prestige. Even when firms use objective criteria, cash bonuses are
typically based on the firm's own operating or accounting performance, which ignores
and may be substandard to peers’ performance.
Another area that demonstrates the disconnection between CEO compensation
and firm performance is the severance payments provided to departing CEOs. CEOs
pushed out by their boards can be paid a handsome severance amounting to two or three
years' worth of annual compensation, regardless of the firm’s performance.

These

payments are often not reduced even when the CEO's performance has been clearly
substandard. For example, Carly Fiorina, former CEO of Hewlett Packard, was awarded
a $21 million severance package when she was dismissed of her duties even though the
board and the stockholders were disappointed with the performance of Hewlett Packard
and its acquisition of Compaq. Another example is Robert Nardelli, former CEO of
Home Depot, who was paid $210 million when he resigned under pressure even though
Home Depot had underperformed the market and its primary competitor Lowe’s
throughout his reign.
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Research by Bebchuk and Fried (2005) finds that pension payments can
demonstrate a disconnection of pay from performance. The authors perform a case study
on Franklin Raines, who was forced to retire as Fannie Mae's CEO in late 2004. Terms
of the pension obligated Fannie Mae to pay him (or his surviving spouse after his death)
an annual pension of approximately $1.4 million, an amount specified without any
connection to the firm's stock performance under Raines. Bebchuk and Fried (2005)
estimate the value of this non-performance element of his pension at about $25 million.
In summary, there is substantial evidence to suggest that CEO compensation
(particularly the equity-based and Other components of compensation) may not be
sufficiently linked to firm performance, an issue I will discuss in more detail later when I
develop my specific research hypotheses.
A related question is whether or not a disconnection between CEO compensation
and firm performance exists for all CEOs or for just a sub-set of CEOs. For example, it
could be that a relatively small number of highly-paid CEOs have an inordinate impact
on the mean values of the components of compensation that are shown in Figures 3 and
4. To explore this question, Figure 5 presents mean CEO total direct compensation each
year for three groups of CEOs based simply on a ranking of total direct compensation
each year: all CEOs, those CEOs in the top 10% of total direct compensation, and those
in the bottom 90% of total direct compensation. (Note that in the next sub-section I
develop a more rigorous method for ranking and classifying the CEOs; I rank by total
direct compensation in this section just to illustrate that a relatively small number of the
highly paid CEOs skew the sample.)
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Figure 5 shows that the baseline group of all CEOs has a ‘hump’ in the total direct
compensation from about 1998 through 2002. For the group of all CEOs, the total direct
compensation increased by a nominal rate of 20.9% per year from 1993 through 2000
then declined thereafter by a nominal rate of 3.6% per year through 2005. In contrast, the
bottom 90% group of CEOs by total direct compensation had an annualized nominal
growth rate of 14.5% (substantially less than the group of all CEOs) from 1993 through
2000 and it continued to increase by a nominal rate 3.4% per year through 2005. Even
though the bottom 90% group of CEOs has a hump for the year 2000 in the plot, it is not
nearly as pronounced a hump as for the group of all CEOs.
In contrast, as shown in Figure 5, the plot for the CEOs in the top 10% by total
direct compensation has a huge hump in the 1997-2002 period. The top 10% group of
CEOs by total direct compensation had an annualized nominal growth rate in total direct
compensation of 27.9% from 1993 through 2000 then declined thereafter at the nominal
rate of 10.2% per year through 2005. In comparison, the S&P 500 index increased 16.0%
per year from 1993 through 2000 then declined modestly thereafter at the rate of 1.1%
per year through 2005. These comparisons certainly suggest that a sub-set of CEOs may
be the primary culprit for any disconnection between CEO compensation and firm
performance.
In summary, I make three observations based on the information presented in
Table 1 and Figures 1-5. First, the level and composition of the components of CEO
compensation change substantially during the sample period; the level of compensation
increases significantly during the period and equity-based compensation becomes the
largest component of compensation. Second, the data do not reveal any obvious link
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between CEO compensation and firm performance; in fact, mean compensation has
grown more rapidly than shareholder wealth. Third, a relatively small number of highly
paid CEOs appear to be skewing the mean compensation upward.
These observations motivate the idea that it is possible that previous empirical
research results and conclusions regarding the link between CEO compensation and firm
performance might be distorted because previous studies have failed to explicitly address
the impact caused by a small number of highly paid and influential CEOs. In the next
sub-section, I build on this thought and develop my specific research questions.

3.3

Motivation of Research Questions
Sub-section 3.3.1 is a review of the specific literature that motivates my empirical

research. Sub-section 3.3.2 describes the proxy for CEO managerial power that I use in
my empirical tests to rank and classify CEOs. Sub-section 3.3.3 presents the specific
research questions.

3.3.1

Literature Review
A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm

performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across
firms, even within the same industry. This research uses CEO characteristics, (such as
“superstar” or “celebrity” status, “reputation”, “skill”, “managerial power”, age, dual role
as CEO and Chairman of the Board, and percent of firm ownership by the CEO) and firm
characteristics (such as size, complexity, growth opportunities, and leverage) to explain
‘why’ CEOs’ compensation varies widely in cross-section.
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However, this research

assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory
variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs (this
assumption is implicit in the use of all CEO’s in the samples for which the models are
estimated).

In other words, extant research assumes a one-size-fits-all CEO

compensation model.

Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm

performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model. I review
some of that literature next and for convenient referral I summarize the models and the
findings of the literature I consider key to my research in Table 2.
A possible explanation for extraordinarily high CEO compensation is the belief
that a “superstar” CEO could deliver outsized performance. If the board has the mindset
that a particular CEO candidate can lead a firm to superior success then higher
compensation levels for those individuals is appropriate and should be acceptable to the
stockholders. Sherwin Rosen is often given credit for coining the term “superstar” as
used in the context of researching CEO or executive compensation. The following quote
from Rosen (1981) provides a clear description of the term: “The phenomenon of
Superstars, wherein relatively small numbers of people earn enormous amounts of money
and dominate the activities in which they engage, seems to be increasingly important in
the modern world.” Ironically, that was published in 1981 yet it is still “increasingly”
important in the modern world in 2008.
Malmendier and Tate (2005) build on Rosen’s concept and define “superstar”
CEOs as those who receive prestigious awards from the business press. The authors find
that the firms of such CEOs subsequently under perform after the CEO receives the
award, compared to both the overall market and a sample of hypothetical award winners
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(CEOs that did not win awards but have matching firm and CEO characteristics to actual
award winners). They also find that CEOs who win awards are compensated more after
receiving the awards, in absolute dollars and relative to the number 2 executive in the
firm. Furthermore, CEOs spend more time on external activities (including outside
directorships and writing books) after receiving the awards. These effects are strongest in
poorly governed firms implying a correlation between the personal benefits of a CEO’s
superstar status and the weakness of a firm’s corporate governance.
Hayward, Rindova and Pollock (2004) develop a theoretical model in which CEO
“celebrity” status is in part a product of the tendency of journalists to over-attribute a
firm’s actions and results, good or bad, to the ability of the CEO rather than to broader
contributing factors. The authors argue that CEOs can internalize this over-attribution,
become overconfident, and make decisions unfavorable to the firm.

Wade, Porac,

Pollock and Graffin (2006) discuss the burden of celebrity and argue that the Financial
World’s CEO of the Year Award is a “certification” contest that effectively ranks the
CEOs for the benefit of the firms’ stakeholders. They find a positive correlation between
CEO total compensation and certification when return on equity is relatively high and
find a negative correlation between CEO total compensation and certification when
return on equity is relatively low, which implies certified CEOs are rewarded when return
on equity is high and punished when return on equity is low. They find an undesirable,
from the stockholders perspective, negative correlation between CEO awards and current
year stock performance.
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Wade, Porac, Pollock and Graffin (2006) define “certification” in a similar
manner to how Malmendier and Tate (2005) define “superstar” and both papers find a
negative correlation between CEO awards and firm performance.
Milbourn (2003) develops the idea that a CEO’s “reputation” or perceived ability
should affect the CEO’s compensation package, particularly the pay-for-performance
components. Milbourn also hypothesizes that reputation should help explain the
enormous variation in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities across firms. As proxies
for reputation, Milbourn uses: (1) CEO tenure, (2) the number of business articles in
which the CEO’s name appears, (2) whether or not the CEO was hired from outside of
the firm, and (4) industry adjusted firm performance. Milbourn finds a statistically and
economically significant positive relationship between pay-for-performance sensitivity
and reputation.
Daines, Nair and Kornhauser (2005) argue that CEO “skill” helps explain the
variation in CEO compensation across firms. Their definition of a highly skilled CEO is
one who leads a firm to continued good performance (they use return on assets and
abnormal stock returns) from one year to the next, relative to industry peers. They also
define a highly skilled CEO as one who turns around prior poor firm performance from
one year to the next, relative to industry peers. They find that highly compensated CEOs
appear more skilled than their industry peers when firms are small (particularly when
there is a large stockholder to monitor activities) and that the CEO has high incentive
compensation (alignment with the shareholder). Also, highly compensated CEOs appear
more skilled than their industry peers when the firm faces fewer environmental
constraints on management discretion (that is, more skill is required with more
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discretionary decisions). By contrast, compensation is negatively related to skill in firms
constrained by environmental conditions (less skill is required with fewer discretionary
managerial decisions); especially when there is no large stockholder to monitor
management or the firm is large.
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) shed a different light on this issue by suggesting
that only a few CEOs have sufficient power or influence to extract excessive
compensation. They note that in 2001 the top ten CEOs of U.S. firms received average
option grants of $170 million, while the median value of total compensation for CEOs of
the S&P 500 companies was only about $7 million.

The authors argue that “U.S.

executive pay may not be quite the runaway train that has been portrayed in the press.”
However, I find no research that thoroughly investigates the impact and distortions that a
class of ‘only a few’ powerful CEOs (i.e., those with sufficient levels of managerial
power or influence to extract excessive compensation) has on the one-size-fits-all CEO
compensation and firm performance models. In addition, the literature has not examined
whether the firms that are led by such CEOs experience superior performance. This void
in the literature motivates my research.

3.3.2

A Proxy for Managerial Power
A key aspect of this research is how best to measure a CEOs managerial power to

extract higher and different compensation, after controlling for other variables, and to
determine whether CEOs with managerial power receive higher compensation because
they are superior CEOs based on firm performance measures or because they have undue
influence over their own compensation.

The classifications of CEOs used in prior
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research, such as “superstar”, “celebrity”, “certification”, “reputation”, and “skill”, each
measure to some extent CEO managerial power. However, I propose an alternative
measure of CEO managerial power. I define the CEO/Number_2 Ratio as the ratio of
CEO total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid nonCEO executive in the firm. I believe this ratio is a meaningful proxy for CEO managerial
power, as described below.
First, the CEO/Number_2 Ratio directly measures the CEOs influence or
authority over the firm’s board, which is responsible for setting the CEO’s compensation,
to extract excess compensation relative to another executive in the same firm. This
implies the CEOs with the highest CEO/Number_2 Ratios have the most managerial
power. An appealing attribute of this proxy for CEO managerial power is that it is based
on data internal to the firm (no external measures such as press certifications, media or
industry awards, or market opinion are required) and therefore more directly measures a
CEOs influence within the firm.
Second, this CEO/Number_2 Ratio has precedent in prior research. Hayward and
Hambrick (1997) examine the role of CEO hubris in explaining large acquisition
premiums. They argue that “the greater the CEO’s relative compensation to the number
two executive, the greater the CEO’s self-importance and the more likely the CEO is to
be infected with hubris.”

The authors find a positive correlation between this

CEO/Number_2 Ratio and acquisition premiums, which implies higher CEO managerial
power. Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that for CEOs receiving awards (i.e., “superstar
CEOs”), the CEO/Number_2 Ratio is greater after receiving the reward relative to prior
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to receiving the award. This result implies an increase in CEO managerial power after
receiving an award.
Third, many of the same variables that are included to explain CEO compensation
should also be included in a model to explain the compensation of a company’s other
highly paid executives. This implies that the CEO/Number_2 Ratio should be relatively
constant across firms and that any significant deviation in this ratio is due to excessive
managerial power wielded by the CEO.
For theses reasons, I use the CEO/Number_2 Ratio as a metric for ranking and
classifying the CEOs for the purposes described in the next sub-section.

3.3.3

Research Questions
My dissertation examines four research questions. The first two questions focus

on (1) the impact that the inclusion of Elite CEOs in a sample has on standard
compensation models and (2) the factors that affect Elite CEO compensation differently
from Non-Elite CEO compensation.
Question (1): Is the CEO compensation model that explains Elite CEO
compensation different from the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model?

Asked

another way, does the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model apply for Elite CEOs?
The methodology for answering this question is more fully developed in Section 4.
Question (2): If the compensation of different classes of CEOs (Elite CEOs and
Non-Elite CEOs) are best described with different CEO compensation models, which is
what I expect, then how are they compensated differently? That is, should the CEO
compensation model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) contain the
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same structure and the same variables? Or if the same variables are contained in the
models, are there different coefficients on these variables? For example, is the equitybased compensation for Elite CEOs more sensitive to past firm performance than NonElite CEOs? The methodology for answering this question is more fully developed in
Section 4.
The empirical research for Questions 1 and 2 specifically investigates whether
Elite CEOs are compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs. If the same one-size-fitsall model does not apply to all CEOs, then existing models distort the significance of the
variables that are in the CEO compensation regression with respect to the impact they
have on Elite CEOs.

This of course suggests that we do not fully understand

compensation of Elite CEOs and have possibly been underestimating the role of CEO
managerial power in determining CEO compensation.
Furthermore, I hypothesize that Elite CEOs’ firms do not experience superior
performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.

For this hypothesis I perform

empirical tests to answer the following Questions 3 and 4.
Question (3): Is the firm performance model that explains Elite CEOs’ firms’
performance different from the one-size-fits-all firm performance model? Asked another
way, does the one-size-fits-all firm performance model apply for Elite CEOs’ firms? The
methodology for this question is more fully developed in Section 4.
Question (4): If the firm performance of the different classes of CEOs’ (Elite
CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) firms are best described with different firm performance
models, which is what I expect, then how do the firms perform differently? That is,
should the firm performance model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite
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CEOs) contain the same structure and the same variables? Or if the same variables are
contained in the different models, are there different coefficients on these variables? For
example, is the firm performance for Elite CEOs’ firms more sensitive to firm sales than
Non-Elite CEOs? The methodology for this question is more fully developed in Section
4.
The empirical research for Questions 3 and 4 specifically investigates whether or
not Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. If the same onesize-fits-all firm performance model does not apply to all CEOs’ firms, then existing
models distort the significance of the variables that are in the firm performance
regression with respect to the impact they have on the Elite CEOs’ firms. This of course
suggests that we do not fully understand the firm performance of Elite CEOs’ firms and
have possibly been underestimating the role of CEO managerial power in determining
firm performance.
There are two important potential implications of the findings of this research.
First, it is possible that previous empirical research results and conclusions regarding the
link between CEO compensation and firm performance might be distorted because
previous studies have failed to explicitly address the impact caused by a small number of
highly paid and influential CEOs. Second, it is important for shareholders, boards, and
policy makers to understand the link (if one exists) between CEO managerial power and
firm performance.
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4

Methodology
In this section I describe the steps involved in performing my research. I describe

the data in Section 5 and present the results in Section 6.

4.1

Step 1: Develop the Classification of Elite CEO
I rank the CEOs using the proxy for CEO managerial power, CEO/Number_2

Ratio. I then segregate the CEOs into two groups or classes: “Elite CEOs” (above some
cut-off by ranking) and “Non-Elite CEOs” (the remaining CEOs).

I use these

classifications for CEO compensation regressions and firm performance regressions. I
describe in detail my method for determining the cut-off level for classifying the CEOs
(including an alternate proxy for CEO managerial power for robustness tests and
alternative cut-off levels for sensitivity tests) in Section 6.

4.2

Step 2: Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?
Question (1): Is the CEO compensation model that explains Elite CEO

compensation different from the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model?

Asked

another way, does the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model apply for Elite CEOs? I
initiate this analysis by including an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with
all of the explanatory variables (except for the year and industry dummies) in the CEO
compensation regressions. I then perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite
CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. It is a modified Chow Test in the sense
that I do not interact the Elite CEO dummy with the year and industry dummy variables.
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This research specifically investigates whether or not the class of Elite CEOs is
compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs. If the same one-size-fits-all model does
not apply to all CEOs, then existing models might distort the significance of the variables
that are in the CEO compensation regression with respect to the impact they have on Elite
CEOs. This of course suggests that we do not fully understand the compensation of Elite
CEOs and have possibly been underestimating the role of CEO managerial power in
determining CEO compensation.
I use five measures of CEO compensation (salary, bonus, equity-based
compensation, Other compensation, and total direct compensation) as the dependent
variable in my base case regressions. I also run a sensitivity case with only the firms that
are in the sample for the full thirteen years with CEO total direct compensation as the
dependent variable (to explore potential survivorship issues).

I then run three

sensitivities using different methods for ranking and classifying the CEOs on each of the
six cases. Furthermore, for each of the cases I run both random-effects and fixed-effects
on the firm-effects (in Section 6, I show why firm-effects is a better specification than
CEO-effects), and then perform the Hausman test to determine which is appropriate.
I use the following empirical specification of CEO compensation, which is similar
to models used in the literature:
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ln(compensationi , j ,t ) = β 0 + β 1 ( ROAi , j ,t −1 ) + β 2 ( Net Income 3 − year growth ratei , j ,t −1 )
+ β 3 ( Shareholder 3 − year returni , j ,t −1 )
+ β 4 ln(Sales i , j ,t −1 ) + β 5 ( Stock volatility i , j ,t −1 )
+ β 6 (Total Liabilities i , j ,t −1 / assets i , j ,t −1 ) + β 7 ( PP & E i , j ,t −1 / assets i , j ,t −1 )
+ β 8 ( R & Di , j ,t −1 / assets i , j ,t −1 ) + β 9 ( Market to Book ratio i , j ,t −1 )

(1)

+ β 10 (CEO agei , j ,t −1 ) + β 11 (CEO age 2 i , j ,t −1 ) + β 12 (CEO tenurei , j ,t −1 )
+ β 13 (Governance Indexi , j ,t −1 )
+ β 14 ( Elite CEO dummy ) + β x ( Elite CEO Interaction Terms)
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε i , j ,t

where subscripts i, j, and t denote firm, CEO and time, respectively. 2 I include three
measures of firm performance as explanatory variables in the CEO compensation
regressions: (1) the net income before extraordinary items over assets (return on assets or
ROA), in the year prior to the year of observation, as a proxy for CEO skill and to help
explain CEOs’ annual bonus, (2) 3-year growth rate in net income in the year prior to the
year of observation, as a proxy for CEO skill and to help explain CEOs’ long term
incentive plan bonus, and (3) 3-year shareholder return with dividends reinvested, in the
year prior to the year of observation, as a proxy for CEO skill and to help explain CEOs’
equity-based compensation.

Generally, I expect a positive correlation between all

components of CEO compensation and past firm performance.

I include predicted

positive signs in the results tables.
I include six measures of firm characteristics as explanatory variables in the CEO
compensation regressions: (1) the natural log of sales, in the year prior to the observation,
explains firm scale and complexity, (2) the Black-Scholes stock volatility measure, in the
β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable, βx represents the set of partial coefficients
on the explanatory variables interacted with Elite CEO dummy, and ε represents the error term.
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients.

2
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year prior to the observation, explains firm complexity, (3) the ratio of total liabilities to
total assets, in the year prior to the observation, explains firm complexity, (4) the ratio of
a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets, in the year prior to the
observation, explains firm complexity, (5) the ratio of the firm’s research and
development expenditures (R&D) to total assets, in the year prior to the observation,
explains firm complexity, and (6) the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of
assets, in the year prior to the observation, explains firm growth opportunity and
complexity. Generally, I expect a positive correlation between all components of CEO
compensation and firm characteristics based on the notion that a CEO that manages a
larger or more complex firm deserves higher compensation. I include predicted positive
signs in the results tables.
I include three CEO characteristic as an explanatory variable in the CEO
compensation regressions: (1) the age of the CEO in the year prior to the observation,
proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) the age of the CEO squared in the
year prior to the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, and (3)
CEO tenure at the firm in the year prior to the observation, proxy for CEO experience
and standing at the firm. The previous research has found mixed signs and significance
for the coefficient on this variable. Based on the idea that an older CEO or a CEO with
more tenure is more highly skilled and experienced and therefore deserving of higher
compensation, I include positive predicted signs in the results tables.
I include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index to control for firm
governance characteristics. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) develop the governance
index as a proxy for shareholder rights based on 24 governance rules. The construction
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of the governance index for each firm is as follows: the authors add 1 point for every
provision that restricts shareholder rights (increases managerial power). The governance
index ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest shareholder rights).
Generally, I expect a positive correlation between all components of CEO compensation
and weakness in the governance index, i.e. the weaker corporate governance leads to
higher CEO compensation. I include predicted positive signs in the results tables as
compensation is increasing with increasing weakness in corporate governance. I also
include industry and year dummy variables in the CEO compensation regressions.
Table 3 presents a list and a description of the variables and the sources of the
data for the CEO compensation regressions. Table 4 presents summary results from
previous research models, including the signs and significance of estimated coefficients
on the control variables for a variety of different dependent variables that measure
compensation.
I perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite CEOs are compensated
differently. To perform the modified Chow Test I include an Elite CEO dummy variable
(equal to 1 for Elite CEOs and 0 otherwise) and interact it with all explanatory variables
(except for the year and industry dummies) then test the null that the coefficients on the
Elite CEO dummy and all Elite CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. If the
null is rejected, then Elite CEOs are compensated differently and something else is going
on that is not captured in the CEO compensation models, such as excessive CEO
managerial power or weak corporate governance.

70

4.3

Step 3: How Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?
Question (2): If the compensation of different classes of CEOs (Elite CEOs and

Non-Elite CEOs) are best described with different CEO compensation models, which is
what I expect, then how are they compensated differently? That is, should the CEO
compensation model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) contain the
same structure and the same variables? The research in this step assumes the same
variables are contained in the both the Elite CEO and Non-Elite CEOs compensation
models and investigates whether the coefficients on these variables are different. For
example, is total direct compensation for Elite CEOs more sensitive to past firm
performance than Non-Elite CEOs?
This step involves three additional cases (“All CEOs”, “Non-Elite CEOs” (the
CEOs that are not Elite), and Elite CEOs) for each of the five measures of CEO
compensation as the dependent variable. Furthermore, for each case I run both randomeffects and fixed-effects on the firm-effects (I describe my support for using firm-effects
instead of CEO-effects in Section 6), and then perform the Hausman test to determine
which is appropriate.
I use the following empirical specification of CEO compensation:
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ln(compensationi , j ,t ) = β 0 + β 1 ( ROAi , j ,t −1 ) + β 2 ( Net Income 3 − year growth ratei , j ,t −1 )
+ β 3 ( Shareholder 3 − year returni , j ,t −1 )
+ β 4 (ln(Sales i , j ,t −1 ) + β 5 ( Stock volatility i , j ,t −1 )
+ β 6 (Total Liabilities i , j ,t −1 / assets i , j ,t −1 ) + β 7 ( PP & E i , j ,t −1 / assets i , j ,t −1 )
+ β 8 ( R & Di , j ,t −1 / assets i , j ,t −1 ) + β 9 ( Market to Book ratio i , j ,t −1 )

(2)

+ β 10 (CEO agei , j ,t −1 ) + β 11 (CEO age 2 i , j ,t −1 ) + β 12 (CEO tenurei , j ,t −1 )
+ β 13 (Governance Indexi , j ,t −1 )
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε i , j ,t

where subscripts i, j, and t denote firm, CEO and time, respectively. 3 For this set of CEO
compensation regressions I use the same explanatory variables and expect the same signs
on the coefficients as described in Step 2. However, for this set of CEO compensation
regressions I do not include the Elite CEO dummy or the Elite CEO interaction terms.
The analysis of these regressions is a simple comparison of the statistical and
economic significance of the coefficients on the variables from the three additional cases
just described (All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs) and the case from Step 2. If
the coefficients and their statistical significances are different, then something else is
going on that is not captured in the CEO compensation models, such as excessive CEO
managerial power or weak corporate governance.

4.4

Step 4: Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently?
Question (3): Is the firm performance model that explains Elite CEOs’ firms’

performance different from the one-size-fits-all firm performance model? Asked another
way, does the one-size-fits-all firm performance model apply for Elite CEOs’ firms? I
β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable and ε represents the error term.
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
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initiate this analysis by including an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with
all of the explanatory variables (except for the year and industry dummies) in the firm
performance regressions. I then perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite
CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.
This research specifically investigates whether or not Elite CEOs’ firms perform
differently from Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. If the same one-size-fits-all firm performance
model does not apply to all CEOs’ firms, then existing models distort the significance of
the variables that are in the firm performance regression with respect to the impact they
have on the Elite CEOs’ firms. This of course suggests that we do not fully understand
the performance of Elite CEOs’ firms and have possibly been underestimating the role of
CEO managerial power in determining firm performance.
For this step, I use eight measures of firm performance (forward one-year return
on assets, forward one-year return on equity, forward three-year growth rate in net
income, forward five-year growth rate in net income, forward shareholder one-year return
including reinvesting dividends, forward shareholder three-year return including
reinvesting dividends, forward shareholder five-year return including reinvesting
dividends, and market value to book value ratio) as dependent variables. I also run a
sensitivity case using only the firms that are in the sample for the full thirteen years for
each of the eight dependent variables (to explore potential survivorship issues). I then
run one sensitivity test on each of the cases using a different method for ranking and
classifying the CEOs. Furthermore, for each case I run both random-effects and fixedeffects on the firm-effects (I support using firm-effects instead of CEO-effects in Section
6), and then perform the Hausman test to determine which is appropriate.
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I use the following empirical specification of firm performance for seven of the
eight dependent variables (all but the market value to book value ratio which has a
different specification as described later):

( firm performancei , j ,t + var ies ) = β 0 + β1 ln(Firm sizei , j ,t ) + β 2 (Stock volatilityi , j ,t )
+ β 3 (Total liabilitiesi , j ,t / assetsi , j ,t ) + β 4 ( PP & Ei , j ,t / assetsi , j ,t )
+ β 5 ( R & Di , j ,t / assetsi. j.t ) + β 6 ( Market to Book ratioi , j ,t )
+ β 7 ln(Salaryi , j ,t ) + β 8 ln(Bonusi , j ,t )
+ β 9 ln(Equity − basedi , j ,t ) + β10 ln(Otheri , j ,t )

(3)

+ β11 (CEO agei , j ,t ) + β12 (CEO age 2 i , j ,t ) + β13 (CEO tenurei , j ,t )
+ β14 (GovernanceIndexi , j ,t )
+ β15 ( Elite CEO dummy) + β x ( Elite CEO Interaction Terms)
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε i , j ,t

where for equation 3 subscripts i, j and t denote the firm, CEO and time, respectively. 4 I
include six measures of firm characteristics as explanatory variables in the firm
performance regressions: (1) the natural log of sales, in the year of the observation,
explains firm scale and complexity, (2) the Black-Scholes stock volatility measure, in the
year of the observation, explains firm complexity, (3) the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets, in the year of the observation, explains firm complexity, (4) the ratio of a firm’s
net property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets, in the year of the observation,
explains firm complexity, (5) the ratio of the firm’s research and development
expenditures (R&D) to total assets, in the year of the observation, explains firm
β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable, βx represents the set of partial coefficients
on the explanatory variables interacted with Elite CEO dummy, and ε represents the error term.
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
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complexity, and (6) the ratio of market value to book value, in the year of the
observation, explains firm growth potential.
Based on the efficient market theory that all information is already priced in the
market, I do not expect a statistically significant or consistent correlation between
market-based measures of forward firm performance and firm characteristics. Likewise
and somewhat by extension, I do not expect a statistically significant or consistent
correlation between accounting based measures of forward firm performance and firm
characteristics. However, consistent with the literature these firm characteristics will be
included as control variables. I include not significant (“NS”) for the predicted signs in
my results tables.
I include four measures of CEO compensation as explanatory variables in the firm
performance regressions: (1) CEO annual salary in the year of the observation, proxy for
CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) CEO annual bonus in the year of the
observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, (3) CEO equity-based
compensation in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably
skill, and (4) CEO Other compensation in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO
experience and presumably skill.

Based on the efficient market theory that all

information is already priced in the market, I do not expect a statistically significant or
consistent correlation between market-based measures of firm performance and measures
of CEO compensation. However, Mehran (1995) found a statistically significant positive
relationship between CEO equity-based compensation and both Tobin’s Q and return on
assets. Therefore I expect a positive correlation between accounting based measures of
firm performance and all measures of CEO compensation. I include NS for the predicted
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signs for the market-based measures of firm performance in my results tables and include
a positive predicted sign for the accounting based measures of firm performance in my
results tables.
I include three CEO characteristic as an explanatory variable in the CEO
compensation regressions: (1) the age of the CEO in the year of the observation, proxy
for CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) the age of the CEO squared in the year of
the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, and (3) CEO tenure at
the firm in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO experience and standing at the
firm. Based on the premise that an older CEO or a CEO with more tenure is more highly
skilled and experienced and based on Daines, Nair and Kornhauser (2005)’s finding of a
positive correlation between CEO skill and forward firm performance I include positive
predicted signs in my results tables.
I include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index to control for firm
governance characteristics. Generally, shareholders want a positive correlation between
firm performance and a strengthening governance index, i.e. stronger corporate
governance should lead to better firm performance. Unfortunately, the previous research
has found mixed signs and significance for the coefficients on various measures of
corporate governance. The construction of the governance index is described in subsection 4.2 but to review it ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest
shareholder rights). I include negative predicted signs in my results tables as firm
performance is decreasing with increasing weakness in the governance index. I also
include industry and year dummy variables in the firm performance regressions.
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The market to book ratio is different from the other performance metrics in that it
does not measure a rate of return. The market value of a firm can be thought of as the
capitalized value of different firm characteristics. Therefore, I use the following empirical
specification for the market value to book value ratio:

( MarkettoBookRatioi , j ,t ) = β 0 + β 1 ( NetIncomei , j ,t / assets i , j ,t ) +
+ β 2 (Total liabilities i , j ,t / assets i , j ,t ) + β 3 ( PP & E i , j ,t / assets i , j ,t )
+ β 4 ( R & Di , j ,t / assets i. j .t ) +
+ β 5 (CEO agei , j ,t ) + β 6 (CEO age 2 i , j ,t ) + β 7 (CEO tenurei , j ,t )

(4)

+ β 8 (Governance Indexi , j ,t )
+ β 9 ( Elite CEO dummy) + β x ( Elite CEO Interaction Terms)
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε i , j ,t

where for equation 4 subscripts i, j and t denote the firm, CEO and time, respectively. 5 I
include four measures of firm characteristics as explanatory variables: (1) the ratio of net
income to the assets, in the year of the observation, explains firm profitability, (2) the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets, in the year of the observation, measures the
leveraging effects of debt, (3) the ratio of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment
(PP&E) to total assets, in the year of the observation, measures tangibility of assets, and
(4) the ratio of the firm’s research and development expenditures (R&D) to total assets,
in the year of the observation, is a proxy for growth.

β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable, βx represents the set of partial coefficients
on the explanatory variables interacted with Elite CEO dummy, and ε represents the error term.
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients.

5
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I include three CEO characteristic as an explanatory variable in the CEO
compensation regressions: (1) the age of the CEO in the year of the observation, proxy
for CEO experience and presumably skill, (2) the age of the CEO squared in the year of
the observation, proxy for CEO experience and presumably skill, and (3) CEO tenure at
the firm in the year of the observation, proxy for CEO experience and standing at the
firm. Based on the premise that an older CEO or a CEO with more tenure is more highly
skilled and experienced and based on Daines, Nair and Kornhauser (2005)’s finding of a
positive correlation between CEO skill and forward firm performance I include positive
predicted signs in my results tables.
I include the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index to control for firm
governance characteristics. Generally, shareholders want a positive correlation between
firm performance and a strengthening governance index, i.e. stronger corporate
governance should lead to better firm performance. Unfortunately, the previous research
has found mixed signs and significance for the coefficients on various measures of
corporate governance. The construction of the governance index is described in subsection 4.2 but to review it ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest
shareholder rights). I include negative predicted signs in my results tables as firm
performance is decreasing with increasing weakness in the governance index. I also
include industry and year dummy variables in the firm performance regressions.
As mentioned previously, a list and a description of the variables and the sources
of the data are provided in Table 5.

I list the variables and present the sign and

significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some measure
of firm performance as the dependent variable in Table 6.
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I perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite CEOs’ firms perform
differently. To perform the modified Chow Test I include a dummy variable equal to one
for Elite CEOs and interact it with all explanatory variables (except for the year and
industry dummies) then test the null that the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and all
interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. If that is indeed the case, then something else
is going on that is not captured in the firm performance models, such as excessive CEO
managerial power or weak corporate governance.

4.5

Step 5: How Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently?
Question (4): If the firm performance of the different classes of CEOs’ (Elite

CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) firms are best described with different firm performance
models, which is what I expect, then how do the firms perform differently? That is,
should the firm performance model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite
CEOs) contain the same structure and the same variables? The research in this step
assumes the same variables are contained in the both the Elite CEO and Non-Elite CEOs
firm performance models and investigates whether the coefficients on these variables are
different? For example, is the firm performance for Elite CEOs’ firms more sensitive to
firm sales than Non-Elite CEOs?
This step involves three additional cases (All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite
CEOs) for each of the eight measures of firm performance as the dependent variable. I
then run one sensitivity case on each of these twenty-four cases using a different method
for ranking and classifying the CEOs. Furthermore, for each of the forty-eight cases I run
both random-effects and fixed-effects on the firm-effects (I support using firm-effects
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instead of CEO-effects in Section 6 Results), and then perform the Hausman test to
determine which is appropriate.
I use the following empirical specification of firm performance for seven of the
eight dependent variables (all but the market value to book value ratio which has a
different specification):

( firm performancei , j ,t + var ies ) = β 0 + β 1 ln( Firm sizei , j ,t ) + β 2 ( Stock volatility i , j ,t )
+ β 3 (Total liabilities i , j ,t / assets i , j ,t ) + β 4 ( PP & E t / assetsi , j ,t )
+ β 5 ( R & Di , j ,t / assets i. j .t ) + β 6 ( Market to Book ratioi , j ,t )
+ β 7 ln(Salary i , j ,t ) + β 8 ln( Bonusi , j ,t )

(5)

+ β 9 ln( Equity − based i , j ,t ) + β 10 ln(Otheri , j ,t )
+ β 11 (CEO agei , j ,t ) + β 12 (CEO age 2 i , j ,t ) + β 13 (CEO tenurei , j ,t )
+ β 14 ( Average Ratioi , j ,t ) + β 15 (Governance Indexi , j ,t )
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε i , j ,t

I use the following empirical specification of firm performance for the market
value to book value ratio:

( MarkettoBookRatioi , j ,t ) = β 0 + β 1 ( NetIncomei , j ,t / assets i , j ,t ) +
+ β 2 (Total liabilities i , j ,t / assets i , j ,t ) + β 3 ( PP & E t / assets i , j ,t )
+ β 4 ( R & Di , j ,t / assets i. j .t ) +
+ β 5 (CEO agei , j ,t ) + β 6 (CEO age 2 i , j ,t ) + β 7 (CEO tenurei , j ,t )
+ β 8 ( Average Ratioi , j ,t ) + β 9 (Governance Indexi , j ,t )
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε i , j ,t
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(6)

where for both equations 5 and 6 subscripts i, j and t denote the firm, CEO and time,
respectively. 6 For this set of firm performance regressions I use the same explanatory
variables and expect the same signs on the coefficients as described in Step 4 for
equations 3 and 4, respectively; except, I now include the Average Ratio as an
explanatory variable but do not include the Elite CEO dummy or Elite CEO interaction
terms. 7
The analysis of these regressions is a simple comparison of the statistical and
economic significance of the coefficients on the variables from the three additional cases
just described (All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs) and the case from Step 4. If
the coefficients and their statistical significances are different, particularly on the
Average Ratio, then something else is going on that is not captured in the CEO
compensation models, such as excessive CEO managerial power or weak corporate
governance. The sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient on Average Ratio
should help explain whether or not Elite CEOs’ firms outperform all other firms.

β represents the partial coefficient on the explanatory variable and ε represents the error term.
Industrydummies represents the set of industry dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
Yeardummies represents the set of year dummies and their respective partial coefficients.
7
The Average Ratio is the average of a CEO’s CEO/Number_2 Ratio over a CEO’s tenure as the CEO at a
given firm. The CEO/Number_2 Ratio was first described in Section 3 and the Average Ratio is more fully
developed in Section 6.
6
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5

Data
In this section I describe in detail how I prepare the data set for this research in

sub-section 5.1 and provide descriptive statistics and information on the data set in subsection 5.2.

5.1

Data Set
Table 3 lists and describes the variables I use in my CEO compensation

regressions, as more fully described in Steps 2 and 3 of Section 4. Table 5 lists and
describes the variables I use in my firm performance regressions, as more fully described
in Steps 4 and 5 of Section 4. In these tables I also note the source of the data for each
variable and the source’s name or code for the listed variables. Table 7 presents the data
and sources used in prior research that I consider key to my dissertation. Following is a
description of the process I followed to collect and prepare the data for this research.
I utilized the Wharton Research Data Services to collect three ‘master’ data files
for the period 1993 through 2005 from the Compustat North America dataset (one data
file from the Executive Compensation area and one data file from the Financial
Statements area) and from the RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) dataset.
Since my focus is on CEOs, I began building my dataset with the Executive
Compensation (“ExecuComp”) master data file which has information for the top five
executives at each firm. I dropped observations that do not have any compensation data
whatsoever. For the observations that are missing data for total direct compensation
(variable tdc1), restricted stock grants (variable rstkgrnt), and stock options (variable
option_1) but have data for variables salary or bonus; I set tdc1 equal to salary plus
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bonus. I created a variable Equity that is equal to restricted stock grants (rstkgrnt) plus
stock options (option_1).
I created a new dummy variable CEO set equal to 1 if the ExecuComp variable
ceoann was equal to the string ‘CEO’ and 0 otherwise. Unfortunately, some of the firms
do not recognize any of the executives for a given firm-year as the CEO by the variable
ceoann. For these firms I took two approaches to identifying the firm’s CEO.

First, I

identify the firms that have a CEO for at least one other firm-year. For these firms, if it is
obvious that the person who is the CEO in the firm-years with a non-missing ceoann
value is also the CEO in the firm-year with the missing ceoann variable, then I manually
change the CEO dummy variable to 1 for firm-years missing ceoann.

Second, for the

firms without a CEO for at least one firm-year, I ranked the executives by their respective
total direct compensation by firm-year and deemed the highest ranking executive to be
the CEO for the given firm-year.
I rank the ‘non-CEO’ executives by total direct compensation by firm-year and
deemed the highest ranking non-CEO to be the Number 2 executive. I drop firm-years
that do not have both a CEO and a Number 2 executive. I create a new variable Ratio
that for a given firm-year is simply the ratio of the CEO’s total direct compensation and
the Number 2 executive’s total direct compensation (previously defined as CEO/Number
2 Ratio). The use of CEO/Number_2 Ratio was discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
The CEO’s age is an explanatory variable in my regressions but the variable age
is missing data for 1,187 firm-years. However, for 407 of these observations the CEO’s
age is available in at least one firm-year but is missing data in other firm-year(s). For
these 407 observations I added or subtracted, accordingly, from the CEO’s age to fill in
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the missing data. I created CEO tenure based on the number of years the CEO serves as
CEO at a given firm in the sample. For the executives who were CEOs in 1993, I add the
number of years the served as CEO at that firm prior to 1993 using the becameceo
variable from ExecuComp.
I merge the ExecuComp data file, as it is at this point, with the Financial
Statements data file (“Compustat”) by company identification number (variable gvkey)
and year.

I drop observations that are missing data for company sales and drop

observations with sales less than $25 million for a given firm-year (in 2005 dollars).
I set missing data equal to zero for the following variables (this is a common
approach in the literature): (1) research and development (variable data45) was missing
data for 18,240 observations; and (2) deferred taxes (variable data74) was missing 3,421
observations. I winsorize the data at the 99th percentile for three variables to mitigate the
influence of outliers: 1) shareholder one-year return (variable trs1yr), 2) shareholder
three-year return (variable trs3yr) and 3) shareholder five-year return (variable trs5yr).
The RiskMetrics (“IRRC”) master data file includes the Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick governance index (variable gindex). Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) develop
the governance index as a proxy for shareholder rights based on 24 governance rules.
The construction of the governance index for each firm is as follows: the authors add 1
point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights (increases managerial power).
The governance index ranges from 1 (strongest shareholder rights) to 24 (weakest
shareholder rights). Unfortunately, gindex is only available for years 1993, 1995, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. I fill in the missing years by averaging the values for gindex
in the preceding year and subsequent year, in cases where both the preceding year and
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subsequent year are available (for 1996 and 1997 it is the average of the gindex values for
1995 and 1998 if both are available). For the other years missing data for gindex I set the
missing value equal to the preceding year’s value (if available) or the subsequent year’s
value (if available). I then use the “interpolate and extrapolate” features of Stata to fill in
any remaining gaps.
I merge the IRRC working data file with the combined ExecuComp and
Compustat data file by cusip and year and drop 71 observations that I can not match. I
drop one of the two firm-years for CEOs that are serving as CEO at two firms in the same
year and I drop the one firm with no industry identification. The final dataset has 23,528
firm-year observations for the period 1993-2005.

5.2

Descriptive Statistics
There are 2,746 firms and 13 years in the final dataset, for a total of 23,528 firm-

years for most variables. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum,
median and mean) for each of the variables in the regressions. Table 9 presents their
pair-wise correlations.

The variables include five measures of CEO compensation

(salary, bonus, equity-based, Other, and total compensation), eight measures of firm
performance (return on assets, return on equity, net income 3-year growth rate, net
income 5-year growth rate, shareholder 1-year, 3-year and 5-year growth rate, and market
to book value ratio), six firm characteristics (sales, stock price volatility, total liabilities to
assets ratio, PP&E to assets ratio, R&D to assets ratio, and Governance Index), and three
CEO characteristics (age, age2, and tenure).
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I now demonstrate that the firm-effects and CEO-effects are stable in the dataset.
Table 10, panel A, indicates that on average 95% of the firms in the sample survive from
one year to the next. I define a firm’s life as the number of years it is in the sample.
Table 10, panel B, shows that 88 percent of the firms have a life of 3 years or greater. The
mean firm life is 8.6 years and the median is 9 years. Firms tend not to float in and out
of the sample; only 58 of the 2,746 firms have gaps in the years that they are in the
sample. Thus, the sample of firms is relatively stable from year to year. In other words,
intertemporal variation in the data is not being driven by a changing composition of firms
from year to year. This suggests that the entire sample of 23,528 firm-years can be used.
However, I also run a sensitivity case including only the firms that are in the sample for
the full 13 years for both the CEO compensation and firm performance regressions.
In sub-section 3.3 I refer to Figure 5 and point out that the top 10% group of
CEOs (based on a ranking of total direct compensation) has a huge hump in its total
direct compensation in the years leading up to 2000. A natural concern is that potentially
some subset of firms represented within the top 10% group of CEOs is responsible for the
anomaly. For example, the technology firms that came and went during the internet
bubble in the late 1990s potentially could be the source of the hump in total direct
compensation. Figure 6 addresses this concern by breaking the sample into three groups
based on the number of years the firm is in the sample: (1) one to five year firm life, (2)
six to nine year firm life, and (3) ten to thirteen year firm life. From Figure 6 it is clear
that all three groups have similarly shaped humps in the total direct compensation. Thus,
the sample is not being distorted by a changing mixture of firms.
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Next I focus on CEOs and find that fewer than 150 of the 5,210 CEOs in the sample
serve at more than one firm during the sample years, indicating that few CEOs move
from one firm in the sample to another firm in the sample. Table 11 shows that
approximately 64 percent of the CEOs have tenure (including service prior to 1993)
longer than three years, with mean CEO tenure of 6.4 years and median of 4 years.
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6

Results
In this section I present the results of my research in the order of the five steps

outlined in Section 4.

6.1

Step 1: Develop the Classification of Elite CEOs
The purpose of this step is to categorize the CEOs into two classes: “Elite CEOs”

and “Non-Elite CEOs” (the remaining CEOs). I began by calculating for each CEO in
each year the CEO/Number_2 Ratio. I then calculate the mean CEO/Number_2 Ratio for
each CEO for the years that the CEO serves as the CEO at the firm. I call this the
“Average Ratio.” Note that each CEO has only one Average Ratio at a given firm, no
matter how many years the individual is employed as the CEO. I then rank the CEOs by
year using the Average Ratio. Figure 7 is a plot of the Average Ratio for all CEOs versus
the fraction of the data and it indicates a slight bend in the curve starting at the 80th
percentile and a distinct bend in the curve at the 90th percentile. 8 In other words, the
Average Ratio is pretty similar for about 90% of the CEOs, but it is much higher for the
top 10%. Therefore, I classify a CEO as an Elite CEO for the entire firm-tenure if the
CEO has an Average Ratio that is in the top 10% for at least one year during the CEO’s
tenure.
The use of the Average Ratio leads to a definition of Elite CEO status that is
relatively similar to the alternative of defining each year the Elite CEOs as those with a
8

The Average Ratio is about 2.0 at the 70th percentile and increases to 2.3 at the 80th percentile. The slope
increases (almost doubles) for the next decile as the Average Ratio climbs to 2.9 at the 90th percentile.
Thereafter, the slope continues to increases as the Average Ratio jumps to 3.7 at the 95th percentile. Figure
7 plots only the first 98% (by Average Ratio) because the top 2% of the sample have such large values
(greater than 6.0) that they distort the scale of the figure if they are included in the figure. Although the top
2% are excluded from the figure, all observations are used in the subsequent empirical tests.
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CEO/Number_2 Ratio in the top 10% for that year. In other words, the annual ranking of
CEO/Number_2 Ratio is fairly “sticky” over time. For example, CEOs that have an
CEO/Number_2 Ratio in the top 10% for at least one year also are in the top 10% for
more than 80% of the years in which they are CEO. In addition, Table 12 shows the
stickiness of Elite CEO status by firm-tenure using the Average Ratio approach as
defined with a top 10% cutoff (for robustness, Table 12 also shows similar data for a top
15% cutoff). Notice that if a long-tenured CEO is classified as Elite in at least one year,
then the CEO is classified as Elite in most years.
There are two reasons that I do not reclassify Elite CEOs each year, but instead
classify a CEO as an Elite CEO for the entire firm-tenure if the CEO is above the cut-off
level for at least one year during the CEO’s tenure. First, the Average Ratio approach
mitigates the impact of golden hellos (sign on bonuses and other additional compensation
in the first year on seat as the CEO) and golden goodbyes (severance or retirement
packages in the last year of service) because it takes into account the CEO’s
compensation in all years of the CEO’s firm-tenure. Second, the Average Ratio approach
makes Elite CEO status time invariant for an Elite CEO’s firm-tenure. If I reclassified
Elite CEOs each year then some CEOs would float in and out of Elite CEO status during
their firm-tenure, creating anomalies in the firm-effect analysis.
It is important to recognize that the CEO/Number_2 Ratio is not just another way
of expressing total compensation but instead captures a distinct aspect of CEO
managerial power. Figure 8 presents a rank-order of the CEOs by their CEO/Number_2
Ratio and total direct compensation, with the ranking done by thirds (I chose to rank by
thirds because it provides sufficient insight without the clutter caused by more ranking
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categories). Figure 8 clearly demonstrates ranking by CEO/Number_2 Ratio is
substantially different from ranking by total direct compensation. For example, if the
CEO/Number_2 Ratio and total compensation were perfectly correlated, then 100% of
the CEOs in the top one-third when ranked by the CEO/Number_2 Ratio would also be in
the top one-third when ranked by total compensation. However, Figure 8 shows that only
51% of the top one-third CEOs ranked by CEO/Number_2 Ratio are also in the top onethird of CEOs ranked by total direct compensation. Furthermore, Table 1 (panel B)
shows the pair-wise correlation of CEO total direct compensation and CEO/Number_2
Ratio is relatively low (in the range of 0.12 to 0.46 with an average of 0.24) for the period
1993 through 2005. The Spearman’s rank-order correlation is also shown in Table 1
panel B, and it, too, is low.
Because all executives at a particular firm may be highly compensated, the level
of CEO total compensation does not necessarily speak to a CEO’s ability to extract
excess compensation; in other words, there may be rational firm-specific reasons to have
a highly compensated CEO and senior executives. However, as I have noted previously,
the CEO/Number_2 Ratio is a proxy for CEO managerial power or influence over the
board, which is responsible for setting CEO compensation.

Therefore ranking and

classifying the CEOs by their CEO/Number_2 Ratio provides insights on the different
classes of CEOs’ relative level of compensation and relative level of firm performance.
Some could argue that the CEOs’ with the highest CEO/Number_2 Ratios are
simply managing more complex firms and therefore deserve the relatively higher
compensation. I argue that if a firm is more complex, then all executives’ roles in
managing the firm are more demanding and deserving of relatively higher compensation.
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Several of the firm characteristic explanatory variables that I previously described in
Section 4 are proxies for firm complexity. Therefore the CEO/Number_2 Ratios should
stay relatively level within a firm after controlling for firm complexity.
Others could argue that the CEOs with the highest CEO/Number_2 Ratios simply
have a better relationship with their respective boards or there is an element of cronyism
where the CEO and the directors set each others salaries. I control for this “cronyism”
issue by including the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick governance index as an explanatory
variable.
For robustness tests, I develop a concentration index of each CEO’s compensation
based on the top five executives’ compensation at each firm. The logic and support for
this approach is that the relationship of the CEO’s compensation to the top five
executives’ compensation is a measure of the CEO’s managerial power and ability to
extract compensation. The technique I use for developing the concentration index of
CEO compensation is analogous to the Herfindahl Index, also known as the HerfindahlHirschman Index. The Herfindahl Index is an indicator of the amount of competition
among firms in an industry and is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares
of each individual firm. As such, it can range from close to 0 for an industry with many
small firms to 1 for an industry with a single monopolistic producer.
My concentration index is the sum of squares of the top five executive’s
respective share (percent) of the total compensation for the top five executives. In theory
it can range from 0.2 if the top five executives are equally compensated to 1.0 if one of
the executives receives all of the compensation paid to the top five executives.
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Similar to Average Ratio, I rank and classify Elite CEOs based on the average
compensation concentration index, denoted by “Average CCI.” Figure 9 is a plot of the
Average CCI for all CEOs versus the fraction of the data and it indicates a distinct bend
in the curve at the 80th through the 90th percentile.
In summary, I classify a CEO as an Elite CEO for the entire firm-tenure if the
CEO has an Average Ratio that is in the top 10% for at least one year during the CEO’s
tenure. I use this classification for my base cases for the CEO compensation regressions
and the firm performance regressions. For robustness tests, in the CEO compensation
regressions I use the Average Ratio with a top 20% cutoff, the Average CCI with a top
10% cutoff, and the Average CCI with a top 20% cut-off as sensitivity cases. As I show
later, the results from the CEO compensation regressions using the definition of an Elite
CEO based on a top 10% cutoff with the Average Ratio are robust to the alternative
cutoffs and the use of the Average CCI. Therefore, I only use the Average CCI with a
top 10% cut-off as a sensitivity case for the firm performance regressions.
From my base-case classification of Elite CEO status, based on the Average Ratio
and a cut-off at the 90th percentile, Table 13 shows the number of CEOs and Elite CEOs
by year. I note that the number and percent of Elite CEOs is increasing from year to year
during the sample period. Figure 10 demonstrates that this is simply because the Average
Ratio is increasing for All CEOs throughout the sample period; which, naturally results in
more CEOs being above the 90th percentile in the second half of the sample period.9 It is
interesting that even though the Average Ratio is increasing during the sample period, the
9

As a sensitivity case, I use the CEO/Number_2 Ratio to rank and classify CEOs with a 10% cut-off by
year for Elite CEO status and find similar results as for my base case. However, this sensitivity case has
the unfavorable characteristic that Elite CEO status is time variant (i.e., CEOs float in and out of Elite CEO
status).
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mean Average Ratios for All CEOs of 1.94 and Non-Elite CEOs of 1.66 are comparable
to what the CEO/Number_2 Ratio was in the 1930s. This comparison is based on
information from Baker (1939) that enables me to determine that the CEO/Number_ 2
Ratio for the top executive’s compensation to the number two executive’s compensation
was about 1.7 in 1929 and 1.9 in 1936 for large firms.
After classifying CEOs, I perform a univariate analysis of the means and medians
of all variables I use later in my multivariate tests. Table 14 presents these results. It is
interesting to note that the mean and median for every component of compensation and
the total direct compensation for the Elite CEOs are two to four times higher and
statistically different at the 1% level compared to the respective amounts for Non-Elite
CEOs. Yet, none of my eight measures of firm performance are statistically different at
the 1% level, for both the mean and median, between the Elite CEOs and Non-Elite
CEOs.

In fact, the mean and median for only two of the eight measures of firm

performance (net income 5-year growth rate and shareholder 5-year return) are higher
and statistically different at the 5% level for Elite CEOs compared to Non-Elite CEOs.
This comparison suggests that Elite CEOs receive much higher compensation than NonElite CEOs yet it is not clear at all that the Elite CEOs’ firms perform better.
The comparison of the firm characteristic control variables between the two
classes of CEOs is also quite interesting. The mean and median for firm sales, stock
volatility, and liabilities to assets ratio are higher and statistically different at the 1% level
for Elite CEOs’ firms compared to the respective numbers for Non-Elite CEOs. This
suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms are larger, more complex, and riskier. In addition, the
mean and median for the ratio of PP&E to assets is lower and statistically different at the
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1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms compared to the respective values for Non-Elite CEOs.
This suggests that Elite CEOs firms are more difficult to monitor (firms are more difficult
to monitor with decreasing levels of physical assets). It is also important to notice the
mean and median for the governance index is also higher (which means weaker corporate
governance) and statistically different at the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms than for NonElite CEOs’ firms. These observations suggest that by virtue of the weaker corporate
governance, higher difficulty of monitoring, and higher risk at their firms, Elite CEOs
have relatively more opportunity than Non-Elite CEOs to extract excess compensation
without necessarily providing higher firm performance.
The foregoing comparison suggests that there are several statistically significant
and interesting differences between the two classes of CEOs. The next 3 sub-sections
present the results of my multivariate tests of CEO compensation models.

6.2

The Basic Unadjusted CEO Compensation Regression Model: A Comparison
with Extant Literature
Before performing multivariate tests that employ the classification of Elite CEOs,

I first estimate my basic compensation model (without any adjustments for Elite status)
and compare the results with the extant literature to verify that my basic unadjusted
model produces results similar to results in the existing literature. This sub-section
demonstrates that my CEO compensation model and data are indeed comparable to
similar CEO compensation models in extant literature.
As mentioned in Section 4, I run both random-effects and fixed-effects for all of
my regressions. In most cases, Hausman tests indicated that the random-effects estimator
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was not appropriate. Consequently, I use and present the results from the fixed-effects
estimator throughout this section. However, before I ran the regressions I needed to
determine whether it should be firm-effects or CEO-effects. I calculated the mean and
standard deviation of the CEO/Number_2 Ratio by CEO and by firm.

From that

information I determined that the standard deviation of the CEO/Number_2 Ratio has a
higher mean and varies more for firms than for CEOs. Therefore I use firm-effects for all
regressions.
Table 15 lists the variables used in several comparable CEO compensation
models in extant literature with total direct compensation as the dependent variable. 10
Table 15 also reports the results from my regression with CEO total direct compensation
as the dependent variable in the last column. The R2 for extant CEO compensation
models range from 0.08 to 0.80 with the majority in the range of 0.08 to 0.56. The R2 for
my CEO total direct compensation model is comparable at 0.39. Table 15 also presents
the sign and the significance on the coefficients for variables used in the respective CEO
compensation models. A comparison of the sign and the significance of the coefficients
on the variables used in my CEO total direct compensation model are comparable to the
results from extant literature. Other than a larger sample (more firms and more years),
Table 15 confirms that my unadjusted model and data are similar to models and data in
previous empirical studies. Therefore, my new results in the next two sub-sections are
due to my adjustments for Elite CEO status rather than to any difference in data or model
structure.

10

Table 15 is essentially a reproduction of Table 4 but includes information from my CEO compensation
model with total direct compensation as the dependent variable.
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6.3

Step 2: Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?
This sub-section presents the results of my research and shows that Elite CEOs

are indeed compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs. I begin with a review of my
research question and methodology then present the results.
Question (1): Is the CEO compensation model that explains Elite CEO
compensation different from the one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model?

As

described in Section 4, I estimate regressions with compensation measures as the
dependent variables and a set of control variables as the independent variables, including
an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with all of the independent variables
(except for the year and industry dummies). I then perform a modified Chow Test to test
the null that the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and all interaction terms are jointly
equal to zero. If the null is rejected, then the same model does not apply for Elite CEOs
and Non-Elite CEOs. In other words, something is not captured in the typical CEO
compensation models, such as excessive CEO managerial power of the Elite CEOs. Note
that the CEO’s managerial power may be due to superior performance or to weak
corporate governance, an issue that I address later in this section.
Table 16 presents results of the modified Chow Tests. The rows of the table show
results for regression models with different dependent variables, which are the four
components of compensation (salary, bonus, equity, Other) and the total direct
compensation. In addition, for robustness testing I repeat the regression for total direct
compensation using a sub-sample containing only the firms that are in the sample for all
thirteen years. Each column in Table 16 is for a different method of classifying Elite
96

CEOs. These are based on the Average Ratio with cut-offs at the top 10% and top 20%.
For robustness, I also classify Elite CEOs based on the Average CCI index with cut-offs
at 10% and 20%. In all cases, except for the bonus component of compensation, I reject
the null at the 5% level (in fact most at the 1% level) that Elite CEO interaction terms are
jointly equal to zero. Also, rejecting the null for both the full sample and the sub-sample
containing only the firms that are in the sample for the full 13 years is evidence that I
probably do not have a severe selection problem. Therefore, the answer to Question 1 is
that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than implied by the one-size-fits-all CEO
compensation model. 11
The modified Chow Test includes the Elite CEO dummy term in the test of the
coefficients being jointly equal to zero. A possibility for my finding that Elite CEOs are
compensated differently is simply because they have a higher intercept (i.e., Elite CEOs
might have higher compensation after controlling for other factors). Therefore as a
sensitivity case, I run an alternate modified Chow Test to test the null that the coefficients
on all Elite CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero (the Elite CEO dummy term is
excluded from this test). Table 17 presents the results of the alternate modified Chow
Test and they confirm that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite
CEOs. 12

11

As sensitivity cases for robustness, I determined two alternate Average Ratios based on salary and salary
plus bonus for ranking and classifying CEOs. I then ran regressions for all five measures of CEO
compensation and also found that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs.
12
As another sensitivity case for robustness, I ran a regression with total direct compensation as the
dependent variable and interacted Elite CEO dummy with all explanatory variables and the variable year.
Both the modified and alternate modified Chow Tests indicate Elite CEOs are compensated differently at
the 1% level. None of the Elite CEO interacted year terms are significant at the 1% level.
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Now that I have established that Elite CEOs are compensated differently, the
natural follow-on question is “How Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?”

I

address this question in the next sub-section.

6.4

Step 3: How Are Elite CEOs Compensated Differently?
This sub-section presents the results of my research that investigates how Elite

CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs. I begin with a review of my
research question and methodology before presenting the results.
Question (2): If the compensation of different classes of CEOs (Elite CEOs and
Non-Elite CEOs) are best described with different CEO compensation models, which is
what I expect, then how are they compensated differently? The answer to Question 1 is
that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs. That being the case,
the research in this step assumes the same variables are contained in the both the Elite
CEO and Non-Elite CEOs compensation models and investigates whether the coefficients
on these variables are different.
For this analysis I perform CEO compensation regressions both with and without
the Elite CEO interaction terms. Tables 18 through 22 present the results of these
regressions; with each table presenting the results for a different measure of CEO
compensation as the dependent variable. For each table, Columns (1) and (2) are the
results from a single regression including Elite CEO interaction terms; the coefficients on
the independent variables are presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite
CEO dummy and interaction terms are presented in column (2). The results in column
(2) show how Elites CEOs are compensated relative to the Non-Elite CEOs with respect
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to the importance of particular control variables. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the
results of three regressions (without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for
All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs, respectively; and are essentially a frame of
reference or benchmark for determining how Elite CEOs are compensated differently.
The regression in column (3) shows the results that a researcher would obtain if the
impact of Elite CEOs is ignored. As the following discussion will show, there are a
couple of situations in which a researcher might draw an inappropriate conclusion with
respect to either the significance or magnitude of a coefficient. As a reminder, I use firm
fixed-effects in my regressions for reasons previously explained in sub-section 6.2.
Recall from Table 14 that the mean total direct compensation of $8.6 million for
Elite CEOs is higher and statistically different from the mean total direct compensation of
$3.6 million for Non-Elite CEOs. In general, the multivariate tests identify which
independent variables explain the differences in compensation. In addition, tests in the
previous sub-section demonstrated that the coefficients on explanatory variables are not
identical for Elite CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs. The objective in this sub-section is to
examine the results from the multivariate tests and identify differences in the ways that
Elite and Non-Elite CEOs are compensated.
I discuss separately the regressions for each form of compensation presented in
Tables 18-22, but I make a couple of general observations here. First, the dummy term
for Elite CEOs is not significant at even a 10% level for any form of compensation. This
indicates that the control variables in the regression models (rather than the intercept)
explain the differences between Elite CEO compensation and Non-Elite CEO
compensation. Second, the separate regressions for Non-Elite CEOs tend to have higher
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explanatory power than the regressions for Elite CEOs. This suggests that the models
used in extant literature might be better specified if they were adjusted for the influence
of Elite CEOs.
Table 18 presents the results of the four CEO compensation regressions with the
natural log of CEO total direct compensation as the dependent variable. An interesting
observation is that the R-squared for the Non-Elite CEOs case, 0.45 in column (4), is
higher than it is for either the All CEOs or Elite CEOs cases, 0.38 in column (3) and 0.27
in column (5), respectively. As I mentioned earlier, this suggests that the models used in
extant literature might be better specified if they were adjusted for the influence of Elite
CEOs.
Focusing on the results shown in Table 18, the coefficient on the market value to
book value ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite
CEO, as shown in columns (1) and (4). Furthermore, the Elite CEO interaction term on
the market to book value ratio is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level,
see column (2). An interpretation of these results is that the compensation contracts for
Elite CEOs have relatively more incentives (compared with the compensation contracts
for Non-Elite CEOs) designed to mitigate CEOs shirking duties regarding the investment
and growth opportunities reflected in the market to book value ratio. This interpretation
is consistent with findings by Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) and Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) that managers prefer the quiet life and therefore must have
incentives to mitigate the underinvestment problem. A slightly different interpretation is
that Elite CEOs simply receive relatively more compensation than Non-Elite CEOs for
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the increasing complexity of managing firms with greater investment and growth
opportunities.
Still reviewing Table 18, the coefficient on the PP&E to assets ratio is negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs, as shown in columns (1)
and (4). This suggest that for Non-Elite CEOs the total direct compensation is decreasing
with increasing levels of PP&E to assets ratio, possibly because if a greater percent of a
firm’s assets are in the form of physical assets then the firm is easier to monitor.
However, the coefficient of the Elite CEO interaction term on the PP&E to assets ratio is
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that Elite CEOs are
compensated differently from Non-Elite CEOs with respect to their firms’ asset intensity
and either have incentives in their contracts to mitigate the shirking of duties regarding
investment in PP&E or Elite CEOs are able to use their influence to extract more
compensation based on increasing levels of the PP&E to asset ratio.
The economic significance of these results are as follows: (1) the Elite CEO
receives an additional $91 thousand in total direct compensation (relative to that of a
Non-Elite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the PP&E to asset ratio (at the mean for Elite
CEOs this would be an increase of 2.7 percentage points from 27.0 percent to 29.7
percent for the ratio) and (2) the Elite CEO receives an additional $128 thousand in total
direct compensation (relative to that of a Non-Elite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the
market value to book value ratio (at the mean for Elite CEOs this would be an increase of
21.4 percentage points from 214.0 percent to 235.4 percent for the ratio). 13

13

Refer to Table 14 for the summary statistics for these variables.
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Finally from Table 18, the coefficient on the R&D to assets ratio is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs, as shown in column (4).
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant for All CEOs, see column (3).
This indicates that the influence of the Elite CEOs masks the significance of the R&D to
assets ratio in explaining Non-Elite CEOs’ compensation. Furthermore, this suggests that
a researcher might draw the inappropriate conclusion regarding the significance of the
coefficient on the R&D to asset ratio in the one-size-fits-all CEO total compensation
model.
Table 19 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the
natural log of CEO equity-based compensation as the dependent variable. Focusing on
the results shown in column (2) of Table 19, the coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction
term for Black-Scholes stock volatility is negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level. An interpretation of this finding is that Elite CEOs are more adept than Non-Elite
CEOs at using their CEO managerial power to reduce the personal risk associated with
equity-based compensation when their firms have higher levels of stock volatility.
However, keep in mind that the mean equity-based compensation for Elite CEOs is 2.7
times as great as the mean equity-based compensation for Non-Elite CEOs as shown in
Table 14. Also, the coefficient on CEO tenure is positive and statistically significant at
the 5% level for Non-Elite CEOs, as shown in column (4). However, the coefficient is
not statistically significant for All CEOs, see column (3).

This indicates that the

influence of the Elite CEOs masks the significance of CEO tenure in explaining NonElite CEOs’ compensation. Furthermore, this suggests that a researcher might draw the
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inappropriate conclusion regarding the significance of the coefficient on CEO tenure in
the one-size-fits-all CEO equity-based compensation model.
Table 20 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the
natural log of CEO Other compensation as the dependent variables. Focusing on the
results shown in column (2) of Table 20, the coefficients on the Elite CEO interaction
terms for the total liabilities to assets ratio and the PP&E to assets ratio are positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level.
The coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term for the total liabilities to assets
ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, see column (2) in Table 20.
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant for Non-Elite CEOs, see columns
(1) and (4). An interpretation of this finding is that compensation contracts for Elite
CEOs has more incentives (compared with the compensation contracts for Non-Elite
CEOs) designed to compensate Elite CEOs for managing the additional risk associated
with increasing levels of debt.
The positive coefficient for Elite CEOs on the PP&E to asset ratio is particularly
interesting because the coefficient on the PP&E to assets ratio is negative and statistically
significant for Non-Elite CEOs at the 1% level (this makes sense for Non-Elite CEOs
because firms are easier to monitor with increasing levels of physical assets). The signs
and the level of significance for these coefficients are the same as the previously
discussed case with CEO total direct compensation as the dependent variable. The
interpretation of these results is that the compensation contracts for Elite CEOs has
relatively more Other compensation (compared with the compensation contracts for NonElite CEOs) when the firm has higher levels of tangible assets in the form of PP&E.
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The economic significance of these results are as follows: (1) the Elite CEO
receives an additional $30 thousand in Other compensation (relative to that of a NonElite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the PP&E to asset ratio (at the mean for Elite
CEOs this would be an increase of 2.7 percentage points from 27.0 percent to 29.7
percent for the ratio) and (2) the Elite CEO receives an additional $97 thousand in Other
compensation (relative to that of a Non-Elite CEO) for a 10 percent increase in the total
liabilities to assets ratio (at the mean for Elite CEOs this would be an increase of 5.9
percentage points from 59.0 percent to 64.9 percent for the ratio).14
Table 21 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the
natural log of CEO salary as the dependent variables. Focusing on the results shown in
column (2) of Table 21, the coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term for the total
liabilities to assets ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. An
interpretation of this result is that the compensation contracts for Elite CEOs has
relatively more incentives (compared with the compensation contracts for Non-Elite
CEOs) designed to compensate Elite CEOs for managing the additional risk associated
with increasing levels of debt.
The economic significance of this result is as follows: (1) the Elite CEO receives
an additional $24 thousand in salary compensation (relative to that of a Non-Elite CEO)
for a 10 percent increase in the total liabilities to assets ratio (at the mean for Elite CEOs
this would be an increase of 5.9 percentage points from 59.0 percent to 64.9 percent for
the ratio).

14

Refer to Table 14 for the summary statistics.
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Table 22 presents the results of four CEO compensation regressions with the
natural log of CEO bonus as the dependent variables. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the bonus compensation is not statistically different for Elite CEOs compared to
Non-Elite CEOs.
In summary, Elite CEOs receive higher compensation and they are compensated
differently from Non-Elite CEOs in the sense that a one-size-fits-all model is
inappropriate. Furthermore, Elite CEOs have higher compensation and their additional
compensation is explained by their interacted control variables in the models rather than
by the Elite CEO dummy variable.

Therefore future research should consider the

influence of Elite CEOs on compensation models. In particular, it appears that the
variables proxying firm risk, ease of monitoring the firm, and investments affect Elite
CEO compensation and Non-Elite CEO compensation differently.
I now examine firm performance regressions to determine whether or not Elite
CEOs’ firms perform differently from Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.

6.5

The Basic Unadjusted Firm Performance Model: A Comparison with Extant
Literature
Before performing multivariate tests that employ the classification of Elite CEOs,

I first estimate my basic firm performance model (without any adjustments for Elite
status) and compare the results with the extant literature to verify that my basic
unadjusted model produces results similar to results in the existing literature. This subsection demonstrates that my firm performance model is indeed comparable to similar
firm performance models in extant literature.
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Table 23 lists the variables used in several comparable firm performance models
in extant literature; my results are in the last column. 15

The R2 for extant firm

performance models range from 0.01 to 0.43 with the majority in the range of 0.01 to
0.17. The R2 for my firm performance model is comparable in the range of 0.01 to 0.10
for my eight measures of firm performance. Generally speaking, the firm performance
models do not have as much explanatory power as the CEO compensation models. Table
23 also presents the sign and the significance on the coefficients for variables used in the
respective firm performance models. A comparison of the sign and the significance of
the coefficients on the variables used in my firm performance model are qualitatively
comparable to the results from extant literature.
The Mehran (1995) firm performance model is essentially a single cross-section
and therefore would be expected to have higher R2 than my pooled time-series crosssection. For comparison purposes, I ran single regressions each year for my data with the
market to book value ratio used as a measure of firm performance (for comparability with
Mehran (1995)). I found values of R2 by year in the range of 0.05 to 0.38 which is
comparable to Mehran’s range of 0.03 to 0.43. Also, the cases in Daines, Nair and
Kornhauser (2005) that have R2 in the order of 0.3 had not only return on assets as the
dependent variable but also the prior year return on assets as a control variable; because
return on assets is fairly highly correlated from year to year, Daines et al. have fairly
high explanatory power when they include the prior years’ return on assets. The other
Daines et al. cases have R2 more in line with my firm performance model.

15

Table 23 is essentially a reproduction of Table 6 but includes information from my firm performance
model.
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Other than a larger sample (more firms and more years) and the differences noted
above, Table 23 confirms that my unadjusted model and data are similar to models and
data in previous empirical studies. Therefore, my new results in the next two subsections are due to my adjustments for Elite CEO status rather than to any difference in
data or model structure.

6.6

Step 4: Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently?
This sub-section presents the results of my research that finds that Elite CEOs’

firms do perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. I begin with a review of my
research question and methodology then present the results.
Question (3): Is the firm performance model that explains Elite CEOs’ firms’
performance different from the one-size-fits-all firm performance model? Asked another
way, does the one-size-fits-all firm performance model apply for Elite CEOs’ firms? For
this analysis I include an Elite CEO dummy variable and its interaction with all of the
explanatory variables (except for the year and industry dummies) in the firm performance
regressions.

I then perform a modified Chow Test to determine if the Elite CEO

interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.
This research specifically investigates whether or not Elite CEOs’ firms perform
differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. If the same one-size-fits-all firm performance
model does not apply to all CEOs’ firms, then existing models distort the significance of
the variables that are in the firm performance regression with respect to the impact they
have on the Elite CEOs’ firms. This of course suggests that we do not fully understand
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the performance of Elite CEOs’ firms and have possibly been underestimating the role of
CEO managerial power in determining firm performance.
Table 24 presents results of the modified Chow Tests. The rows of the table show
results from regressions with eight different measures of firm performance as the
dependent variable. Each column in Table 24 is for a different method of classifying
Elite CEOs. These are based on the Average Ratio with cut-off at the top 10% and for
robustness I also classify Elite CEOs based on the Average CCI index with cut-off at
10%. In all cases, except for return on equity, I reject the null at the 1% level that Elite
CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. Therefore, the answer to Question 3 is
that Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently than implied by the one-size-fits-all firm
performance model.
The described modified Chow Test includes the Elite CEO dummy term in the
test of the coefficients being jointly equal to zero. A possibility for my finding that Elite
CEOs’ firms perform differently is simply because they have a higher intercept (although
the univariate tests in Table 14 do not indicate that Elite CEOs’ firms perform
differently). Therefore as a sensitivity case, I run an alternate modified Chow Test to test
the null that the coefficients on all Elite CEO interaction terms are jointly equal to zero
(the Elite CEO dummy is exclude from this test). Table 25 presents the results of the
alternate modified Chow Test and the results tell the same story that Elite CEOs’ firms
perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms.
I demonstrated in sub-sections 6.3 and 6.4 that Elite CEOs receive higher and
different compensation than Non-Elite CEOs and have now established that Elite CEOs’
firms perform differently. Do Elite CEOs receive this substantially higher compensation
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because they lead their firms to superior performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’
firms? Or, is it because the Elite CEOs have undue influence over their respective boards
for extracting excessive compensation even though their firms perform relatively worse
than non-Elite CEOs’ firms? The foregoing leads to the natural follow-on research
question: “How do Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently?” I address this question in the
next sub-section.

6.7

How Do Elite CEOs’ Firms Perform Differently?
This sub-section presents the results of my research that investigates how Elite

CEOs’ firms perform are differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. I begin with a review
of my research question and methodology then present the results.
Question (4): If the firm performance of the different classes of CEOs’ (Elite
CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs) firms are best described with different firm performance
models, which is what I expect, then how do the firms perform differently? That is,
should the firm performance model for each class of CEO (Elite CEOs and Non-Elite
CEOs) contain the same structure and the same variables? The research in this step
assumes the same variables are contained in the both the Elite CEO and Non-Elite CEOs
firm performance models and investigates whether the coefficients on these variables are
different.
For this analysis I perform firm performance regressions both with and without
the Elite CEO interaction terms. Tables 26 through 33 present the results of these
regressions; with each table presenting the results for a different measure of firm
performance as the dependent variable. For each table, Columns (1) and (2) are the
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results from one regression with coefficients on the independent variables presented in
column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) show how Elites CEOs’ firms
perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the
results of three regressions (without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for
All CEOs’ firms, Non-Elite CEOs’ firms, and Elite CEOs’ firms, respectively. I use firm
fixed-effects in my regressions for reasons previously explained in sub-section 6.2.
I discuss the results for each measure of performance separately, but it is
worthwhile pointing out now that the coefficient on the Elite CEO dummy variable
(column (2) of Tables 26-33) is never positive and statistically significant. This suggests
that after controlling for other factors, Elite CEOs’ firms do not have higher performance.
Table 26 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the
forward shareholder 5-year return as the dependent variable. The coefficient on market
value to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for All
CEOs’ firms and Non-Elite CEOs’ firms (see columns (1), (3) and (4)); but, notice the
coefficient is incrementally more negative for Elite CEOs’ firms (see columns (2) and
(5)). This implies that an increasing market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth
opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced forward
shareholder 5-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an even bigger reduction for
Elite CEOs’ firms. There are two possible interpretations for this result. First, because
firms with higher levels of market to book value ratio are more difficult to monitor, CEOs
of such firms are able to shirk duties which leads to poor future firm performance; if Elite
CEOs have more power then this suggests that Elite CEOs are able to shirk more in firms
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that are difficult to monitor. Second, it may be evidence of long term reversals of firm
performance (i.e., the current market to book value is high because recent shareholder
returns have been high but the forward shareholder returns reverse). However, it is not
clear why the reversal would be more pronounced for Elite CEOs’ firms.
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs (see columns
(1), (3) and (4)); but, notice the coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term is positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level (see column (2)). This suggests awarding
additional equity-based compensation reduces forward shareholder 5-year return for NonElite CEOs’ firms but improves forward shareholder 5-year return for Elite CEOs’ firms.
However, no coefficient on any other component of CEO compensation is statistically
different for Elite CEOs which implies that the additional compensation that Elite CEOs
receive relative to Non-Elite CEOs does not translate to better forward 5-year shareholder
return.
The coefficients on Average Ratio in columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 26 tell an
interesting story. The coefficient on Average Ratio is positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs but is not statistically significant for
Elite CEOs; which suggests the result for All CEOs is being driven by Non-Elite CEOs.
Considering that the mean Average Ratio is 4.18 for Elite CEOs and only 1.63 for NonElite CEOs it appears the higher compensation paid to Elite CEOs does not translate to
higher shareholder 5-year return for Elite CEOs’ firms. This result indicates that firm
performance initially improves with increasing levels of the Average Ratio up to a point,
but then any further increase to the Average Ratio does not benefit firm performance. An
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interpretation of this finding is that the market (shareholders) responds favorably to
increasing levels of this proxy for CEO managerial power, possibly as a signal of CEO
ability and leadership, but the market does not reward excessive levels of the Average
Ratio such as received by Elite CEOs.
Table 27 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the
forward shareholder 3-year return as the dependent variable. As expected, the results and
the interpretation of the results are very similar to the story told by using the forward
shareholder 5-year return as the dependent variable.
Similar to the results for the forward shareholder 5-year returns, Tables 27 shows
the coefficient on market value to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level for All CEOs’ firms and Non-Elite CEOs’ firms (see columns (1), (3) and
(4)); but, notice the coefficient is incrementally more negative for Elite CEOs (see
columns (2) and (5)). This implies that an increasing market value to book value ratio (a
proxy for growth opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced
forward shareholder 3-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an even bigger
reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms.
In contrast to the results for the forward shareholder 5-year returns, the coefficient
on the natural log of bonus compensation is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs (see columns (1), (3) and (4)); but, notice the
coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the
5% level (see column (2)).

This suggests awarding additional bonus compensation

reduces forward shareholder 3-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but improves
forward shareholder 3-year return of Elite CEOs’ firms. However, no coefficient on any
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other component of CEO compensation is statistically different for Elite CEOs which
implies that the additional compensation that Elite CEOs receive relative to Non-Elite
CEOs does not translate to better forward shareholder 3-year return.
Still reviewing Table 27, the coefficient on the R&D to asset ratio is not
statistically significant for All CEOs’ firms and Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but the Elite CEO
interaction term is positive and statistically different at the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms
(see column (2)). As the ratio of R&D to assets is a proxy for technical complexity, this
suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms with increasing levels of technical complexity are more
skilled at increasing forward 3-year shareholder return. However, this is an odd finding
for two reasons. First, the Elite CEO interaction on the R&D to assets ratio is not
statistically significant for any other of my seven measures of forward firm performance.
Second, increasing levels of the market to book value ratio and the R&D to asset ratio
individually indicate higher firm complexity and higher difficulty in monitoring; yet, the
signs on the respective Elite CEO interaction terms are moving in opposite directions. 16
The coefficients on Average Ratio in columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 27 tell the
exact same interesting story as learned from Table 26. The coefficient on Average Ratio
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs and Non-Elite CEOs
but is not statistically significant for Elite CEOs. Considering that the mean Average
Ratio is 4.18 for Elite CEOs and only 1.63 for Non-Elite CEOs it appears the additional
compensation paid to Elite CEOs does not translate to higher shareholder 3-year return
for Elite CEOs’ firms.

16

The market to book value ratio and the R&D to asset ratio only have a 0.06 pair-wise correlation, see
Table 9.

113

Table 28 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the
forward shareholder 1-year return as the dependent variable. The coefficients on the
market value to book value ratio tell the exact same story as using the forward
shareholder 3-year and 5-year returns. Which is that an increasing market value to book
value ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm,
leads to reduced forward shareholder 1-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an
even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms.
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs (see column (3)) but is not
statistically significant for Non-Elite CEOs (see column (4)).

However, notice the

coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term (see column (2)) and the coefficient for
Elite CEOs (see column (5)) are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
This suggests awarding additional equity-based compensation does not impact forward
shareholder 1-year return for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but reduces the forward shareholder
1-year return of Elite CEOs’ firms. However, the coefficient on the bonus component of
CEO compensation is positive and statistically different for Elite CEOs which implies
that the additional bonus compensation that Elite CEOs receive relative to Non-Elite
CEOs does translate to better forward 1-year shareholder return.
Still referring to Table 28, the coefficient on the measure of stock volatility is
negative and statistically different for Elite CEOs’ firms but is not statistically significant
for All CEOs’ firms or Non-Elite CEOs’ firms. This suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms are
less adept than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms at managing the underlying source of risk that
causes stock volatility. Also, the coefficients on Average Ratio are not statistically
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significant for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs or Elite CEOs. This suggests that increasing
levels of this proxy for CEO managerial power does not impact forward shareholder 1year return. Said another way, increasing CEO compensation relative to the Number 2
executive does not improve the forward 1-year shareholder return.
Table 29 presents the results of the firm performance regressions with the market
value to book value ratio as the dependent variable. The coefficient on the net income to
asset ratio interaction term is negative and statistically different at the 1% level for Elite
CEOs’ firms (see column (2)) but the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms (see column (5)). Also, notice the coefficient is
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms (see
columns (1) and (4). These findings suggest the market rewards firms with a higher
market to book value ratio for increasing levels of net income to assets but not as much
so for Elite CEOs’ firms.
As shown on Table 29, the coefficient on the Average Ratio is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level for Non-Elite CEOs but is even more negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level for Elite CEOs. The interpretation is that higher
levels of CEO managerial power, as measured by the Average Ratio, result in decreasing
levels of the market value to book value ratio for their firms. This finding implies that
higher Average Ratio leads to reduced market to book value for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms
and an even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms. Also, the Elite CEO dummy is
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level; implying that after controlling for
other factors, Elite CEOs’ firms have less value. All of the foregoing suggests that the
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market does not respond favorably to Elite CEOs’ firms or to increasing levels of the
Average Ratio.
Table 30 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the
forward net income 5-year growth rate as the dependent variable. The coefficient on
stock volatility is positive at statistically different at the 1% level for Elite CEOs’ firms
(see column (2)). This suggests that Elite CEOs’ firms convert increasing level of stock
volatility into higher levels of forward net income 5-year growth rate. However, the
coefficient on PP&E to asset ratio is negative and statistically different at the 1% level for
Elite CEOs’ firms (see column (2)). This implies increasing levels of this ratio hurts the
forward net income 5-year growth rate.
The coefficients on the market value to book value ratio as seen on Table 30 tell
the exact same story as several other measures of firm performance. An increasing
market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities which are difficult to
monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced forward net income 5-year growth rate for Non-Elite
CEOs’ firms and it is an even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’ firms.
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level for All CEOs (see column (3)) and is statistically
significant at the 5% level for Non-Elite CEOs (see column (4)). However, notice the
coefficient on the Elite CEO interaction term (see column (2)) and the coefficient for
Elite CEOs (see column (5)) are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
This suggests awarding additional equity-based compensation hurts forward net income
5-year growth rate for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but hurts forward performance by this
measure even more so for Elite CEOs’ firms.
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The final lesson from Table 30 is that the coefficient on the Average Ratio is not
statistically significant for any class of CEO. This implies that increasing the level of
CEO managerial power, as measured by the Average Ratio, does not impact forward net
income 5-year growth rate.
Table 31 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the
forward net income 3-year growth rate as the dependent variable. The coefficients on the
market value to book value ratio tell the exact same story as several other measures of
firm performance. An increasing market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth
opportunities which is difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced forward net
income 5-year growth rate for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and it is the same but even worse
for Elite CEOs’ firms.
The coefficient on the natural log of equity-based compensation is not statistically
significant for All CEOs or Non-Elite CEOs. However, notice the coefficient on the Elite
CEO interaction term is negative and statistically different at the 5% level (see column
(2)). This suggests awarding additional equity-based compensation does not impact the
forward net income 3-year growth rate for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but reduces the
forward net income 3-year growth rate for Elite CEOs’ firms. However, the coefficient
on the Other component of CEO compensation is positive and statistically different for
Elite CEOs which implies that the additional Other compensation that Elite CEOs receive
relative to Non-Elite CEOs does translate to better forward net-income 3-year growth
rate.
The most interesting information from Table 31 is that the coefficient on the
Average Ratio is not statistically significant for All CEOs or Non-Elite CEOs but is
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negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for Elite CEOs. The interpretation is
that higher levels of CEO managerial power hurts forward net income 3-year growth rate
for Elite CEOs’ firms.
Table 32 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the
forward return on assets as the dependent variable. The most interesting information
from this table is that the coefficient on the Average Ratio is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level for Non-Elite CEOs but is negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level for Elite CEOs.

The interpretation is that higher levels of CEO

managerial power helps forward return on assets for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms but hurts
forward return on assets for Elite CEOs’ firms.
The coefficient on stock volatility is negative and significantly different for Elite
CEOs’ firms (see column (2)), which suggests higher stock volatility diminishes forward
return on assets. However, the coefficients on total liabilities to asset ratio and the
market value to book value ratio are both positive and statistically different (see column
(2)), which increasing levels of these variables improves forward return on assets.
Table 33 presents the results of the four firm performance regressions with the
forward return on equity as the dependent variable. I include this table for reference but
do not review the results herein as the modified Chow Test indicates that Elite CEOs’
firms do not perform differently as measured by the forward return on equity.
In summary, the two most consistent and therefore most interesting findings from
this sub-section relate to the market to book value ratio and the Average Ratio. The
coefficient on the market to book value ratio is negative and statistically significant for
five of the six relevant measures of forward firm performance (shareholder 5-year return,
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shareholder 3-year return, shareholder 1-year return, net income 5-year growth rate, and
net income 3-year growth rate) for the cases with All CEOs’ firms and Non-CEOs’
firms. 17 Furthermore, for these five measures of forward firm performance, the Elite
CEO interaction on the market to book value is negative and statistically significant.
This implies that an increasing market value to book value ratio (a proxy for growth
opportunities which are difficult to monitor) for a firm, leads to reduced firm
performance for Non-Elite CEOs’ firms and an even bigger reduction for Elite CEOs’
firms. There are two possible interpretations for this result. First, because firms with
increasing levels of market to book value ratio are more difficult to monitor and Elite
CEOs have more power, Elite CEOs are able to shirk even more at firms where
monitoring is difficult.

Second, it may be evidence of long term reversal of firm

performance (i.e., the current market to book value is high because recent shareholder
returns have been high but then forward shareholder returns just reverses). However, it is
not clear why the reversal would be more pronounced for Elite CEOs’ firms.
The coefficients on the Average Ratio, a proxy for CEO managerial power, tell
the most interesting story. Increasing levels of CEO managerial power do not benefit
firm performance for Elite CEOs’ firms for four measures of firm performance
(shareholder 5-year return, shareholder 3-year return, shareholder 1-year return, and net
income 5-year growth rate). Increasing levels of CEO managerial power hurts firm
performance for Elite CEOs’ firms for three measures of firm performance (market to
book value ratio, net income 3-year growth rate, and return on assets). That is fairly
17

The two of the eight measures of firm performance that are not relevant for this generalization regarding
the coefficients on the market to book value ratio as a control variable are (1) the market to book value ratio
as the dependent variable for obvious reason and (2) return on equity because it is not statistically different
for Elite CEOs’ firms.
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condemning evidence considering that the mean Average Ratio and the mean CEO total
direct compensation are each roughly 2.5 times greater for Elite CEOs compared to NonElite CEOs. 18 This finding indicates that Elite CEOs receive higher compensation than
Non-Elite CEOs not because Elite CEOs lead their firms to superior performance but
because the Elite CEOs have undue influence over their boards.

18

See Table 14 for summary statistics.
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7

Closing Comments
A particular body of research examines the issue of linking executive pay to firm

performance by focusing on the observation that CEO compensation varies widely across
firms, even within the same industry. This research uses CEO characteristics, (such as
“superstar” or “celebrity” status, “reputation”, “skill”, “managerial power”, age, dual role
as CEO and Chairman of the Board, and percent of firm ownership by the CEO) and firm
characteristics (such as size, complexity, growth opportunities, and leverage) to explain
‘why’ CEOs’ compensation varies widely in cross-section.

However, this research

assumes that the same compensation model (i.e., structure of the model, explanatory
variables, and coefficients on those variables) can be applied to all CEOs (this
assumption is implicit in the use of all CEO’s in the samples for which the models are
tested). If you will, extant research utilizes a one-size-fits-all CEO compensation model
for empirical analysis.

Furthermore, much of this research also examines firm

performance and similarly utilizes a one-size-fits-all firm performance model.
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) shed a different light on this issue by suggesting
that only a few CEOs have sufficient power or influence to extract excessive
compensation. They note that in 2001 the top ten CEOs of U.S. firms received average
option grants of $170 million, while the median value of total compensation for CEOs of
the S&P 500 companies was only about $7 million.

The authors argue that “U.S.

executive pay may not be quite the runaway train that has been portrayed in the press.”
However, I find no research that thoroughly investigates the impact and distortions that a
class of ‘only a few’ powerful CEOs (i.e., those with sufficient levels of managerial
power or influence to extract excessive compensation) has on the one-size-fits-all CEO
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compensation and firm performance models. In addition, the literature has not examined
whether the firms that are led by such CEOs experience superior performance. This void
in the literature motivates my research.
To empirically test the Holmstrom and Kaplan hypothesis that only a few
powerful CEOs can extract excessive compensation, a proxy for CEO managerial power
is required. I develop two separate proxies for CEO managerial power that I use to rank
and classify the CEOs. 19 First, I use the ratio of CEO total direct compensation to the
total direct compensation of the highest paid executive, other than the CEO, as a proxy
for CEO managerial power. Second, for robustness and sensitivity tests I develop a
concentration measure of CEOs compensation, based on the top five executive’s
compensation at each firm, which is analogous to the concentration ratio used to measure
industry competitiveness (the Herfindahl Index).
I hypothesize that the most powerful (or “Elite”) class of CEOs, as defined by my
proxies, receives excessive compensation relative to the class of other (or “Non-Elite”)
CEOs. For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs receive higher and
different compensation, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs; and if
so, how are Elite CEOs compensated differently? Furthermore, I hypothesize that Elite
CEOs’ firms do not experience superior performance compared to Non-Elite CEOs’
firms. For this hypothesis my empirical test is whether Elite CEOs’ firms perform
differently, after controlling for other variables, than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; and if so,
how do Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently?

19

I demonstrate that ranking the CEOs by my proxy for CEO managerial power is not the same as simply
ranking the CEOs by their total direct compensation.
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I perform regressions with CEO compensation as the dependent variable, the
common independent variables in extant literature, an Elite CEO dummy variable, and
Elite CEO interaction terms with the independent variables. Furthermore, I perform
regressions with eight measures of firm performance as the dependent variable, the
common independent variable utilized in extant literature, an Elite CEO dummy term,
Elite CEO interaction terms, and the Average Ratio as an explanatory variable.
My empirical results show that one-size-fits-all models can be rejected. The
estimated coefficients in compensation models and performance models are different for
Elite CEOs as compared to Non-Elite CEOs. Also, firms with Elite CEOs do not have
higher performance. In fact, I find evidence suggesting that the presence of an Elite CEO
hurts firm performance and value. This suggests that Elite CEOs extract excessive
compensation due to influence over their respective boards rather than to superior
performance. These findings have two important implications. First, it is possible that
previous empirical research results and conclusions regarding the link between CEO
compensation and firm performance might be distorted because previous studies have
failed to explicitly address the impact caused by a small number of highly paid and
influential CEOs. Second, it is important for shareholders, boards, and policy makers to
understand the link (if one exists) between CEO managerial power and firm performance.
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) find that the United States corporate governance
system is better at resolving agency problems than other countries’ corporate governance
systems based on comparing respective market returns. Their findings suggest the United
States corporate governance system is not broken. On the other hand, their findings do
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not tell us whether or not recent increases in CEO (executive) compensation have
improved the system with respect to firm performance.
Even though the United States corporate governance system was and may still be
the number one system in the world that does not mean that the tremendous increase in
CEO compensation from 1993 through 2005 was not a step backward in the evolution of
the United States corporate governance system.
In closing, I find that Elite CEOs receive higher compensation than Non-Elite
CEOs not because Elite CEOs lead their firms to superior performance but because the
Elite CEOs have undue influence over their boards for extracting excessive
compensation. These findings suggest that we may have indeed taken a step backward
with our corporate governance system.
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Figure 1. Component's Percentage Contribution to CEOs’ Total Compensation.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005. This bar graph presents the percent each component of compensation
contributes to the mean CEO total direct compensation for all firms in the sample, by year.
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stock grants each contribute to the mean CEO equity-based compensation for all firms in the sample, by year.
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Figure 3. Component's $ Contribution to CEOs’ Total Compensation.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars. This stacked bar
graph presents the mean CEO total direct compensation and its components for all firms in the sample by year.
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Figure 4. Increase in CEOs' Components of Mean Compensation.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005. This figure presents the respective nominal increase in the index of
each component of CEO mean compensation by year through 2005 from an index for each component of 100 in 1993.
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Figure 5. CEO Total Compensation by Groups Ranked by Total Compensation.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars. This figure
presents the mean CEO total direct compensation adjusted for inflation, by year for three groups of CEOs: top 10% by total direct compensation, all
CEOs, and bottom 90% by total direct compensation.
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Figure 6. CEO Total Compensation by Groups of Firm Life.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars. This figure
presents the mean CEO total direct compensation adjusted for inflation by year for five groups of CEOs: top 10% by total direct compensation for all
firms, top 10% by total direct compensation for firms with sample life within 1 to 5 years, top 10% by total direct compensation for firms with sample
life within 6 to 9 years, top 10% by total direct compensation for firms with sample life within 10 to 13 years, and all CEOs for all Firms.
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Figure 7. Plot of Average Ratio.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005. The Average Ratio is the average of the annually determined ratio of
CEO total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO) during the CEO’s firm-tenure. This
figure plots only the first 98% as the top 2% by Average Ratio have such large value that the scale of the figure is distorted.
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Figure 8. Rank Order of CEO Compensation and CEO/Number_2 Ratio, by thirds.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005. This figure is a rank-order of CEO total direct compensation versus
the CEO/Number_2 Ratio. The CEO/Number_2 Ratio is the annually determined ratio of CEO total direct compensation to the total direct
compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO).
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Figure 9. Plot of Average CCI.
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005. The Average Compensation Concentration Index (“Average CCI”) is
the average of the annually determined firm compensation concentration index over the CEO’s firm-tenure. This figure plots only the first 98% as the
top 2% by Average CCI distorts the scale. The compensation concentration index is the sum of squares of the top five executive’s respective share
(percent) of the total compensation for the top five executives: this technique is analogous to the Herfindahl Index.
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Figure 10. CEOs' Average Ratio
Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005. The Average Ratio is the average of the annually determined ratio of
CEO total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO) during the CEO’s tenure at a given
firm. Based on using the Average Ratio to rank and classify CEOs; Elite CEOs are based on a top 10% cut-off and the remaining CEOs are classified as
Non-Elite CEOs.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for CEO Compensation.
Panel A. Mean CEO Compensation and S&P 500 Index.
All Firms.
Salary
Bonus
Equity
Other
Total
S&P 500 Index
Yr-End
Firm Count

1993
0.64
0.50
0.97
0.24
2.35
466

1994
0.65
0.57
1.30
0.25
2.76
459

1995
0.65
0.61
1.24
0.29
2.80
616

1996
0.64
0.69
1.96
0.37
3.66
748

1997
0.64
0.69
2.46
0.46
4.25
975

1998
0.65
0.66
3.16
0.40
4.86
1,229

1999
0.67
0.79
3.97
0.50
5.93
1,469

2000
0.68
0.82
5.40
0.52
7.42
1,320

2001
0.70
0.72
4.76
0.48
6.66
1,173

2002
0.70
0.76
3.23
0.43
5.12
909

2003
0.71
0.92
2.54
0.52
4.69
1,108

2004
0.72
1.07
2.92
0.50
5.21
1,212

2005
0.74
1.16
2.89
0.67
5.46
1,248

1,622

1,688

1,778

1,902

1,962

1,996

1,897

1,807

1,764

1,801

1,847

1,789

1,675

Firms in the sample each year for 1993-2005 (847 firms).
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Salary

0.69

0.71

0.72

0.73

0.75

0.78

0.78

0.79

0.81

0.82

0.84

0.83

0.84

Bonus

0.53

0.60

0.65

0.73

0.84

0.84

0.94

1.08

0.95

0.99

1.24

1.43

1.49

Equity

0.93

1.31

1.32

2.13

2.85

4.30

3.96

6.11

4.64

3.67

3.05

3.35

3.29

Other

0.28

0.29

0.35

0.47

0.69

0.53

0.63

0.73

0.58

0.60

0.72

0.72

0.94

Total

2.43

2.93

3.03

4.06

5.12

6.46

6.30

8.72

6.98

6.07

5.85

6.33

6.56

Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005, adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2005 dollars. Year-end S&P
500 Index levels are from Yahoo! Finance.

Panel B. Correlation Between CEO Total Direct Compensation and CEO/Number_2 Ratio.
Pair-wise
Spearman's

1993
0.34
0.34

1994
0.42
0.40

1995
0.42
0.35

1996
0.21
0.36

1997
0.31
0.37

1998
0.12
0.38

1999
0.27
0.43

2000
0.29
0.42

2001
0.35
0.44

2002
0.40
0.46

2003
0.47
0.45

2004
0.35
0.44

2005
0.35
0.43

Overall
0.24
0.42

Note: The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp for the years 1993-2005. This table presents the pair-wise correlation and the Spearman
correlation between CEO total direct compensation and the CEO/Number_2 Ratio. The CEO/Number_2 Ratio is the annually determined ratio of CEO
total direct compensation to the total direct compensation of the highest paid executive (other than the CEO).
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Table 2. Key Extant Research.
Authors (Year
Published)
Bebchuk &
Grinstein 2005

Brick, Palmon,
Wald 2006

Daines, Nair,
Kornhauser 2005

Main model(s)

Main Findings

1) Executive comp.
regressions

1) Controlling for firm size, performance and industry
classification they find that compensation increased far beyond
what can be attributed to their control variables.
2) Find that actual 2003 compensation levels were much higher
than was predicted based on the relation of compensation to
firm size, performance and industry classification in 1993.
1) Find director compensation is directly related to the need for
firm monitoring.

2) Predicted 2003
comp. based on
1993 model
1) Director
compensation
regressions
2) CEO
compensation
regressions
3) Summary
statistics on
extreme director
comp.
4) 1-year excess
returns regressions
1) Firm
performance
regressions (all
firms)
2) Segregate by
small and large
firms

3) Segregate by
high and low
environmental
constraints

Hayward &
Hambrick 1997

1) Acquisition
premium regression
2) Post-acquisition
CAR regression

2) Find a significant positive relation between CEO
compensation and excess director compensation after
controlling for other variables.
3) Conclude that excess CEO and director compensation is
associated with poor firm governance.

4) Results are consistent with their cronyism hypothesis.
1) Find highly paid CEOs are significantly more likely to lead
firms that have persistently good performance. However, find
no evidence that highly paid CEOs turnaround poor firm
performance.
2) Finds small firms with highly paid CEOs are significantly
more likely to continue good performance and to reverse poor
performance than poorly paid CEOs. However, in large firms
there is no evidence that highly paid CEOs produce predictably
better results than poorly paid CEOs.
3) Finds firms with low constraints and highly paid CEOs are
significantly more likely to continue good performance and to
reverse poor performance than poorly paid CEOs. However, in
firms with high constraints there is little evidence that highly
paid CEOs produce predictably better results than poorly paid
CEOs.
1) The four indicators of CEO hubris are highly correlated with
the size of the acquisition premium.
2) Found losses in acquiring firms’ shareholder wealth
following an acquisition. Also found that the greater the CEO
hubris and acquisition premium, the greater the loss.

(Continued on next page)
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Table 2 continued.
Authors (Year
Published)
Malmendier &
Tate 2005

Main model(s)

Main Findings

1) Logit regression

1) CEO award winners are more likely to have more company
ownership, higher compensation, longer tenure and to be
female. The firms are typically larger, have lower book-tomarket ratio, higher sales, and higher returns over the past year.
2) Find negative cumulative abnormal performance, using stock
return data, over a 1, 2, or 3 year interval following the award.
3) Find over the three years following an award, the ROA is
roughly two and a quarter percentage points lower than in the
year preceding and year of the CEO award. Also, a matched
sample of ‘predicted winners’ did not experience the same
decline in performance.
4) Find award winners obtain significantly higher total
compensation (tdc1) in the year following the award.
Generally, this takes the form of increases in equity-based
compensation and is greatest among powerful CEOs (also
Chairman and President) and in weakly governed firms.
1) Finds stock based pay sensitivities are strictly increasing in a
CEO’s reputation.

2) Event study
around award date
3) ROA regressions

4) total and cash
compensation
regressions

Milbourn 2005

Wade, Porac,
Pollock, and
Graffin 2006

1) CEO pay
sensitivity
regressions
1) Event Study

2) Firm
performance
regressions

3) CEO
compensation
regressions

1) They performed an event study around the announcement
date of the CEO of the year Award and found the immediate
effect of winning a medal is positive, over time the effect is
negative.
2) Using a fixed-effects regression analysis they found that
although the market had an initially positive reaction to CEO
certification, over the long term there is a negative relationship
between CEO certification and market performance, and no
relationship between CEO certification and accounting
performance in the following year.
3) Found that certified CEOs received higher compensation
than non-certified CEOs when performance was high but lower
remuneration when performance was poor.
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Table 3. CEO Compensation Regressions, Variables and Descriptions.
Variable name
Variable description and comments 20
Dependent Variables
CEO Compensation
variables
Salary
Bonus
Equity-based compensation
Other compensation
Total direct compensation

Independent Variables
Firm performance
variables 21
Return on assets

Net Income 3 yr growth rate

Shareholder 3-year return

Ln of CEOs salary. ExecuComp.
Ln of CEOs bonus. ExecuComp.
Ln of (CEOs restricted stock grants plus stock options). RSTKGRNT +
OPTION_1 from ExecuComp.
Ln of (Total direct compensation – salary – bonus – equity-based comp.).
Ln of CEOs total of salary, bonus, the total value of restricted stock
granted, total value of stock options granted using Black-Scholes model,
long term incentive payouts, and all other payments. TDC1 from
ExecuComp.

Net income before extraordinary items over assets, in the year prior to the
year of observation. Proxy for CEO skill and helps explain annual bonus.
ROA from ExecuComp.
3-year growth rate in net income using least squares methodology, in the
year prior to the year of observation. Proxy for CEO skill and helps
explain long term incentive plan bonus. NI3LS from ExecuComp.
3-year shareholder return with dividends reinvested, in the year prior to the
year of observation. Proxy for CEO skill and helps explain equity-based
compensation. Winsorized at the 99th percentile to remove influential
outliers. TRS3YR from ExecuComp.

(Continued on next page)

20

The listed variable name is the same as the source’s name for the variable unless otherwise noted.
I use past firm performance as a proxy for CEO skill. Certainly some could make the argument that this
over-attribution. Regardless, these variables explain components of CEO compensation.
21
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Table 3 continued
Variable name
Firm characteristics
Firm size
Stock volatility

Total liabilities/assets
PP&E/assets

R&D/assets

Market to Book ratio

CEO characteristics
CEO age
CEO age2
CEO tenure
Governance
characteristics
Governance Index

Variable description and comments20
The ln of sales, in the year prior to the observation. Explains firm scale and
complexity. SALES from ExecuComp.
The Black-Scholes stock volatility measure, in the year prior to the
observation. Explains firm complexity. BS_VOLATILITY from
ExecuComp.
The ratio of total liabilities to total assets, in the year prior to the observation.
Explains firm complexity. DATA181/DATA6 from Compustat.
The ratio of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment to total assets, in the
year prior to the observation. Explains firm complexity. DATA8/DATA6
from Compustat.
The ratio of the firm’s research and development expenditures to total assets,
in the year prior to the observation. Explains firm complexity. Missing
values are replaced by zeros. DATA45/DATA6 from Compustat.
The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets, in the year
prior to the observation. The market value of assets is the market value of
equity (CRSP year price (DATA24) times common shares outstanding
(DATA25)) plus book assets (DATA6) minus book equity (DATA60) minus
deferred taxes (DATA74). The book value of assets is DATA6. Compustat.
The age of the CEO, in the year prior to the observation. AGE from
ExecuComp.
The age of the CEO squared, in the year prior to the observation.
The years of service as the CEO at the firm, in the year prior to the
observation. Determined from data in ExecuComp.

The Gompers, Ishii, Metrick governance index. Variable gindex from The
Investor Responsibility Research Center.

Control variables
Industry dummies
Industry group codes. SPINDEX from ExecuComp.
Year dummies
Year of the observation. ExecuComp.
Note: This table lists and describes the variables I use in the regressions with CEO compensation as the
dependent variable. I also note the source of the data for each variable and the source’s name or code for
the listed variable.
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Table 4. CEO Compensation Regressions, Key Extant Research.

CEO Sample
Dependent Variable
Log of CEO compensation

Malmendier
and Tate 2005
CEO award
winners 23

Malmendier
and Tate 2005
Matched sample
of CEOs 24

Brick et al 22
2006
All CEOs

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005
All CEOs

Various time
periods 25

Various time
periods23

Yes23

Yes 26

CEO pay sensitivity
Independent Variables
Firm characteristics
Firm size (log of sales)

Milbourn
2003
All CEOs

Yes 27
Yes

Not Significant

Mixed
Significance

Firm size (log of salest-1)
Firm size (market equity)
Firm size (log of net assets)

Positive

Positive
Negative
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

Stock Return
Return on Equity

ROA
Qt-1
ROAt-1

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002
All CEOs

Mixed
Significance

Positive
Positive
Not Significant

(Continued on next page)

22

Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006
Regressions with only CEO award winners.
24
Regressions comparing ‘actual’ CEO award winners to ‘predicted’ CEO award winners (i.e., matched sample).
25
Ran regressions with both total and cash compensation.
26
Ran regressions with total, equity and non-equity compensation.
27
Three regressions: base salary, equity compensation, and discretionary compensation.
23
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Table 4 continued.
Malmendier
and Tate 2005
Mean ROAt-1, t-3
Stock returnt-1, t-3
Cash flow risk
Stock volatility
Log (employeest-1)
R&Dt-1/assetst-1
Advertisingt-1/assetst-1
Debtt-1/assetst-1
PP&Et-1/assetst-1
Investmentst-1/assetst-1

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Brick et al
2006
Not Significant
Positive
Mixed
Significance
Mixed
Significance
Positive
Mixed
Significance
Mixed
Significance
Mixed
Significance
Negative
Mixed
Significance

Log(1+Firm ROAt-1)
Log(1+Firm Returnt-1)
Log(1+Firm Returnt-2)
Default Risk
Financial Leverage

Milbourn
2003

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002

Positive

Positive
Positive
Positive 28
Negative
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

Growth opportunities

(Continued on next page)

28

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005

Statistical Significance depends on level of compensation used in regression.
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Table 4 continued.

CEO characteristics
CEO age

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Not Significant

Not Significant

CEO gender

Internal CEO

Dow Jones Hits
Outsider
Industry adj. firm
performance
Board characteristics
Number of board meetings
Excess director total comp.
Proportion of outside
directors
Board Size

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005

Milbourn 2003

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002

Negative

Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

Mixed
Significance
Negative
Mixed
Significance
Negative

CEO stock ownership [%]
CEO is chairman

CEO reputation (Milbourn)
CEO tenure (experience)

Brick et al
2006

Not Significant

Not Significant

Mixed
Significance

Positive
Positive

Positive

Mixed Sign

Positive
Positive
Positive 29

Mixed
Significance
Positive
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

(Continued on next page)

29

Industry adjusted stock price performance for 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years prior with current CEO at the helm. Used only one of these in a given model.
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Table 4 continued.
Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Brick et al
2006

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005

Milbourn 2003

Ownership Characteristics
Largest stock ownership, nonCEO [%]

Negative,
Mixed
Significance
Negative,
Mixed
Significance
Negative

Largest stock ownership,
CEO [%]
Compensation committee
ownership [%]
Internal Blockholder > 5%
External Blockholder > 5%
Other independent variables
1 year after award
2 years after award
3 years after award
Firm fixed-effects
Year fixed-effects
SIC (industry) dummies
Regulated industry

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002

Not Significant
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Positive
Positive
Positive
Included
Included

Not Significant
Not Significant
Not Significant
Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Positive 30

Included
Included
Negative,
Mixed
Significance

Data
Time period
1992-2002
1992-2002
1992-2001
1993-2003
1993-1998
1992-1993
633-805
1,435 firms
1,500 firms
1,500 firms
1,648 firms
Number of CEOs
594-760 31
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some
component of CEO compensation as the dependent variable.

30
31

Positive and statistically Significant for each year 1994 through 2003.
Without CEO age variable.

153

Table 5. Firm Performance Regressions, Variables and Descriptions.
Variable name
Dependent Variables
Firm performance variables
Return on assets
Return on equity
Shareholder 1-year return
Shareholder 3-year return
Shareholder 5-year return
Net Income 3 yr growth rate
Net Income 5 yr growth rate
Market to Book ratio

Variable description and comments 32
Net income before extraordinary items over total assets, in the year after the observation. ROA from
ExecuComp.
Return on equity, in the year after the observation. ROEPER from ExecuComp.
1-year return shareholders with dividends reinvested, 1-year after the year of the observation. Winsorized
at the 99th percentile to remove influential outliers. TRS3YR from ExecuComp.
3-year return shareholders with dividends reinvested, 3 years after the year of the observation. Winsorized
at the 99th percentile to remove influential outliers. TRS3YR from ExecuComp.
5-year return shareholders with dividends reinvested, 5 years after the year of the observation. Winsorized
at the 99th percentile to remove influential outliers. TRS5YR from ExecuComp.
3-year growth rate in net income using least squares methodology, 3 years after the year of the
observation. NI3LS from ExecuComp.
5-year growth rate in net income using least squares methodology, 5 years after the year of the
observation. NI3LS from ExecuComp.
The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets. The market value of assets is the market
value of equity (CRSP year price (DATA24) times common shares outstanding (DATA25)) plus book
assets (DATA6) minus book equity (DATA60) minus deferred taxes (DATA74). The book value of assets
is DATA6. Compustat.

(Continued on next page)

32

The listed variable name is the same as the source’s name of the variable unless otherwise noted.
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Table 5 continued.
Variable name
Independent Variables
Firm characteristics
Firm size
Stock volatility
Total liabilities/assets
PP&E/assets
R&D/assets
Market to Book ratio

Net income/assets

Variable name
CEO Compensation variables
Salary
Bonus
Equity-based compensation
Other compensation
CEO characteristics
CEO age
CEO age2
CEO tenure

Variable description and comments
The ln of sales. Explains firm scale and complexity. SALES from ExecuComp.
The Black-Scholes stock volatility measure. Explains firm complexity. BS_VOLATILITY from
ExecuComp.
The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Explains firm complexity. DATA181/DATA6 from Compustat.
The ratio of a firm’s net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Explains firm complexity.
DATA8/DATA6 from Compustat.
The ratio of the firm’s research and development expenditures to total assets. Explains firm complexity.
Missing values are replaced by zeros. DATA45/DATA6 from Compustat.
The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets. The market value of assets is the market
value of equity (CRSP year price (DATA24) times common shares outstanding (DATA25)) plus book
assets (DATA6) minus book equity (DATA60) minus deferred taxes (DATA74). The book value of assets
is DATA6. Compustat.
The ratio of firm net income to total assets. Net income (after extraordinary and discontinued operations)
from ExecuComp/DATA6 from Compustat. This independent variable replaces market to book ratio as an
independent variable for the regression with market to book ratio as a dependent variable.

Variable description and comments
Ln of CEOs salary. ExecuComp.
Ln of CEOs bonus. ExecuComp.
Ln of CEOs restricted stock grants plus stock options. RSTKGRNT + OPTION_1 from ExecuComp.
Except use STOCK_AW + OPTION_A for some in 2006 (SEC reported values).
Ln of (Total direct compensation – salary – bonus – equity-based comp.).
The age of the CEO in the year of the observation. AGE from ExecuComp.
The age of the CEO squared, in the year prior to the observation.
The years of service as the CEO at the firm, in the year prior to the observation. Determined from data in
ExecuComp.

(Continued on next page)
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Table 5 continued.
Variable name
Governance characteristics
Governance Index
Control variables
Industry dummies
Year dummies

Variable description and comments
The Gompers, Ishii, Metrick governance index. Variable gindex from The Investor Responsibility
Research Center.
Industry group codes. SPINDEX from ExecuComp.
Year of the observation. ExecuComp.

Note: This table lists and describes the variables I use in the regressions with firm performance as the dependent variable. I also note the source of the
data for each variable and the source’s name or code for the listed variable.
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Table 6. Firm Performance Regressions, Key Extant Research.
Mehran 1995
CEO Sample
Dependent Variable
Tobin’s Q
Return on Assets

Included
Included

Malmendier
and Tate 2005
CEO award
winners9

Malmendier
and Tate 2005
Matched
sample10

Various time
periods

Various time
periods

Firm size (log of salest-1)
R&D/Sales
(Inv+PP&E)/total assets
LT debt/ total assets
Qt-1
ROAt-1
Mean ROAt-1, t-3
Stock returnt-1, t-3
Cash flow risk
Stock volatility
Log (employeest-1)

Negative
Negative

Mixed
significance
Not reported

Positive
Not significant
Not significant
Positive

Positive

(Continued on next page)

33

Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006
Daines, Nair and Kornhauser 2005
35
One-factor model and Fama-French three-factor model.
36
Fama-French four-factor model.
34
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Daines et al 34
2005
All CEOs

Included
Included 35

1-year excess returns
Independent Variables
Firm characteristics
Firm size (log of tot assets)
Firm size (log of sales)

Brick et al 33
2006
All CEOs

Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported

Included 36

Table 6 continued.
Mehran 1995
Firm characteristics
(continued)
R&Dt-1/assetst-1
Advertisingt-1/assetst-1
Debtt-1/assetst-1
PP&Et-1/assetst-1
Investmentst-1/assetst-1
CEO characteristics
CEO tenure (experience)
CEO gender
CEO’s equity-based comp [% of
total comp]
% equity owned by CEO

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Daines et al
2005

Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Positive
Positive

Mixed
significance
Not significant
Mixed
significance
Negative 37

CEO is chairman
Internal CEO
Log (CEO’s total comp.)
Board characteristics
% shares held by outside
directors
Outside directors [% of board]
Number of board meetings
Excess director total comp.
Log (director’s total comp.)

Brick et al 2006

Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Positive
Negative

(Continued on next page)

37

Mixed significance depending upon which model is used (pooled versus fixed-effects, one-factor versus Fama-French three-factor model).
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Table 6 continued.
Mehran 1995
Other independent
variables
1 year after award
2 years after award
3 years after award
Firm fixed-effects
Year fixed-effects
SIC (industry) dummies
Prior good performance
for
highly paid CEOs
Prior bad performance for
highly paid CEOs
Highly paid CEO dummy

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Negative
Negative
Negative
Included
Included

Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Included
Included

Brick et al 2006

Daines et al
2005

Included
Included
Mixed
significance 38
Mixed
significance
Mixed
significance
Mixed
significance
Mixed
significance

Prior good performance
Prior bad performance

Data
Time period
1979-1980
1992-2002
1992-2002
1992-2001
1992-2001
1193-1336
2,284
Number of firms
153
608-775
641-814
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some measure
of firm performance as the dependent variable.

38

Mixed significance depending upon how they broke out the regressions: i.e., by firm size, by management constraints, by level of incentive pay, and
by whether or not there is a 5% blockholder.
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Table 7. Data and Sources in Key Extant Research.
Authors (Year
Published)
Bebchuk & Grinstein
2005
Brick, Palmon, & Wald
2006

Core, Holthausen &
Larcker 1999
Daines, Nair, &
Kornhauser 2005

Hall & Liebman 1998

Hayward & Hambrick
1997

Jensen & Murphy
1990a

Data

Sources

Period

Sample

Executive compensation.
Firm acctg and market
characteristics.
Executive and director
compensation.
Firm acctg and market
characteristics.
Governance characteristics.

ExecuComp.
Compustat.

1993-2003.

1,500 firms (S&P500,
Mid400, Small600)

ExecuComp.

1992-2001.

1163 to 1441 firms (varies).

Governance characteristics.
Executive compensation.
Firm variables.
Board and ownership variables.
CEO compensation and
characteristics.
Firm characteristics and
performance.
CEO compensation.
Stock price and returns.
Accounting information.
Acquisitions > $100 million.

Media praise for the CEO.
CEO compensation.
Firm characteristics and
performance.

Compustat.
Directory of Corporate
Executives and Directors.
Proxy statements.
Compensation consultant.
Compustat.
Proxy statements.
ExecuComp.

1997.
1992-2001.
1982-1984.

Sub-sample of 237 firms.
205 publicly traded firms.

1992-2001.

2,284 firms and 2,880 CEOs.

1980-1994.

478 firms.

1989 and
1992.

106 transactions.

1969-1983.

73 manufacturing firms.

Compustat and CRSP.
Proxy statements and 10-K
filings.
CRSP.
Compustat.
Securities Data Corporation’s
Mergers and Acquisitions
database.
Seven major newspapers.
Forbes’ Executive Comp
Survey and proxies.
Compustat and CRSP.

(Continued on next page)
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Table 7 continued.
Authors (Year
Published)
Malmendier & Tate
2005

Data

Sources

Period

Sample

CEO Awards.

Hand-collected from various
journals.
ExecuComp.

1975-2002.

283 awards.

1992-2002.

1,500 firms (S&P500,
Mid400, Small600)

CEO compensation and
characteristics.
Firm characteristics and
Compustat and CRSP.
performance.
Mehran 1995
CEO compensation, firm and
Compustat Annual Industrial
board characteristics.
File.
Milbourn 2005
CEO compensation and
ExecuComp.
characteristics.
Stock data.
CRSP.
Dow Jones News Retrieval
Number of articles with CEO’s
Service.
name.
Wade, Porac, Pollock,
CEO of the Year Award
Financial World.
& Graffin 2006
CEO compensation and
ExecuComp.
characteristics.
Firm characteristics and
Compustat.
performance.
Note: The data and sources used in prior research that I consider key to my dissertation.
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1975-2002.
1979-1980

153 manufacturing firms.

1993-1998.

1,500 firms (S&P500,
Mid400, Small600)

1975-1996.
1992-1996.

278 firms from the S&P 500.

Table 8. Summary Statistics.
Variable
N
Min
Max
CEO Compensation Variables
Salary [$ Thousands]
23,528
0
8,320
Bonus[$ Thousands]
23,528
0
43,512
Equity [$ Thousands]
23,528
0 650,812
Other [$ Thousands]
23,528
0
96,423
Total Compensation [$Thousands]
23,528
0 655,448
CEO Characteristics
CEO Age [Years]
23,528
28
91
CEO Age Squared
23,528
784
8,281
CEO Firm-Tenure [Years]
23,528
1.0
55.0
Average Ratio
23,528
0.0
60.3
Average CCI
23,143
0.2
0.65
Firm Performance Variables
ROA [%]
23,527
-588
1,100
ROE [%]
22,916
-33,719
5,277
NI 3-Year Growth Rate [%]
15,667
-93
28,527
NI 5-Year Growth Rate [%]
13,802
-68
1,843
Shareholder 1-Year Return [%]
23,528
-99
567
Shareholder 3-Year Return [%]
23,528
-94
169
Shareholder 5-Year Return [%]
23,528
-84
97
Market Value/Book Value
23,286
0.22
246.47
Firm Characteristics
Sales [$Millions]
23,528
19 328,213
BS Volatility
23,505
0.10
4.21
Net Income/Assets
23,527
-5.88
11.0
Liabilities/Assets
23,476
0.02
4.22
PPE/Assets
23,133
0.00
0.97
RD/Assets
23,527
0.00
0.96
Governance Index
23,528
1.0
18.5
Note: Summary statistics for the data set described in Section 5.
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Median

Mean

s.d.

526
320
652
41
1,900

591
672
2,525
386
4,173

345
1,327
9,874
1,712
10,606

55
3,025
4.0
1.72
0.27

55
3,127
6.4
1.94
0.27

7.6
856.0
6.4
1.42
0.05

4.1
12.7
15.5
14.2
12.5
12.0
11.7
1.47

3.3
6.9
27.4
21.1
21.0
14.1
12.2
2.09

17.6
248.5
236.8
43.4
60.6
28.6
19.9
2.77

973
0.37
0.04
0.57
0.23
0.00
9.0

3,934
0.44
0.03
0.57
0.29
0.01
9.0

11,632
0.26
0.18
0.25
0.24
0.04
2.6

Table 9. Pair-wise Correlations.
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

1

Salary [$M]

1.00

2

Bonus[$M]

0.42

1.00

3

Equity [$M]

0.16

0.19

1.00

4

Other [$M]

0.21

0.23

0.07

1.00

5

Total Comp. [$M]

0.26

0.36

0.97

0.26

1.00

6

7

8

9

10

6

CEO Age [Years]

1.00

7

CEO Age Squared

0.99

1.00

8

CEO Firm-Tenure
[Years]

0.28

0.29

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1.00

9

ROA [%]

0.05

0.05

0.07

1.00

10

ROE [%]

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.18

1.00

11

NI 3-Year Growth
Rate [%]

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.00)

0.05

0.01

1.00

12

NI 5-Year Growth
Rate [%]

(0.12)

(0.11)

(0.03)

0.19

0.07

0.75

1.00

13

Shareholder 1-Year
Return [%]

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.00)

0.00

(0.01)

(0.02)

1.00

14

Shareholder 3-Year
Return [%]

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.01)

0.04

(0.00)

0.01

0.01

0.68

1.00

15

Shareholder 5-Year
Return [%]

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.03

0.03

0.00

0.01

0.05

0.45

0.75

1.00

16

Sales [$MM]

0.06

0.05

(0.00)

0.02

0.01

(0.01)

(0.04)

0.01

0.01

(0.00)

1.00

17

BS Volatility

(0.19)

(0.18)

(0.17)

(0.17)

(0.06)

0.05

0.23

0.08

(0.02)

(0.08)

(0.13)

1.00

18

Liabilities/Assets

0.07

0.06

(0.05)

(0.17)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.13)

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.15

(0.15)

1.00

19

PPE/Assets

0.06

0.06

0.07

0.02

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.11)

(0.03)

(0.01)

0.01

0.02

(0.16)

0.02

1.00

20

RD/Assets

(0.04)

(0.03)

0.01

0.01

0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.03

(0.04)

(0.02)

1.00

21

Market Value to
Book Value
Governance Index

(0.10)

(0.09)

(0.03)

0.09

0.01

0.04

0.22

0.08

0.08

0.07

(0.03)

0.14

(0.21)

(0.10)

0.06

1.00

0.04

0.03

(0.03)

(0.00)

0.01

(0.02)

(0.11)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.01)

(0.16)

0.17

0.05

(0.02)

(0.09)

22

22

Note: Pair-wise correlations for the data set described in Section 5.
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1.00

Table 10. Firm Life.
Panel A
(1) Firm Count
(2) Count survived from previous year
(3) % survived from previous year
(4) Count survived from 1993
(5) % survived from 1993

1993
1,622

1994
1,688
1,589
98.0%
1,589
98.0%

1995
1,778
1,620
96.0%
1,522
93.8%

1996
1,902
1,711
96.2%
1,464
90.3%

1997
1,962
1,762
92.6%
1,340
82.6%

1998
1,996
1,844
94.0%
1,246
76.8%

1999
1,897
1,846
92.5%
1,145
70.6%

2000
1,807
1,742
91.8%
1,053
64.9%

2001
1,764
1,689
93.5%
989
61.0%

2002
1,801
1,717
97.3%
970
59.8%

2003
1,847
1,753
97.3%
949
58.5%

2004
1,789
1,777
96.2%
920
56.7%

2005
1,675
1,671
93.4%
867
53.5%

Note: Rows (2) and (3) show the count and percent, respectively, of firms that survive from one year to the next. Rows (4) and (5) show the count and
percent, respectively, of firms that are in the sample in 1993 that survive throughout the sample period. Note that slightly more than half of the firms
that are in the sample in 1993 are still in the sample in 2005 (i.e., 867 out of 1,622 firms). However, 20 of the 867 firms are not in the sample for all 13
years.

Panel B
(1) Life - N years
(2) Firms w/ N yr life
(3) % of Total
(4) Cumulative %
(5) % w/ Life > N yrs

1
42
1.5%
1.5%
98.5%

2
83
3.0%
4.6%
95.4%

3
215
7.8%
12.4%
87.6%

4
252
9.2%
21.6%
78.4%

5
201
7.3%
28.9%
71.1%

6
185
6.7%
35.6%
64.4%

7
162
5.9%
41.5%
58.5%

8
197
7.2%
48.7%
51.3%

9
160
5.8%
54.5%
45.5%

10
151
5.5%
60.0%
40.0%

11
131
4.8%
64.8%
35.2%

12
120
4.4%
69.2%
30.8%

13
847
30.8%
100.0%
0.0%

Note: Row (1) is the number of years that a firm can be in the 13 year sample. Rows (2) and (3) present the count and percent of total firms,
respectively, of firms by firm life in the sample. Row (4) is the cumulative of row (3). Row (5) is 100% minus row (4). As a point of reference, row
(5) shows that almost two-thirds of the firms (64.4%) are in the sample for at least five years.
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Table 11. CEO Tenure.
(1) Life - N years
(2) CEOs with N yr tenure
(3) % of Total
(4) Cumulative %
(5) % with Life > N yrs

1
831
16.0%
16.0%
84.0%

2
507
9.7%
25.7%
74.3%

3
546
10.5%
36.2%
63.8%

4
431
8.3%
44.4%
55.6%

5
490
9.4%
53.8%
46.2%

6
372
7.1%
61.0%
39.0%

7
304
5.8%
66.8%
33.2%

8
271
5.2%
72.0%
28.0%

9
322
6.2%
78.2%
21.8%

10
212
4.1%
82.3%
17.7%

11
146
2.8%
85.1%
14.9%

12
129
2.5%
87.5%
12.5%

>12
649
12.4%
100.0%
0.0%

Note: Row (1) is CEO tenure as the CEO at a given firm and rows (2) and 3 are the count and percent, respectively, of CEOs by CEO tenure; note that
649 CEOs (12.4%) of the 5,210 CEOs in the sample were CEOs prior to 1993 (1993 is the beginning of the sample period). Row (4) is the cumulative
of row (3). Row (5) is 100% minus row (4).
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Table 12. Average Ratio Stickiness.
Firm-Tenure
As CEO
N years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Elite CEO Status
By Top 10%
By Top 15%
%
%
100.00%
100.00%
98.59%
98.07%
92.40%
96.42%
92.41%
94.38%
92.17%
89.90%
85.98%
83.57%
80.67%
81.48%
85.90%
86.83%
79.63%
88.53%
81.43%
73.64%
69.09%
78.64%
58.33%
72.62%
62.72%
63.92%

Note: CEOs that are Elite CEOs for at least one year using the Average Ratio approach of ranking and
classifying CEOs as Elite with the indicated cutoff. The indicated % is the number of years classified as
Elite using the Average Ratio approach with the indicated cut-off divided by the CEO’s firm-tenure.
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Table 13. Elite CEO Count by Year.

All CEO Count

1993
1,622

1994
1,688

1995
1,778

1996
1,902

1997
1,962

1998
1,996

Elite CEO Count
116
128
145
167
193
201
% Elite
7.2% 7.6% 8.2% 8.8% 9.8% 10.1%
Note: This table presents the count of all CEOs in the sample by year.
CEOs are ranked and classified using the Average Ratio as a proxy for
CEO status for this table and my base case regressions is the top 10%.

1999
1,897

2000
1,807

2001
1,764

2002
1,801

2003
1,847

2004
1,789

2005
1,675

Overall
5,210
197
190
209
217
231
234
226
522
10.4% 10.5% 11.8% 12.0% 12.5% 13.1% 13.5%
10.0%
Also, this table presents the count and percent of total of Elite CEOs by year.
CEO managerial power as described in sub-section 6.2. The cut-off for Elite
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Table 14. Univariate Comparison of Variables' Means and Medians: Elite versus
Non-Elite CEOs.
NonElite
CEOs
Mean

Elite
CEOs

NonElite
CEOs
Median

Elite
CEOs

Variable
Mean
t-test
Median Wilcoxon
CEO Compensation Variables
Salary [$ Thousands]
572
726 0.00***
509
682 0.00***
Bonus[$ Thousands]
612
1,106 0.00***
300
575 0.00***
Equity [$ Thousands]
2,086
5,731 0.00***
572
1,940 0.00***
Other [$ Thousands]
335
756 0.00***
38
85 0.00***
Total Compensation [$ Thousands]
3,606
8,319 0.00***
1,722
4,044 0.00***
CEO Characteristics
CEO Age [Years]
55.5
54.4 0.00***
55.0
55.0 0.00***
CEO Age Squared
3,143
3,015 0.00***
3,025
3,025 0.00***
CEO Firm-Tenure [Years]
6.4
6.2 0.17
4.0
4.0 0.02**
1.61
3.47 0.00***
Average Ratio
1.63
4.18 0.00***
Average CCI
0.27
0.34 0.00***
0.26
0.32 0.00***
Firm Performance Variables
ROA [%]
3.3
3.5 0.67
4.1
4.1 0.74
ROE [%]
6.5
9.8 0.52
12.7
12.8 0.09*
NI 3-Year Growth Rate [%]
27.2
29.2 0.73
15.4
16.8 0.02**
NI 5-Year Growth Rate [%]
20.8
23.7 0.01**
14.0
15.5 0.00***
Shareholder 1-Year Return [%]
20.8
22.8 0.10*
12.4
13.2 0.20
Shareholder 3-Year Return [%]
14.0
15.4 0.02**
11.9
12.8 0.07*
12.1
13.2 0.01***
11.5
12.5 0.03**
Shareholder 5-Year Return [%]
Market Value/Book Value
2.08
2.14 0.31
1.47
1.55 0.00***
Firm Characteristics
Sales [$Millions]
3,866
4,431 0.02**
949
1,211 0.00***
Stock Volatility
0.43
0.47 0.00***
0.37
0.40 0.00***
Liabilities/Assets
0.57
0.59 0.00***
0.57
0.59 0.00***
PPE/Assets
0.29
0.27 0.00***
0.23
0.21 0.00***
RD/Assets
0.01
0.01 0.41
0.00
0.00 0.06*
Governance Index
9.0
9.2 0.00***
9.0
9.2 0.00***
Note: CEOs are ranked and classified using the Average Ratio as a proxy for CEO managerial power as
described in sub-section 6.1. The cut-off for Elite CEO status for this table and my base case regressions is
the top 10%. The t-test compares the respective mean of the two classes and the Wilcoxon test compares
the medians of the two classes.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 15. CEO Compensation Regression Model: Comparison to Extant Models.

Dependent Variable
Log of CEO compensation

Malmendier
and Tate
2005 39

Brick et al 40
2006

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005

Various time
periods 41

Yes3

Yes 42

CEO pay sensitivity
Independent Variables
Firm characteristics
Firm size (log of sales)
Firm size (log of salest-1)
Firm size (market equity)
Firm size (log of net assets)

Pate 2008

Yes 43

Yes 44

Not Significant
Positive

Positive

Positive
Negative
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

Return on Equity

Qt-1
ROAt-1

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002

Yes

Stock Return

ROA

Milbourn
2003

Mixed
Significance
Positive
Not Significant

Not Significant

(Continued next page)

39

Regressions with only CEO award winners.
Brick, Palmon and Wald 2006
41
Ran regressions with both total and cash compensation.
42
Ran regressions with total, equity and non-equity compensation.
43
Three regressions: base salary, equity compensation, and discretionary compensation.
44
For this table I am only comparing my regression with the natural log of CEO total direct compensation for all CEOs.
40
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Table 15 continued.
Malmendier
and Tate 2005
Mean ROAt-1, t-3
Stock returnt-1, t-3
Cash flow risk
Stock volatility
Log (employeest-1)
R&Dt-1/assetst-1
Advertisingt-1/assetst-1
Debtt-1/assetst-1
PP&Et-1/assetst-1
Investmentst-1/assetst-1
Log(1+Firm ROAt-1)
Log(1+Firm Returnt-1)
Log(1+Firm Returnt-2)
Default Risk
Financial Leverage

Brick et al
2006
Not Significant
Positive
Mixed
Significance
Mixed
Significance
Positive
Mixed
Significance
Mixed
Significance
Mixed
Significance
Negative
Mixed
Significance

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002

Pate 2008

Positive

Positive

Not Significant

Not Significant

Negative

Positive
Positive
Positive 45
Negative
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

Growth opportunities

(Continued next page)

45

Milbourn
2003

Statistical Significance depends on level of compensation used in regression.
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Not Significant

Positive

Table 15 continued.
Malmendier
and Tate 2005
CEO characteristics
CEO age

Internal CEO

Excess director total comp.
Proportion of outside
directors
Board Size

Milbourn 2003

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002

Pate 2008

Negative

Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

Not Significant

Mixed
Significance
Negative
Mixed
Significance
Negative

CEO stock ownership [%]
CEO is chairman

Dow Jones Hits
Outsider
Industry adj. firm
performance
Board characteristics
Number of board meetings

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005

Not Significant

CEO gender

CEO reputation (Milbourn)
CEO tenure (experience)

Brick et al
2006

Not Significant

Positive
Positive

Mixed
Significance

Positive

Mixed Sign

Positive

Positive
Positive
Positive 46

Mixed
Significance
Positive
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Mixed Sign,
Mixed
Significance

Governance Index

Not Significant

(Continued next page)

46

Industry adjusted stock price performance for 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years prior with current CEO at the helm. Used only one of these in a given model.
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Table 15 continued
Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Brick et al
2006

Bebchuk and
Grinstein 2005

Milbourn 2003

Ownership Characteristics
Largest stock ownership, nonCEO [%]

Pate 2008

Negative,
Mixed
Significance
Negative,
Mixed
Significance
Negative

Largest stock ownership,
CEO [%]
Compensation committee
ownership [%]
Internal Blockholder > 5%
External Blockholder > 5%
Other independent variables
1 year after award
2 years after award
3 years after award
Firm fixed-effects
Year fixed-effects
SIC (industry) dummies
Regulated industry

Cyert, Kang,
Kumar 2002

Not Significant
Positive, Mixed
Significance
Positive
Positive
Positive
Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Positive 47

Included
Included
Included

Included
Included
Negative,
Mixed
Significance
0.34 to 0.52

0.14 to 0.35
0.46 to 0.80
0.56
0.08
0.39
R2
Data
Time period
1992-2002
1992-2001
1993-2003
1993-1998
1992-1993
1993-2005
1,435
1,500
1,500
1,648
2,746
Number of Firms
594-760 48
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that performed regressions with some
component of CEO compensation as the dependent variable compared to my regression with using the natural log of CEO total direct compensation for
all CEOs in my sample.

47
48

Positive and statistically significant for each year 1994 through 2003.
Without CEO age variable.

172

Table 16. CEO Compensation Regressions, Modified Chow Test.

Dependent Variable
ln of Salary
ln of Bonus
ln of Equity
ln of Other
ln of Total Compensation
(a) Firm Life = 13 years

Average Ratio
Top 10%
Top 20%
***
0.000
0.002**
0.071*
0.109
***
0.000
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.002***
0.000***
0.031**
0.000***

Average CCI
Top 10%
Top 20%
***
0.000
0.001***
0.243
0.346
***
0.000
0.000***
0.000***
0.047**
0.000***
0.010***
0.007***
0.338

Note: This table presents the results of modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is interacted with
all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if Elite CEOs are
compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs; see Equation (1) in section 4.2 for the complete regression
model. The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to rank
and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6). The results indicate that
Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs for all components of compensation except
for bonus compensation. Row (a) is a sensitivity case for the natural log of total compensation with only
the 847 firms that are in the sample all 13 years.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 17. CEO Compensation Regressions, Alternate Modified Chow Test.

Dependent Variable
ln of Salary
ln of Bonus
ln of Equity
ln of Other
ln of Total Compensation
(a) Firm Life = 13 years

Average Ratio
Top 10%
Top 20%
***
0.000
0.001***
0.070*
0.109
***
0.000
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.003***
0.000***
0.040**
0.000***

Average CCI
Top 10%
Top 20%
***
0.000
0.000***
0.262
0.222
***
0.000
0.000***
0.000***
0.043**
0.090*
0.050**
0.043**
0.520

Note: This table presents the results of an alternate modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is
interacted with all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if
Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs; see Equation (1) in section 4.2 for the
complete regression model. However, the alternate modified Chow Test excludes the Elite CEO intercept
from the test. The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to
rank and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6). The results
indicate that Elite CEOs are compensated differently than Non-Elite CEOs for all components of
compensation except for bonus compensation. Row (a) is a sensitivity case and is for the natural log of
total compensation with only the 847 firms that are in the sample all 13 years.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 18. CEO Total Direct Compensation Regressions.
Variable

(1)

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
0.769
0.000
0.000

All

Non-Elite

Elite

Exp.
Sign

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Elite CEO Dummy
ROA
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.007
Pos
Net Income 3-Year
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Growth Rate
Pos
Shareholder 3-Year
0.004***
0.000
0.003***
0.003***
0.003**
Return
Pos
Ln Sales
0.303***
-0.045*
0.309***
0.269***
0.414***
Pos
Stock Volatility
-0.069
0.218
-0.063
-0.133
0.603
Pos
TotalLiabilities/Assets
-0.068
-0.044
-0.050
-0.042
-0.654**
Pos
PPE/Assets
-0.537***
0.405**
-0.462***
-0.505***
-0.217
Pos
RD/Assets
-0.603
0.716
-0.545
-0.767**
1.599
Pos
MarketToBook Ratio
0.022**
0.072***
0.030***
0.029***
0.091***
Pos
CEOAge
0.040***
-0.006
0.043***
0.042***
0.081
Pos
CEOAge2
-0.000***
0.000
-0.000***
-0.000***
-0.001
Pos
CEOTenure
0.007***
0.012*
0.007***
0.007***
0.024**
Pos
Governance Index
0.006
-0.022
0.002
0.004
0.034
Pos
Constant
4.072***
4.000***
4.254***
2.455
Modified Chow Test
0.000***
R-squared
0.406
0.384
0.450
0.268
Observations
12,557
12,557
11,353
1,204
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 19. CEO Equity-Based Compensation Regressions.
Variable

(1)

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-3.712
0.031
0.007**

All

Non-Elite

Elite

Exp.
Sign

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Elite CEO Dummy
ROA
-0.011
-0.009
-0.013
0.064
Pos
Net Income 3-Year
-0.001
0.000
-0.001
0.005
Growth Rate
Pos
Shareholder 3-Year
0.011***
0.000
0.010***
0.011***
-0.003
Return
Pos
Ln Sales
-0.603***
0.000
-0.655***
-0.645***
-0.481
Pos
Stock Volatility
-1.887***
-3.411**
-2.176***
-2.472***
-1.288
Pos
TotalLiabilities/Assets
2.708***
-0.611
2.692***
2.805***
0.397
Pos
PPE/Assets
-0.180
1.853
0.017
-0.303
1.609
Pos
RD/Assets
-2.788
4.230
-2.658
-2.800
0.247
Pos
MarketToBook Ratio
0.028
0.042
0.031
0.011
0.235
Pos
CEOAge
-0.048
0.195
-0.034
-0.074
0.472
Pos
2
CEOAge
0.000
-0.001
0.000
0.000
-0.004
Pos
CEOTenure
0.025**
-0.070*
0.020
0.029**
-0.024
Pos
Governance Index
-0.056
0.081
-0.044
-0.050
0.164
Pos
Constant
9.552***
9.425***
10.796***
-7.378
Modified Chow Test
0.000***
R-squared
0.095
0.094
0.100
0.008
Observations
12,557
12,557
11,353
1,204
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 20. CEO Other Compensation Regressions.
Variable

(1)

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-2.681
-0.001
0.002

All

Non-Elite

Elite

Exp.
Sign

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Elite CEO Dummy
ROA
-0.005
-0.005
-0.005
-0.014
Pos
Net Income 3-Year
-0.001
0.000
-0.001
0.001
Growth Rate
Pos
Shareholder 3-Year
0.004***
0.000
0.005***
0.003**
0.012***
Return
Pos
Ln Sales
0.535***
0.000
0.537***
0.521***
0.918***
Pos
Stock Volatility
-0.922***
-0.324
-1.018***
-0.961***
-0.383
Pos
TotalLiabilities/Assets
0.005
2.164***
0.339
-0.005
2.236***
Pos
PPE/Assets
-1.777***
1.488**
-1.524***
-1.651***
-0.710
Pos
RD/Assets
0.007
6.463
0.376
-0.421
4.481
Pos
MarketToBook Ratio
-0.031
-0.033
-0.035
-0.032
-0.109
Pos
CEOAge
0.219***
0.017
0.224***
0.231***
0.095
Pos
2
CEOAge
-0.002***
0.000
-0.002***
-0.002***
-0.001
Pos
CEOTenure
-0.001
0.016
0.000
-0.001
0.010
Pos
Governance Index
0.013
-0.026
0.014
0.029
-0.128
Pos
Constant
-6.428***
-6.848***
-6.833***
-5.54
Modified Chow Test
0.000***
R-squared
0.146
0.153
0.146
0.141
Observations
12,557
12,557
11,353
1,204
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 21. CEO Salary Compensation Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
2.06
0.017**
0.001

All

Non-Elite

Elite

Exp.
Sign

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO Dummy
ROA
-0.005
-0.003
-0.006*
0.003
Pos
Net Income 3-Year
0.000
0.000
0.000*
0.001
Growth Rate
Pos
Shareholder 3-Year
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
-0.002
Return
Pos
Ln Sales
0.244***
-0.068**
0.233***
0.238***
0.128
Pos
Stock Volatility
-0.587***
-0.514*
-0.618***
-0.502***
-2.277***
Pos
TotalLiabilities/Assets
-0.101
0.565***
-0.006
-0.121
-0.207
Pos
PPE/Assets
0.032
-0.172
0.035
0.042
-0.657
Pos
RD/Assets
-0.172
0.079
-0.204
-0.279
0.409
Pos
MarketToBook Ratio
-0.029***
0.022
-0.027***
-0.025**
-0.026
Pos
CEOAge
0
-0.075
0.013
0.016
-0.039
Pos
CEOAge2
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
Pos
CEOTenure
0.011***
-0.019**
0.010***
0.012***
-0.011
Pos
Governance Index
0.003
0.031*
0.006
0.003
0.071
Pos
Constant
4.343***
4.461***
4.402***
7.011***
Modified Chow Test
0.004***
R-squared
0.078
0.079
0.091
0.023
Observations
12,557
12,557
11,353
1,204
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 22. CEO Bonus Compensation Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-3.712
0.031
0.007**

All

Non-Elite

Elite

Exp.
Sign

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO Dummy
ROA
-0.011
-0.009
-0.013
0.064
Pos
Net Income 3-Year
-0.001
0.000
-0.001
0.005
Growth Rate
Pos
Shareholder 3-Year
0.011***
0.000
0.010***
0.011***
-0.003
Return
Pos
Ln Sales
-0.603***
0.000
-0.655***
-0.645***
-0.481
Pos
Stock Volatility
-1.887***
-3.411**
-2.176***
-2.472***
-1.288
Pos
TotalLiabilities/Assets
2.708***
-0.611
2.692***
2.805***
0.397
Pos
PPE/Assets
-0.180
1.853
0.017
-0.303
1.609
Pos
RD/Assets
-2.788
4.230
-2.658
-2.800
0.247
Pos
MarketToBook Ratio
0.028
0.042
0.031
0.011
0.235
Pos
CEOAge
-0.048
0.195
-0.034
-0.074
0.472
Pos
CEOAge2
0.000
-0.001
0.000
0.000
-0.004
Pos
CEOTenure
0.025**
-0.070*
0.020
0.029**
-0.024
Pos
Governance Index
-0.056
0.081
-0.044
-0.050
0.164
Pos
Constant
9.552***
9.425***
10.796*** -7.378
Modified Chow Test
0.109
R-squared
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.006
Observations
12,557
12,557
11,353
1,204
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

179

Table 23. Firm Performance Regression Model: Comparison to Extant Models.
Mehran
1995
Dependent Variable
Tobin’s Q
Return on Assets
1-year excess returns
Firm Performance
Independent Variables
Firm characteristics
Firm size (log of tot
assets)
Firm size (log of sales)
Firm size (log of salest1)
R&D/Sales
(Inv+PP&E)/total
assets
LT debt/ total assets
Qt-1
ROAt-1
Mean ROAt-1, t-3
Stock returnt-1, t-3
Cash flow risk
Stock volatility
Log (employeest-1)
R&Dt-1/assetst-1

Included
Included

Malmendier
and Tate
2005

Brick et al
2006

Various
periods

Daines et al
2005

Pate 2008

Included
Included 49

Included 50
8 Measures

Negative
Negative 51

Negative
Not reported
Positive
Not
significant
Not
significant

Positive 52

Positive

Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported
Not reported

Advertisingt-1/assetst-1
Debtt-1/assetst-1
PP&Et-1/assetst-1

Not reported
Not reported
Not reported

Investmentst-1/assetst-1
Market to Book Ratio

Not reported

Positive 53
Not
significant

Not
significant 54
Negative 55

(Continued next page)

49

One-factor model and Fama-French three-factor model.
Fama-French four-factor model.
51
Statistically significant and negative for 6 of 7 cases that have log of sales as a control variable.
52
Statistically significant and positive for 7 of 8 cases.
53
Statistically significant and positive for 4 of 7 cases that have Black-Scholes stock volatility as a control
variable.
54
Not significant for 5 of 8 cases. Statistically significant and positive for 3 of 8 cases.
55
Statistically significant and negative for 5 of 7 cases that have market to book ratio as a control variable.
50
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Table 23 continued.
Mehran
1995
CEO characteristics
CEO age
CEO age2
CEO tenure
(experience)
CEO gender
CEO’s equity-based
comp [% of total comp]
% equity owned by
CEO
CEO is chairman

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Not reported

Daines et
al15
2005

Pate 2008

Mixed 56
Mixed
Not
significant

Not reported
Positive
Positive

Mixed
significance
Not
significant
Mixed
significance
Negative 57

Internal CEO
Log (CEO’s total
comp.)
Log (CEO salary)
Log (CEO bonus)
Log (CEO equity)
Log (CEO Other)
Board characteristics
% shares held by
outside directors
Outside directors [% of
board]
Number of board
meetings
Excess director total
comp.
Log (director’s total
comp.)
Governance Index

Brick et al14
2006

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Positive
Negative
Not
significant

(Continued next page)

56

Mixed significance depending upon the dependent variable.
Mixed significance depending upon which model is used (pooled versus fixed-effects, one-factor versus
Fama-French three-factor model).
57
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Table 23 continued.
Mehran
1995

Malmendier
and Tate 2005

Brick et al14
2006

Daines et al15
2005

Pate 2008

Other independent
variables
1 year after award
Negative
2 years after award
Negative
3 years after award
Negative
Firm fixed-effects
Included
Year fixed-effects
Included
Included
SIC (industry)
Included
dummies
Prior good
Mixed
performance for
significance 58
highly paid CEOs
Prior bad
Mixed
performance for
significance
highly paid CEOs
Highly paid CEO
Mixed
dummy
significance
Prior good
Mixed
performance
significance
Prior bad
Mixed
performance
significance
Data
R2
0.03-0.43
0.12-0.17
0.01-0.10
0.01-0.30
0.01-.12
Time period
1979-1980
1992-2002
1992-2001
1992-2001
1993-2005
Number of firms
153
608-775
1193-1336
2,284
2,710
Note: This table lists the variables and presents the sign and significance of the results of prior research that
performed regressions with some measure of firm performance as the dependent variable.

58

Mixed significance depending upon how they broke out the regressions: i.e., by firm size, by
management constraints, by level of incentive pay, and by whether or not there is a 5% blockholder.
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Table 24. Firm Performance Regressions, Modified Chow Test.

Dependent Variable
Return on Assets
Return on Equity
Shareholder 1-Year Return
Market to Book Ratio
Net Income 3-Year Growth Rate
Shareholder 3-Year Return
Net Income 5-Year Growth Rate
Shareholder 5-Year Return

Average Ratio
Top 10%
0.000***
0.992
0.000***
0.000***
0.002***
0.000***
0.000***
0.001***

Average CCI
Top 10%
0.000***
0.928
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.008***
0.000***
0.005***

Note: This table presents the results of modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is interacted with
all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if Elite CEOs’ firms
perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; see Equation (3) in section 4.4 for the complete regression
model. The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to rank
and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6). The results indicate that
Elite CEOs’ firms do perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms for all measures of firm performance
except for return on equity.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 25. Firm Performance Regressions, Alternate Modified Chow Test.

Dependent Variable
Return on Assets
Return on Equity
Shareholder 1-Year Return
Market to Book Ratio
Net Income 3-Year Growth Rate
Shareholder 3-Year Return
Net Income 5-Year Growth Rate
Shareholder 5-Year Return

Average Ratio
Top 10%
0.000***
0.992
0.000***
0.000***
0.002***
0.000***
0.000***
0.002***

Average CCI
Top 10%
0.000***
0.931
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.007***
0.000***
0.005***

Note: This table presents the results of the alternate modified Chow Test (the Elite CEO dummy term is
interacted with all explanatory variables except not with the year and industry dummies) to determine if
Elite CEOs’ firms perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms; see Equation (3) in section 4.4 for the
complete regression model. However, the alternate modified Chow Test excludes the Elite CEO intercept
from the test. The Average Ratio and Average CCI are proxies for CEO managerial power and are used to
rank and classify CEO elite status (these proxies are more fully described in Section 6). The results
indicate that Elite CEOs’ firms do perform differently than Non-Elite CEOs’ firms for all measures of firm
performance except for return on equity.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 26. Shareholder 5-Year Return Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
26.180
0.824
-1.971
-1.094
1.680
-1.627
-0.645***
0.163
0.104
0.167**
-0.199
-1.418*
0.015*
-0.016

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO dummy
lnSales
-13.733***
-13.623*** -14.154*** -12.662***
NS
Stock Volatility
12.742***
12.851***
10.742***
14.975***
NS
TotalLiabilities/Assets 32.053***
32.006***
32.334***
24.644***
NS
PPE/Assets
12.537***
12.908***
11.824***
22.211***
NS
RD/Assets
-1.776
-1.719
-3.674
-3.865
NS
MarketToBook Ratio
-1.002***
-1.068***
-0.989***
-1.425***
NS
lnSalary
0.433**
0.511***
0.340*
0.886***
NS
lnBonus
-0.444***
-0.434***
-0.446***
-0.213**
NS
lnEquity
-0.142***
-0.120***
-0.154***
0.009
NS
lnOther
-0.041
-0.049
-0.009
-0.563***
NS
CEO Age
0.715**
0.625**
0.598*
1.588
Pos
CEO Age2
-0.006**
-0.005**
-0.005*
-0.013
Pos
CEO Tenure
0.028
0.029
0.038
0.086
Pos
Average Ratio
0.598**
1.908***
-1.169
Pos
Governance Index
-0.703***
0.052
-0.739***
-0.865***
-0.231
Neg
Constant
69.063***
68.479***
74.600***
32.639
Modified Chow Test
0.001***
R-squared
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
10,557
10,557
9,147
1,410
Observations
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 27. Shareholder 3-Year Return Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-48.876
-1.057
8.162*
5.302
1.768
69.310**
-1.016***
0.013
0.274**
-0.081
-0.064
1.573
-0.012
-0.044

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO dummy
lnSales
-18.839***
-19.107*** -18.782*** -25.802***
NS
Stock Volatility
18.735***
19.263***
18.397***
31.892***
NS
TotalLiabilities/Assets 43.534***
44.788***
42.079***
46.434***
NS
PPE/Assets
23.666***
24.555***
24.250***
18.804
NS
RD/Assets
6.955
11.403
5.584
33.729
NS
MarketToBook Ratio
-1.369***
-1.470***
-1.359***
-2.351***
NS
lnSalary
0.632***
0.645***
0.486**
1.096**
NS
lnBonus
-0.366***
-0.329***
-0.370***
-0.209
NS
lnEquity
-0.203***
-0.211***
-0.216***
-0.171
NS
lnOther
-0.092
-0.093
-0.058
-0.451*
NS
CEO Age
0.409
0.561
0.399
3.764**
Pos
CEO Age2
-0.004
-0.005
-0.004
-0.031**
Pos
CEO Tenure
0.055
0.049
0.094
0.128
Pos
Average Ratio
0.611**
2.420***
0.431
Pos
Governance Index
-0.319
0.166
-0.305
-0.406
0.348
Neg
Constant
91.529***
85.927***
89.649***
45.220
Modified Chow Test
0.000***
R-squared
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
14,900
14,900
13,008
1,892
Observations
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 28. Shareholder 1-Year Return Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-57.451
-2.795*
-16.905**
12.423*
-2.451
3.354
-2.325***
-0.390
0.618**
-0.793***
0.252
2.969
-0.023
-0.540

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO dummy
lnSales
-29.689***
-30.269*** -29.597*** -39.807***
NS
Stock Volatility
5.286
2.008
0.551
-37.996***
NS
TotalLiabilities/Assets 57.802***
60.945***
56.424***
69.972***
NS
PPE/Assets
45.134***
45.362***
51.404***
-3.459
NS
RD/Assets
27.894
26.337
28.985
-233.006*
NS
MarketToBook Ratio
-0.911***
-1.001***
-0.993***
-3.973***
NS
lnSalary
0.690
0.594
0.623
0.625
NS
lnBonus
-0.136
-0.061
-0.143
0.231
NS
lnEquity
-0.085
-0.180**
-0.103
-0.754***
NS
lnOther
0.008
0.035
0.029
-0.276
NS
CEO Age
1.777**
2.013**
1.896**
4.277
Pos
CEO Age2
-0.016**
-0.018**
-0.017**
-0.030
Pos
CEO Tenure
0.031
-0.009
0.035
-0.669
Pos
Average Ratio
0.564
1.979
-1.996
Pos
Governance Index
0.788
-0.041
0.889
0.711
2.594
Neg
Constant
93.144***
88.215***
87.765***
142.629
Modified Chow Test
0.000***
R-squared
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
19,990
19,990
17,547
2,443
Observations
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 29. Market to Book Ratio Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-5.352*
0.155
0.304
-0.193
-1.030***
0.168
-0.002
0.006

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO dummy
TotalLiabilities/Assets 0.192
0.173
0.313**
-0.276
NS
PPE/Assets
0.784***
0.788***
1.142***
-1.036*
NS
RD/Assets
2.180**
2.080**
2.064**
1.578
NS
NI/Assets
1.597***
1.318***
1.671***
0.384***
NS
CEO Age
-0.158***
-0.146***
-0.152***
-0.220**
Pos
0.001***
0.001***
0.001***
0.002*
Pos
CEO Age2
CEO Tenure
-0.004
-0.004
-0.005
0.029
Pos
Average Ratio
-0.101***
-0.110**
-0.352***
Pos
Governance Index
0.005
0.052
0.008
0.011
0.05
Neg
Constant
6.557***
6.400***
6.281***
10.805***
Modified Chow Test
0.001***
R-squared
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
Observations
22,856
22,856
20,506
2,350
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 30. Net Income 5-Year Growth Rate Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-6.282
-0.541
21.693***
-7.278
-19.929***
29.686
-1.856***
0.030
-0.069
-0.280**
-0.047
0.516
-0.003
0.308*

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO dummy
lnSales
-16.937***
-17.188*** -18.264*** -12.748***
NS
Stock Volatility
4.857
6.933**
4.319
32.611**
NS
TotalLiabilities/Assets 30.033***
28.733***
28.233***
36.371***
NS
PPE/Assets
6.807
4.334
6.623
-23.299
NS
RD/Assets
-7.397
-6.883
-7.495
21.224
NS
MarketToBook Ratio
-0.495***
-0.646***
-0.478***
-2.328***
NS
lnSalary
0.217
0.211
0.266
0.441
Pos
lnBonus
-0.712***
-0.719***
-0.672***
-1.007***
Pos
lnEquity
-0.115**
-0.156***
-0.117**
-0.399**
Pos
lnOther
-0.086
-0.095
-0.032
-0.379
Pos
CEO Age
0.765
0.867*
0.790
1.219
Pos
CEO Age2
-0.008
-0.008*
-0.008*
-0.011
Pos
CEO Tenure
0.023
0.058
0.051
0.318
Pos
Average Ratio
0.374
1.083
-2.721
Pos
Governance Index
-0.764**
-0.362
-0.797**
-0.791**
-1.650
Neg
Constant
102.819***
101.756*** 109.683*** 81.361
Modified Chow Test
0.000***
R-squared
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.06
6,239
6,239
5,458
781
Observations
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 31. Net Income 3-Year Growth Rate Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
130.293
-0.373
11.962
11.162
-16.932
-1.745
-2.703***
-1.469
-0.194
-0.636**
1.051**
-4.054
0.035
0.575*

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO dummy
lnSales
-24.722***
-24.817*** -26.084*** -29.016***
NS
Stock Volatility
12.094*
13.989**
8.804
42.649
NS
TotalLiabilities/Assets 51.663***
53.190***
47.910***
95.892***
NS
PPE/Assets
13.623*
11.641
13.805
-17.597
NS
RD/Assets
-26.729
-27.808
-27.568
-126.887
NS
MarketToBook Ratio
-0.967***
-1.201***
-0.906***
-4.295***
NS
lnSalary
0.417
0.099
0.518
-1.196
Pos
lnBonus
-1.500***
-1.516***
-1.463***
-1.611***
Pos
lnEquity
-0.070
-0.146*
-0.071
-0.534*
Pos
lnOther
-0.385**
-0.257
-0.344*
0.668
Pos
CEO Age
2.573***
2.344**
2.874***
-2.317
Pos
CEO Age2
-0.024***
-0.022***
-0.027***
0.023
Pos
CEO Tenure
0.040
0.123
0.081
0.514
Pos
Average Ratio
0.226
2.204
-17.803**
Pos
Governance Index
-0.555
-0.747
-0.697
-0.771
-0.243
Neg
Constant
114.013***
123.339*** 115.897*** 299.092**
Modified Chow Test
0.002***
R-squared
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
9,955
9,955
8,758
1,197
Observations
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 32. Return on Assets Regressions.
Variable

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
-15.879
-0.385
-8.961***
37.016***
0.206
-17.004
0.933***
-0.162
0.104
-0.078
-0.058
-0.023
0.001
-0.144

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Elite CEO dummy
lnSales
-1.471***
-1.724***
-1.735***
-3.497**
NS
Stock Volatility
-3.949***
-6.618***
-3.846***
-26.646***
NS
TotalLiabilities/Assets 18.288***
25.489***
13.443***
97.550***
NS
PPE/Assets
-0.580
-0.898
1.481
-34.024***
NS
RD/Assets
10.283
7.694
3.171
-22.901
NS
MarketToBook Ratio
0.419***
0.486***
0.464***
1.449***
NS
lnSalary
-0.295**
-0.266**
-0.328**
-0.207
Pos
lnBonus
0.271***
0.294***
0.261***
0.252**
Pos
lnEquity
0.024
0.005
0.023
-0.150
Pos
lnOther
0.090*
0.077*
0.045
0.040
Pos
CEO Age
0.095
0.078
0.210
-1.100
Pos
CEO Age2
0.000
0.000
-0.002
0.011
Pos
CEO Tenure
-0.005
-0.006
0.014
-0.183
Pos
Average Ratio
0.206
1.216***
-2.405**
Pos
Governance Index
-0.199
-0.256
-0.162
-0.144
-0.093
Neg
Constant
4.796
3.048
2.950
32.354
Modified Chow Test
0.000***
R-squared
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.04
20,124
20,124
17,669
2,455
Observations
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table 33. Return on Equity Regressions.
Variable

(1)

Elite CEO
Interaction
Terms
(2)
31.499
0.735
-1.282
77.850**
6.049
6.163
0.807
1.080
0.802
-0.672
-0.456
-2.626
0.025
-0.605

All

Non-Elite

Elite

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Elite CEO dummy
lnSales
3.082
2.807
4.971*
-6.180*
NS
Stock Volatility
0.516
0.687
7.935
-9.723
NS
TotalLiabilities/Assets -66.120***
-55.510*** -75.130*** 34.546**
NS
PPE/Assets
5.058
6.971
13.970
-78.400**
NS
RD/Assets
-52.355
-54.276
-54.836
-3.467
NS
MarketToBook Ratio
0.854*
0.968*
0.983*
2.279**
NS
lnSalary
-1.016
-0.534
-1.330
-0.857
Pos
lnBonus
0.620*
0.716*
0.564*
1.207***
Pos
lnEquity
1.197***
1.097***
1.178***
0.419*
Pos
lnOther
-0.261
-0.346
-0.241
-0.678*
Pos
CEO Age
3.945*
3.650*
4.507*
-1.450
Pos
-0.035*
-0.033*
-0.040*
0.017
Pos
CEO Age2
CEO Tenure
-0.021
-0.030
0.126
-0.769*
Pos
Average Ratio
3.663*
13.720**
0.173
Pos
Governance Index
1.943
-1.262
1.952
2.471*
0.272
Neg
Constant
-130.194*
-136.227*
-149.226*
86.060
Modified Chow Test
0.992
R-squared
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
19,707
19,707
17,310
2,397
Observations
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are the results from one regression with coefficients on the independent
variables presented in column (1) and the coefficients on the Elite CEO dummy and interaction terms are
presented in column (2). The results in column (2) explain the story of how Elites CEOs are compensated
differently than the Non-Elite CEOs. Columns (3), (4), and (5) present the results of three regressions
(without the Elite CEO dummy or the interaction terms) for All CEOs, Non-Elite CEOs, and Elite CEOs,
respectively; and are included as a frame of reference. Column (6) is the expected sign of the coefficients
for all columns except column (2). I use firm fixed-effects, year dummies, and industry dummies in all
regressions.
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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